+2012-05-29 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+
+ * NEWS:
+ Update for sudo 1.8.5p2
+ [d369d4d40a19]
+
+2012-05-27 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+
+ * src/env_hooks.c, src/sudo.h, src/tgetpass.c:
+ Provide unhooked version of getenv() and use it when looking up
+ DISPLAY and SUDO_ASKPASS in the environment.
+ [04dbdccf4a14]
+
+2012-05-21 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+
+ * plugins/sudoers/set_perms.c, plugins/sudoers/sudoers.c:
+ If sudoers_mode is group-readable but the actual sudoers file is
+ not, open the file as uid 0, not uid 1. This fixes a problem when
+ sudoers has a more restrictive mode than what sudo expects to find.
+ In older versions, sudo would silently chmod the file to add the
+ group-readable bit.
+ [c056b6003e6f]
+
+2012-05-17 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+
+ * NEWS, configure, configure.in:
+ Update for 1.8.5p1
+ [c33c49bf5b4b]
+
+ * plugins/sudoers/toke.c, plugins/sudoers/toke.l:
+ Fix #includedir; from Mike Frysinger
+ [d4833d4e39a0]
+
+ * plugins/sudoers/check.c:
+ Don't prompt for a password if the user is in the exempt group, is
+ root, or is running the command as themselves even if the -k option
+ was specified. This makes "sudo -k command" consistent with the
+ behavior one would get if the user ran "sudo -k" immediately before
+ running the command.
+ [632b3961df00]
+
2012-05-15 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
* INSTALL:
+What's new in Sudo 1.8.5p2?
+
+ * Fixed use of the SUDO_ASKPASS environment variable which was
+ broken in Sudo 1.8.5.
+
+ * Fixed a problem reading the sudoers file when the file mode is
+ more restrictive than the expected mode. For example, when the
+ expected sudoers file mode is 0440 but the actual mode is 0400.
+
+What's new in Sudo 1.8.5p1?
+
+ * Fixed a bug that prevented files in an include directory from
+ being evaluated.
+
What's new in Sudo 1.8.5?
* When "noexec" is enabled, sudo_noexec.so will now be prepended
#! /bin/sh
# Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles.
-# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.68 for sudo 1.8.5.
+# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.68 for sudo 1.8.5p2.
#
# Report bugs to <http://www.sudo.ws/bugs/>.
#
# Identity of this package.
PACKAGE_NAME='sudo'
PACKAGE_TARNAME='sudo'
-PACKAGE_VERSION='1.8.5'
-PACKAGE_STRING='sudo 1.8.5'
+PACKAGE_VERSION='1.8.5p2'
+PACKAGE_STRING='sudo 1.8.5p2'
PACKAGE_BUGREPORT='http://www.sudo.ws/bugs/'
PACKAGE_URL=''
# Omit some internal or obsolete options to make the list less imposing.
# This message is too long to be a string in the A/UX 3.1 sh.
cat <<_ACEOF
-\`configure' configures sudo 1.8.5 to adapt to many kinds of systems.
+\`configure' configures sudo 1.8.5p2 to adapt to many kinds of systems.
Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [VAR=VALUE]...
if test -n "$ac_init_help"; then
case $ac_init_help in
- short | recursive ) echo "Configuration of sudo 1.8.5:";;
+ short | recursive ) echo "Configuration of sudo 1.8.5p2:";;
esac
cat <<\_ACEOF
test -n "$ac_init_help" && exit $ac_status
if $ac_init_version; then
cat <<\_ACEOF
-sudo configure 1.8.5
+sudo configure 1.8.5p2
generated by GNU Autoconf 2.68
Copyright (C) 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file contains any messages produced by compilers while
running configure, to aid debugging if configure makes a mistake.
-It was created by sudo $as_me 1.8.5, which was
+It was created by sudo $as_me 1.8.5p2, which was
generated by GNU Autoconf 2.68. Invocation command line was
$ $0 $@
# report actual input values of CONFIG_FILES etc. instead of their
# values after options handling.
ac_log="
-This file was extended by sudo $as_me 1.8.5, which was
+This file was extended by sudo $as_me 1.8.5p2, which was
generated by GNU Autoconf 2.68. Invocation command line was
CONFIG_FILES = $CONFIG_FILES
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
ac_cs_config="`$as_echo "$ac_configure_args" | sed 's/^ //; s/[\\""\`\$]/\\\\&/g'`"
ac_cs_version="\\
-sudo config.status 1.8.5
+sudo config.status 1.8.5p2
configured by $0, generated by GNU Autoconf 2.68,
with options \\"\$ac_cs_config\\"
dnl
dnl Copyright (c) 1994-1996,1998-2012 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
dnl
-AC_INIT([sudo], [1.8.5], [http://www.sudo.ws/bugs/], [sudo])
+AC_INIT([sudo], [1.8.5p2], [http://www.sudo.ws/bugs/], [sudo])
AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h pathnames.h])
dnl
dnl Note: this must come after AC_INIT
* we use a non-zero uid in order to avoid NFS lossage.
* Using uid 1 is a bit bogus but should work on all OS's.
*/
- if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & 040))
+ if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & S_IRGRP))
state->euid = 1;
else
state->euid = sudoers_uid;
* we use a non-zero uid in order to avoid NFS lossage.
* Using uid 1 is a bit bogus but should work on all OS's.
*/
- if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & 040))
+ if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & S_IRGRP))
state->euid = 1;
else
state->euid = sudoers_uid;
* we use a non-zero uid in order to avoid NFS lossage.
* Using uid 1 is a bit bogus but should work on all OS's.
*/
- if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & 040))
+ if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & S_IRGRP))
state->euid = 1;
else
state->euid = sudoers_uid;
* we use a non-zero uid in order to avoid NFS lossage.
* Using uid 1 is a bit bogus but should work on all OS's.
*/
- if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & 040))
+ if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & S_IRGRP))
state->euid = 1;
else
state->euid = sudoers_uid;
switch (sudo_secure_file(sudoers, sudoers_uid, sudoers_gid, &sb)) {
case SUDO_PATH_SECURE:
+ /*
+ * If we are expecting sudoers to be group readable but
+ * it is not, we must open the file as root, not uid 1.
+ */
+ if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & S_IRGRP)) {
+ if ((sb.st_mode & S_IRGRP) == 0) {
+ restore_perms();
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Open sudoers and make sure we can read it so we can present
+ * the user with a reasonable error message (unlike the lexer).
+ */
if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL) {
log_error(USE_ERRNO, _("unable to open %s"), sudoers);
} else {
- /*
- * Make sure we can actually read sudoers so we can present the
- * user with a reasonable error message (unlike the lexer).
- */
if (sb.st_size != 0 && fgetc(fp) == EOF) {
log_error(USE_ERRNO, _("unable to read %s"),
sudoers);
if (isdir) {
struct stat sb;
switch (sudo_secure_dir(path, sudoers_uid, sudoers_gid, &sb)) {
+ case SUDO_PATH_SECURE:
+ break;
case SUDO_PATH_MISSING:
debug_return_bool(false);
case SUDO_PATH_BAD_TYPE:
if (isdir) {
struct stat sb;
switch (sudo_secure_dir(path, sudoers_uid, sudoers_gid, &sb)) {
+ case SUDO_PATH_SECURE:
+ break;
case SUDO_PATH_MISSING:
debug_return_bool(false);
case SUDO_PATH_BAD_TYPE:
typedef char * (*sudo_fn_getenv_t)(const char *);
+char *
+getenv_unhooked(const char *name)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_DLOPEN) && defined(RTLD_NEXT)
+ sudo_fn_getenv_t fn;
+
+ fn = (sudo_fn_getenv_t)dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "getenv");
+ if (fn != NULL)
+ return fn(name);
+#endif /* HAVE_DLOPEN && RTLD_NEXT */
+ return rpl_getenv(name);
+}
+
char *
getenv(const char *name)
{
return val;
case SUDO_HOOK_RET_ERROR:
return NULL;
- default: {
-#if defined(HAVE_DLOPEN) && defined(RTLD_NEXT)
- sudo_fn_getenv_t fn;
-
- fn = (sudo_fn_getenv_t)dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "getenv");
- if (fn != NULL)
- return fn(name);
-#endif /* HAVE_DLOPEN && RTLD_NEXT */
- return rpl_getenv(name);
- }
+ default:
+ return getenv_unhooked(name);
}
}
typedef int (*sudo_fn_putenv_t)(PUTENV_CONST char *);
+static int
+putenv_unhooked(PUTENV_CONST char *string)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_DLOPEN) && defined(RTLD_NEXT)
+ sudo_fn_putenv_t fn;
+
+ fn = (sudo_fn_putenv_t)dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "putenv");
+ if (fn != NULL)
+ return fn(string);
+#endif /* HAVE_DLOPEN && RTLD_NEXT */
+ return rpl_putenv(string);
+}
+
int
putenv(PUTENV_CONST char *string)
{
return 0;
case SUDO_HOOK_RET_ERROR:
return -1;
- default: {
-#if defined(HAVE_DLOPEN) && defined(RTLD_NEXT)
- sudo_fn_putenv_t fn;
-
- fn = (sudo_fn_putenv_t)dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "putenv");
- if (fn != NULL)
- return fn(string);
-#endif /* HAVE_DLOPEN && RTLD_NEXT */
- return rpl_putenv(string);
- }
+ default:
+ return putenv_unhooked(string);
}
}
typedef int (*sudo_fn_setenv_t)(const char *, const char *, int);
+static int
+setenv_unhooked(const char *var, const char *val, int overwrite)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SETENV) && defined(HAVE_DLOPEN) && defined(RTLD_NEXT)
+ sudo_fn_setenv_t fn;
+
+ fn = (sudo_fn_setenv_t)dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "setenv");
+ if (fn != NULL)
+ return fn(var, val, overwrite);
+#endif /* HAVE_SETENV && HAVE_DLOPEN && RTLD_NEXT */
+ return rpl_setenv(var, val, overwrite);
+}
+
int
setenv(const char *var, const char *val, int overwrite)
{
return 0;
case SUDO_HOOK_RET_ERROR:
return -1;
- default: {
-#if defined(HAVE_SETENV) && defined(HAVE_DLOPEN) && defined(RTLD_NEXT)
- sudo_fn_setenv_t fn;
-
- fn = (sudo_fn_setenv_t)dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "setenv");
- if (fn != NULL)
- return fn(var, val, overwrite);
-#endif /* HAVE_SETENV && HAVE_DLOPEN && RTLD_NEXT */
- return rpl_setenv(var, val, overwrite);
- }
+ default:
+ return setenv_unhooked(var, val, overwrite);
}
}
-#ifdef UNSETENV_VOID
-static void
-#else
-int
-#endif
+static int
rpl_unsetenv(const char *var)
{
char **ep = environ;
if (var == NULL || *var == '\0' || strchr(var, '=') != NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
-#ifdef UNSETENV_VOID
- return;
-#else
return -1;
-#endif
}
len = strlen(var);
ep++;
}
}
-#ifndef UNSETENV_VOID
return 0;
-#endif
}
#ifdef UNSETENV_VOID
typedef int (*sudo_fn_unsetenv_t)(const char *);
#endif
-#ifdef UNSETENV_VOID
-void
-unsetenv(const char *var)
+static int
+unsetenv_unhooked(const char *var)
{
- switch (process_hooks_unsetenv(var)) {
- case SUDO_HOOK_RET_STOP:
- return 0;
- case SUDO_HOOK_RET_ERROR:
- return -1;
- default: {
+ int rval = 0;
#if defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) && defined(HAVE_DLOPEN) && defined(RTLD_NEXT)
- sudo_fn_unsetenv_t fn;
-
- fn = (sudo_fn_unsetenv_t)dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "unsetenv");
- if (fn != NULL)
- fn(var);
- else
+ sudo_fn_unsetenv_t fn;
+
+ fn = (sudo_fn_unsetenv_t)dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "unsetenv");
+ if (fn != NULL) {
+# ifdef UNSETENV_VOID
+ fn(var);
+# else
+ rval = fn(var);
+# endif
+ } else
#endif /* HAVE_UNSETENV && HAVE_DLOPEN && RTLD_NEXT */
- rpl_unsetenv(var);
- }
+ {
+ rval = rpl_unsetenv(var);
}
+ return rval;
}
+
+#ifdef UNSETENV_VOID
+void
#else
int
+#endif
unsetenv(const char *var)
{
+ int rval;
+
switch (process_hooks_unsetenv(var)) {
case SUDO_HOOK_RET_STOP:
- return 0;
+ rval = 0;
+ break;
case SUDO_HOOK_RET_ERROR:
- return -1;
- default: {
-#if defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) && defined(HAVE_DLOPEN) && defined(RTLD_NEXT)
- sudo_fn_unsetenv_t fn;
-
- fn = (sudo_fn_unsetenv_t)dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "unsetenv");
- if (fn != NULL)
- return fn(var);
-#endif /* HAVE_UNSETENV && HAVE_DLOPEN && RTLD_NEXT */
- return rpl_unsetenv(var);
- }
+ rval = -1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ rval = unsetenv_unhooked(var);
+ break;
}
+#ifndef UNSETENV_VOID
+ return rval;
+#endif
}
-#endif /* UNSETENV_VOID */
int process_hooks_putenv(char *string);
int process_hooks_unsetenv(const char *name);
+/* env_hooks.c */
+char *getenv_unhooked(const char *name);
+
/* interfaces.c */
int get_net_ifs(char **addrinfo);
(void) fflush(stdout);
if (askpass == NULL) {
- askpass = getenv("SUDO_ASKPASS");
+ askpass = getenv_unhooked("SUDO_ASKPASS");
if (askpass == NULL || *askpass == '\0')
askpass = sudo_conf_askpass_path();
}
/* If no tty present and we need to disable echo, try askpass. */
if (!ISSET(flags, TGP_STDIN|TGP_ECHO|TGP_ASKPASS|TGP_NOECHO_TRY) &&
!tty_present()) {
- if (askpass == NULL || getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL) {
+ if (askpass == NULL || getenv_unhooked("DISPLAY") == NULL) {
warningx(_("no tty present and no askpass program specified"));
debug_return_str(NULL);
}
projects / debian / sudo / commitdiff