++sudo (1.8.5p2-1~bpo60+1) squeeze-backports; urgency=low
++
++ * backport of version targeted for wheezy release by user request
++
++ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Tue, 25 Sep 2012 10:20:29 -0600
++
+ sudo (1.8.5p2-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * new upstream version
+ * patch to use flock on hurd, run autoconf in rules, closes: #655883
+ * patch to avoid calling unlink with null pointer on hurd, closes: #655948
+ * patch to actually use hardening build flags, closes: #655417
+ * fix sudo-ldap.postinst syntax issue, closes: #669576
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Thu, 28 Jun 2012 12:01:37 -0600
+
+ sudo (1.8.3p2-1) unstable; urgency=high
+
+ * new upstream version, closes: #657985 (CVE-2012-0809)
+ * patch from Pino Toscano to only use selinux on Linux, closes: #655894
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Mon, 30 Jan 2012 16:11:54 -0700
+
+ sudo (1.8.3p1-3) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * patch from Moritz Muehlenhoff enables hardened build flags, closes: #655417
+ * replacement postinst script from Mike Beattie using shell instead of Perl
+ * include systemd service file from Michael Stapelberg, closes: #639633
+ * add init.d status support, closes: #641782
+ * make sudo-ldap package manage a sudoers entry in nsswitch.conf,
+ closes: #610600, #639530
+ * enable mail_badpass in the default sudoers file, closes: #641218
+ * enable selinux support, closes: #655510
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Wed, 11 Jan 2012 16:18:13 -0700
+
+ sudo (1.8.3p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * if upgrading from squeeze, and the sudoers file is unmodified, avoid
+ the packaging system prompting the user about a change they didn't make
+ now that sudoers is a conffile, closes: #612532, #636049
+ * add a recommendation for the use of visudo to the sudoers.d/README file,
+ closes: #648104
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Sat, 12 Nov 2011 16:27:13 -0700
+
+ sudo (1.8.3p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * new upstream version, closes: #646478
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Thu, 27 Oct 2011 01:03:44 +0200
+
+ sudo (1.8.3-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * new upstream version, closes: #639391, #639568
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Sat, 22 Oct 2011 23:49:16 -0600
+
+ sudo (1.8.2-2) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ [ Luca Capello ]
+ * debian/rules improvements, closes: #642535
+ + mv upstream sample.* files to the examples folder.
+ - do not call dh_installexamples.
+
+ [ Bdale Garbee ]
+ * patch from upstream for SIGBUS on sparc64, closes: #640304
+ * use common-session-noninteractive in the pam config to reduce log noise
+ when sudo is used in cron, etc, closes: #519700
+ * patch from Steven McDonald to fix segfault on startup under certain
+ conditions, closes: #639568
+ * add a NEWS entry regarding the secure_path change made in 1.8.2-1,
+ closes: #639336
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Mon, 26 Sep 2011 21:55:56 -0600
+
+ sudo (1.8.2-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * new upstream version, closes: #637449, #621830
+ * include common-session in pam config, closes: #519700, #607199
+ * move secure_path from configure to default sudoers, closes: #85123, 85917
+ * improve sudoers self-documentation, closes: #613639
+ * drop --disable-setresuid since modern systems should not run 2.2 kernels
+ * lose the --with-devel configure option since it's breaking builds in
+ subdirectories for some reason
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Wed, 24 Aug 2011 13:33:11 -0600
+
+ sudo (1.7.4p6-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * new upstream version
+ * touch the right stamp name after configuring, closes: #611287
+ * patch from Svante Signell to fix build problem on Hurd, closes: #611290
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Wed, 09 Feb 2011 11:32:58 -0700
+
+ sudo (1.7.4p4-6) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * update /etc/sudoers.d/README now that sudoers is a conffile
+ * patch from upstream to fix special case in password checking code
+ when only the gid is changing, closes: #609641
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Tue, 11 Jan 2011 10:22:39 -0700
+
+ sudo (1.7.4p4-5) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * patch from Jakub Wilk to add noopt and nostrip build option support,
+ closes: #605580
+ * make sudoers a conffile, closes: #605130
+ * add descriptions to LSB init headers, closes: #604619
+ * change default sudoers %sudo entry to allow gid changes, closes: #602699
+ * add Vcs entries to the control file
+ * use debhelper install files instead of explicit installs in rules
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Wed, 01 Dec 2010 20:32:31 -0700
+
+ sudo (1.7.4p4-4) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * patch from upstream to resolve problem always prompting for a password
+ when run without a tty, closes: #599376
+ * patch from upstream to resolve interoperability problem between HOME in
+ env_keep and the -H flag, closes: #596493
+ * change path syntax to avoid tar error when /var/run/sudo exists but is
+ empty, closes: #598877
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Thu, 07 Oct 2010 15:59:06 -0600
+
+ sudo (1.7.4p4-3) unstable; urgency=low
+
+ * make postinst clause for handling /var/run -> /var/lib transition less
+ fragile, closes: #585514
+ * cope with upstream's Makefile trying to install ChangeLog in our doc
+ directory, closes: #597389
+ * fix README.Debian to reflect that HOME is no longer preserved by default,
+ closes: #596847
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Tue, 21 Sep 2010 23:53:08 -0600
+
+sudo (1.7.4p4-2.squeeze.2) stable; urgency=low
+
+ * patch from upstream to resolve interoperability problem between HOME in
+ env_keep and the -H flag, originally closed #596493, applying this to
+ to squeeze also closes: #614232
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Sun, 20 Feb 2011 09:35:07 -0700
+
+sudo (1.7.4p4-2.squeeze.1) testing; urgency=low
+
+ * patch from upstream to fix special case in password checking code
+ when only the gid is changing, closes #609641
+
+ -- Bdale Garbee <bdale@gag.com> Wed, 26 Jan 2011 09:08:12 +1000
+
sudo (1.7.4p4-2) unstable; urgency=low
* add a NEWS item about change in $HOME handling that impacts programs
--- /dev/null
+ /*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2005, 2007-2011
+ * Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ */
+
+ #include <config.h>
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/param.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #ifdef STDC_HEADERS
+ # include <stdlib.h>
+ # include <stddef.h>
+ #else
+ # ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
+ # include <stdlib.h>
+ # endif
+ #endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
+ # include <string.h>
+ #endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
+ #ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+ # include <strings.h>
+ #endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */
+ #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+ # include <unistd.h>
+ #endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+ # include <login_cap.h>
+ # ifndef LOGIN_SETENV
+ # define LOGIN_SETENV 0
+ # endif
+ #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
+ #include <ctype.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+
+ #include "sudoers.h"
+
+ /*
+ * Flags used in rebuild_env()
+ */
+ #undef DID_TERM
+ #define DID_TERM 0x0001
+ #undef DID_PATH
+ #define DID_PATH 0x0002
+ #undef DID_HOME
+ #define DID_HOME 0x0004
+ #undef DID_SHELL
+ #define DID_SHELL 0x0008
+ #undef DID_LOGNAME
+ #define DID_LOGNAME 0x0010
+ #undef DID_USER
+ #define DID_USER 0x0020
+ #undef DID_USERNAME
+ #define DID_USERNAME 0x0040
+ #undef DID_MAIL
+ #define DID_MAIL 0x0080
+ #undef DID_MAX
+ #define DID_MAX 0x00ff
+
+ #undef KEPT_TERM
+ #define KEPT_TERM 0x0100
+ #undef KEPT_PATH
+ #define KEPT_PATH 0x0200
+ #undef KEPT_HOME
+ #define KEPT_HOME 0x0400
+ #undef KEPT_SHELL
+ #define KEPT_SHELL 0x0800
+ #undef KEPT_LOGNAME
+ #define KEPT_LOGNAME 0x1000
+ #undef KEPT_USER
+ #define KEPT_USER 0x2000
+ #undef KEPT_USERNAME
+ #define KEPT_USERNAME 0x4000
+ #undef KEPT_MAIL
+ #define KEPT_MAIL 0x8000
+ #undef KEPT_MAX
+ #define KEPT_MAX 0xff00
+
+ struct environment {
+ char * const *old_envp; /* pointer the environment we passed back */
+ char **envp; /* pointer to the new environment */
+ size_t env_size; /* size of new_environ in char **'s */
+ size_t env_len; /* number of slots used, not counting NULL */
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Copy of the sudo-managed environment.
+ */
+ static struct environment env;
+
+ /*
+ * Default table of "bad" variables to remove from the environment.
+ * XXX - how to omit TERMCAP if it starts with '/'?
+ */
+ static const char *initial_badenv_table[] = {
+ "IFS",
+ "CDPATH",
+ "LOCALDOMAIN",
+ "RES_OPTIONS",
+ "HOSTALIASES",
+ "NLSPATH",
+ "PATH_LOCALE",
+ "LD_*",
+ "_RLD*",
+ #ifdef __hpux
+ "SHLIB_PATH",
+ #endif /* __hpux */
+ #ifdef _AIX
+ "LDR_*",
+ "LIBPATH",
+ "AUTHSTATE",
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __APPLE__
+ "DYLD_*",
+ #endif
+ #ifdef HAVE_KERB5
+ "KRB5_CONFIG*",
+ "KRB5_KTNAME",
+ #endif /* HAVE_KERB5 */
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECURID
+ "VAR_ACE",
+ "USR_ACE",
+ "DLC_ACE",
+ #endif /* HAVE_SECURID */
+ "TERMINFO", /* terminfo, exclusive path to terminfo files */
+ "TERMINFO_DIRS", /* terminfo, path(s) to terminfo files */
+ "TERMPATH", /* termcap, path(s) to termcap files */
+ "TERMCAP", /* XXX - only if it starts with '/' */
+ "ENV", /* ksh, file to source before script runs */
+ "BASH_ENV", /* bash, file to source before script runs */
+ "PS4", /* bash, prefix for lines in xtrace mode */
+ "GLOBIGNORE", /* bash, globbing patterns to ignore */
+ "SHELLOPTS", /* bash, extra command line options */
+ "JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS", /* java, extra command line options */
+ "PERLIO_DEBUG ", /* perl, debugging output file */
+ "PERLLIB", /* perl, search path for modules/includes */
+ "PERL5LIB", /* perl 5, search path for modules/includes */
+ "PERL5OPT", /* perl 5, extra command line options */
+ "PERL5DB", /* perl 5, command used to load debugger */
+ "FPATH", /* ksh, search path for functions */
+ "NULLCMD", /* zsh, command for null file redirection */
+ "READNULLCMD", /* zsh, command for null file redirection */
+ "ZDOTDIR", /* zsh, search path for dot files */
+ "TMPPREFIX", /* zsh, prefix for temporary files */
+ "PYTHONHOME", /* python, module search path */
+ "PYTHONPATH", /* python, search path */
+ "PYTHONINSPECT", /* python, allow inspection */
+ "PYTHONUSERBASE", /* python, per user site-packages directory */
+ "RUBYLIB", /* ruby, library load path */
+ "RUBYOPT", /* ruby, extra command line options */
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Default table of variables to check for '%' and '/' characters.
+ */
+ static const char *initial_checkenv_table[] = {
+ "COLORTERM",
+ "LANG",
+ "LANGUAGE",
+ "LC_*",
+ "LINGUAS",
+ "TERM",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Default table of variables to preserve in the environment.
+ */
+ static const char *initial_keepenv_table[] = {
+ "COLORS",
+ "DISPLAY",
+ "HOSTNAME",
+ "KRB5CCNAME",
+ "LS_COLORS",
+ "PATH",
+ "PS1",
+ "PS2",
+ "TZ",
+ "XAUTHORITY",
+ "XAUTHORIZATION",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize env based on envp.
+ */
+ void
+ env_init(char * const envp[])
+ {
+ char * const *ep;
+ size_t len;
+ debug_decl(env_init, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ if (envp == NULL) {
+ /* Reset to initial state but keep a pointer to what we allocated. */
+ envp = env.envp;
+ memset(&env, 0, sizeof(env));
+ env.old_envp = envp;
+ } else {
+ /* Make private copy of envp. */
+ for (ep = envp; *ep != NULL; ep++)
+ continue;
+ len = (size_t)(ep - envp);
+
+ env.env_len = len;
+ env.env_size = len + 1 + 128;
+ env.envp = emalloc2(env.env_size, sizeof(char *));
+ #ifdef ENV_DEBUG
+ memset(env.envp, 0, env.env_size * sizeof(char *));
+ #endif
+ memcpy(env.envp, envp, len * sizeof(char *));
+ env.envp[len] = '\0';
+
+ /* Free the old envp we allocated, if any. */
+ if (env.old_envp != NULL)
+ efree((void *)env.old_envp);
+ }
+
+ debug_return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Getter for private copy of the environment.
+ */
+ char **
+ env_get(void)
+ {
+ return env.envp;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Similar to putenv(3) but operates on sudo's private copy of the
+ * environment (not environ) and it always overwrites. The dupcheck param
+ * determines whether we need to verify that the variable is not already set.
+ * Will only overwrite an existing variable if overwrite is set.
+ * Does not include warnings or debugging to avoid recursive calls.
+ */
+ static int
+ sudo_putenv_nodebug(char *str, bool dupcheck, bool overwrite)
+ {
+ char **ep;
+ size_t len;
+ bool found = false;
+
+ /* Make sure there is room for the new entry plus a NULL. */
+ if (env.env_len + 2 > env.env_size) {
+ char **nenvp;
+ size_t nsize = env.env_size + 128;
+ nenvp = env.envp ? realloc(env.envp, nsize * sizeof(char *)) :
+ malloc(nsize * sizeof(char *));
+ if (nenvp == NULL) {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ env.envp = nenvp;
+ env.env_size = nsize;
+ #ifdef ENV_DEBUG
+ memset(env.envp + env.env_len, 0,
+ (env.env_size - env.env_len) * sizeof(char *));
+ #endif
+ }
+
+ #ifdef ENV_DEBUG
+ if (env.envp[env.env_len] != NULL) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ #endif
+
+ if (dupcheck) {
+ len = (strchr(str, '=') - str) + 1;
+ for (ep = env.envp; !found && *ep != NULL; ep++) {
+ if (strncmp(str, *ep, len) == 0) {
+ if (overwrite)
+ *ep = str;
+ found = true;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Prune out duplicate variables. */
+ if (found && overwrite) {
+ while (*ep != NULL) {
+ if (strncmp(str, *ep, len) == 0) {
+ char **cur = ep;
+ while ((*cur = *(cur + 1)) != NULL)
+ cur++;
+ } else {
+ ep++;
+ }
+ }
+ env.env_len = ep - env.envp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found) {
+ ep = env.envp + env.env_len;
+ env.env_len++;
+ *ep++ = str;
+ *ep = NULL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Similar to putenv(3) but operates on sudo's private copy of the
+ * environment (not environ) and it always overwrites. The dupcheck param
+ * determines whether we need to verify that the variable is not already set.
+ * Will only overwrite an existing variable if overwrite is set.
+ */
+ static int
+ sudo_putenv(char *str, bool dupcheck, bool overwrite)
+ {
+ int rval;
+ debug_decl(sudo_putenv, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ rval = sudo_putenv_nodebug(str, dupcheck, overwrite);
+ if (rval == -1) {
+ #ifdef ENV_DEBUG
+ if (env.envp[env.env_len] != NULL)
+ errorx(1, _("sudo_putenv: corrupted envp, length mismatch"));
+ #endif
+ errorx(1, _("unable to allocate memory"));
+ }
+ debug_return_int(rval);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Similar to setenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment.
+ * The dupcheck param determines whether we need to verify that the variable
+ * is not already set.
+ */
+ static int
+ sudo_setenv2(const char *var, const char *val, bool dupcheck, bool overwrite)
+ {
+ char *estring;
+ size_t esize;
+ debug_decl(sudo_setenv2, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ esize = strlen(var) + 1 + strlen(val) + 1;
+ estring = emalloc(esize);
+
+ /* Build environment string and insert it. */
+ if (strlcpy(estring, var, esize) >= esize ||
+ strlcat(estring, "=", esize) >= esize ||
+ strlcat(estring, val, esize) >= esize) {
+
+ errorx(1, _("internal error, sudo_setenv2() overflow"));
+ }
+ debug_return_int(sudo_putenv(estring, dupcheck, overwrite));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Similar to setenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment.
+ * Does not include warnings or debugging to avoid recursive calls.
+ */
+ static int
+ sudo_setenv_nodebug(const char *var, const char *val, int overwrite)
+ {
+ char *estring;
+ size_t esize;
+
+ esize = strlen(var) + 1 + strlen(val) + 1;
+ if ((estring = malloc(esize)) == NULL) {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Build environment string and insert it. */
+ if (strlcpy(estring, var, esize) >= esize ||
+ strlcat(estring, "=", esize) >= esize ||
+ strlcat(estring, val, esize) >= esize) {
+
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return sudo_putenv_nodebug(estring, true, overwrite);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Similar to setenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment.
+ */
+ int
+ sudo_setenv(const char *var, const char *val, int overwrite)
+ {
+ int rval;
+ debug_decl(sudo_setenv, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ rval = sudo_setenv_nodebug(var, val, overwrite);
+ if (rval == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL)
+ errorx(1, _("internal error, sudo_setenv() overflow"));
+ errorx(1, _("unable to allocate memory"));
+ }
+ debug_return_int(rval);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Similar to unsetenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment.
+ * Does not include warnings or debugging to avoid recursive calls.
+ */
+ static int
+ sudo_unsetenv_nodebug(const char *var)
+ {
+ char **ep = env.envp;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (ep == NULL || var == NULL || *var == '\0' || strchr(var, '=') != NULL) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ len = strlen(var);
+ while (*ep != NULL) {
+ if (strncmp(var, *ep, len) == 0 && (*ep)[len] == '=') {
+ /* Found it; shift remainder + NULL over by one. */
+ char **cur = ep;
+ while ((*cur = *(cur + 1)) != NULL)
+ cur++;
+ /* Keep going, could be multiple instances of the var. */
+ } else {
+ ep++;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Similar to unsetenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment.
+ */
+ int
+ sudo_unsetenv(const char *name)
+ {
+ int rval;
+ debug_decl(sudo_unsetenv, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ rval = sudo_unsetenv_nodebug(name);
+
+ debug_return_int(rval);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Similar to getenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment.
+ * Does not include warnings or debugging to avoid recursive calls.
+ */
+ static char *
+ sudo_getenv_nodebug(const char *name)
+ {
+ char **ep, *val = NULL;
+ size_t namelen = 0;
+
+ if (env.env_len != 0) {
+ /* For BSD compatibility, treat '=' in name like end of string. */
+ while (name[namelen] != '\0' && name[namelen] != '=')
+ namelen++;
+ for (ep = env.envp; *ep != NULL; ep++) {
+ if (strncmp(*ep, name, namelen) == 0 && (*ep)[namelen] == '=') {
+ val = *ep + namelen + 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return val;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Similar to getenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment.
+ */
+ char *
+ sudo_getenv(const char *name)
+ {
+ char *val;
+ debug_decl(sudo_getenv, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ val = sudo_getenv_nodebug(name);
+
+ debug_return_str(val);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Merge another environment with our private copy.
+ */
+ void
+ env_merge(char * const envp[], bool overwrite)
+ {
+ char * const *ep;
+ debug_decl(env_merge, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ for (ep = envp; *ep != NULL; ep++)
+ sudo_putenv(*ep, true, overwrite);
+
+ debug_return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check the env_delete blacklist.
+ * Returns true if the variable was found, else false.
+ */
+ static bool
+ matches_env_delete(const char *var)
+ {
+ struct list_member *cur;
+ size_t len;
+ bool iswild;
+ bool match = false;
+ debug_decl(matches_env_delete, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ /* Skip anything listed in env_delete. */
+ for (cur = def_env_delete; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ len = strlen(cur->value);
+ /* Deal with '*' wildcard */
+ if (cur->value[len - 1] == '*') {
+ len--;
+ iswild = true;
+ } else
+ iswild = false;
+ if (strncmp(cur->value, var, len) == 0 &&
+ (iswild || var[len] == '=')) {
+ match = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ debug_return_bool(match);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Apply the env_check list.
+ * Returns true if the variable is allowed, false if denied
+ * or -1 if no match.
+ */
+ static int
+ matches_env_check(const char *var)
+ {
+ struct list_member *cur;
+ size_t len;
+ bool iswild;
+ int keepit = -1;
+ debug_decl(matches_env_check, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ for (cur = def_env_check; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ len = strlen(cur->value);
+ /* Deal with '*' wildcard */
+ if (cur->value[len - 1] == '*') {
+ len--;
+ iswild = true;
+ } else
+ iswild = false;
+ if (strncmp(cur->value, var, len) == 0 &&
+ (iswild || var[len] == '=')) {
+ keepit = !strpbrk(var, "/%");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ debug_return_bool(keepit);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check the env_keep list.
+ * Returns true if the variable is allowed else false.
+ */
+ static bool
+ matches_env_keep(const char *var)
+ {
+ struct list_member *cur;
+ size_t len;
+ bool iswild, keepit = false;
+ debug_decl(matches_env_keep, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ /* Preserve SHELL variable for "sudo -s". */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL) && strncmp(var, "SHELL=", 6) == 0) {
+ keepit = true;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ for (cur = def_env_keep; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ len = strlen(cur->value);
+ /* Deal with '*' wildcard */
+ if (cur->value[len - 1] == '*') {
+ len--;
+ iswild = true;
+ } else
+ iswild = false;
+ if (strncmp(cur->value, var, len) == 0 &&
+ (iswild || var[len] == '=')) {
+ keepit = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ done:
+ debug_return_bool(keepit);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Look up var in the env_delete and env_check.
+ * Returns true if we should delete the variable, else false.
+ */
+ static bool
+ env_should_delete(const char *var)
+ {
+ int delete_it;
+ debug_decl(env_should_delete, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV);
+
+ delete_it = matches_env_delete(var);
+ if (!delete_it)
+ delete_it = matches_env_check(var) == false;
+ debug_return_bool(delete_it);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Lookup var in the env_check and env_keep lists.
+ * Returns true if the variable is allowed else false.
+ */
+ static bool
+ env_should_keep(const char *var)
+ {
+ int keepit;
+ debug_decl(env_should_keep, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV)
+
+ keepit = matches_env_check(var);
+ if (keepit == -1)
+ keepit = matches_env_keep(var);
+
+ debug_return_bool(keepit == true);
+ }
+
+ static void
+ env_update_didvar(const char *ep, unsigned int *didvar)
+ {
+ switch (*ep) {
+ case 'H':
+ if (strncmp(ep, "HOME=", 5) == 0)
+ SET(*didvar, DID_HOME);
+ break;
+ case 'L':
+ if (strncmp(ep, "LOGNAME=", 8) == 0)
+ SET(*didvar, DID_LOGNAME);
+ break;
+ case 'M':
+ if (strncmp(ep, "MAIL=", 5) == 0)
+ SET(*didvar, DID_MAIL);
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ if (strncmp(ep, "PATH=", 5) == 0)
+ SET(*didvar, DID_PATH);
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ if (strncmp(ep, "SHELL=", 6) == 0)
+ SET(*didvar, DID_SHELL);
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ if (strncmp(ep, "TERM=", 5) == 0)
+ SET(*didvar, DID_TERM);
+ break;
+ case 'U':
+ if (strncmp(ep, "USER=", 5) == 0)
+ SET(*didvar, DID_USER);
+ if (strncmp(ep, "USERNAME=", 5) == 0)
+ SET(*didvar, DID_USERNAME);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Build a new environment and ether clear potentially dangerous
+ * variables from the old one or start with a clean slate.
+ * Also adds sudo-specific variables (SUDO_*).
+ */
+ void
+ rebuild_env(void)
+ {
+ char **old_envp, **ep, *cp, *ps1;
+ char idbuf[MAX_UID_T_LEN];
+ unsigned int didvar;
+ bool reset_home = false;
+
+ /*
+ * Either clean out the environment or reset to a safe default.
+ */
+ ps1 = NULL;
+ didvar = 0;
+ env.env_len = 0;
+ env.env_size = 128;
+ old_envp = env.envp;
+ env.envp = emalloc2(env.env_size, sizeof(char *));
+ #ifdef ENV_DEBUG
+ memset(env.envp, 0, env.env_size * sizeof(char *));
+ #else
+ env.envp[0] = NULL;
+ #endif
+
+ /* Reset HOME based on target user if configured to. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) {
+ if (def_always_set_home ||
+ ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RESET_HOME | MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) ||
+ (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL) && def_set_home))
+ reset_home = true;
+ }
+
+ if (def_env_reset || ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ /*
+ * If starting with a fresh environment, initialize it based on
+ * /etc/environment or login.conf. For "sudo -i" we want those
+ * variables to override the invoking user's environment, so we
+ * defer reading them until later.
+ */
+ if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+ /* Insert login class environment variables. */
+ if (login_class) {
+ login_cap_t *lc = login_getclass(login_class);
+ if (lc != NULL) {
+ setusercontext(lc, runas_pw, runas_pw->pw_uid,
+ LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETENV);
+ login_close(lc);
+ }
+ }
+ #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
+ #if defined(_AIX) || (defined(__linux__) && !defined(HAVE_PAM))
+ /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
+ read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, true);
+ #endif
+ for (ep = env.envp; *ep; ep++)
+ env_update_didvar(*ep, &didvar);
+ }
+
++ /* Reset HOME based on target user if configured to. */
++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) {
++ if (def_always_set_home ||
++ ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RESET_HOME | MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) ||
++ (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL) && def_set_home))
++ reset_home = TRUE;
++ }
++
++ if (def_env_reset || ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ /* Pull in vars we want to keep from the old environment. */
+ for (ep = old_envp; *ep; ep++) {
+ bool keepit;
+
+ /* Skip variables with values beginning with () (bash functions) */
+ if ((cp = strchr(*ep, '=')) != NULL) {
+ if (strncmp(cp, "=() ", 3) == 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Look up the variable in the env_check and env_keep lists.
+ */
+ keepit = env_should_keep(*ep);
+
+ /*
+ * Do SUDO_PS1 -> PS1 conversion.
+ * This must happen *after* env_should_keep() is called.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(*ep, "SUDO_PS1=", 8) == 0)
+ ps1 = *ep + 5;
+
+ if (keepit) {
+ /* Preserve variable. */
+ sudo_putenv(*ep, false, false);
+ env_update_didvar(*ep, &didvar);
+ }
+ }
+ didvar |= didvar << 8; /* convert DID_* to KEPT_* */
+
+ /*
+ * Add in defaults. In -i mode these come from the runas user,
+ * otherwise they may be from the user's environment (depends
+ * on sudoers options).
+ */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ sudo_setenv2("SHELL", runas_pw->pw_shell,
+ ISSET(didvar, DID_SHELL), true);
+ sudo_setenv2("LOGNAME", runas_pw->pw_name,
+ ISSET(didvar, DID_LOGNAME), true);
+ sudo_setenv2("USER", runas_pw->pw_name,
+ ISSET(didvar, DID_USER), true);
+ sudo_setenv2("USERNAME", runas_pw->pw_name,
+ ISSET(didvar, DID_USERNAME), true);
+ } else {
+ if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_SHELL))
+ sudo_setenv2("SHELL", sudo_user.pw->pw_shell, false, true);
+ if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_LOGNAME))
+ sudo_setenv2("LOGNAME", user_name, false, true);
+ if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_USER))
+ sudo_setenv2("USER", user_name, false, true);
+ if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_USERNAME))
+ sudo_setenv2("USERNAME", user_name, false, true);
+ }
+
+ /* If we didn't keep HOME, reset it based on target user. */
+ if (!ISSET(didvar, KEPT_HOME))
+ reset_home = true;
+
+ /*
+ * Set MAIL to target user in -i mode or if MAIL is not preserved
+ * from user's environment.
+ */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) || !ISSET(didvar, KEPT_MAIL)) {
+ cp = _PATH_MAILDIR;
+ if (cp[sizeof(_PATH_MAILDIR) - 2] == '/')
+ easprintf(&cp, "MAIL=%s%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, runas_pw->pw_name);
+ else
+ easprintf(&cp, "MAIL=%s/%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, runas_pw->pw_name);
+ sudo_putenv(cp, ISSET(didvar, DID_MAIL), true);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Copy environ entries as long as they don't match env_delete or
+ * env_check.
+ */
+ for (ep = old_envp; *ep; ep++) {
+ /* Skip variables with values beginning with () (bash functions) */
+ if ((cp = strchr(*ep, '=')) != NULL) {
+ if (strncmp(cp, "=() ", 3) == 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Add variable unless it matches a black list. */
+ if (!env_should_delete(*ep)) {
+ if (strncmp(*ep, "SUDO_PS1=", 9) == 0)
+ ps1 = *ep + 5;
+ else if (strncmp(*ep, "PATH=", 5) == 0)
+ SET(didvar, DID_PATH);
+ else if (strncmp(*ep, "TERM=", 5) == 0)
+ SET(didvar, DID_TERM);
+ sudo_putenv(*ep, false, false);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Replace the PATH envariable with a secure one? */
+ if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt()) {
+ sudo_setenv2("PATH", def_secure_path, true, true);
+ SET(didvar, DID_PATH);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set $USER, $LOGNAME and $USERNAME to target if "set_logname" is not
+ * disabled. We skip this if we are running a login shell (because
+ * they have already been set them) or sudoedit (because we want the
+ * editor to find the user's startup files).
+ */
+ if (def_set_logname && !ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_EDIT)) {
+ if (!ISSET(didvar, KEPT_LOGNAME))
+ sudo_setenv2("LOGNAME", runas_pw->pw_name, true, true);
+ if (!ISSET(didvar, KEPT_USER))
+ sudo_setenv2("USER", runas_pw->pw_name, true, true);
+ if (!ISSET(didvar, KEPT_USERNAME))
+ sudo_setenv2("USERNAME", runas_pw->pw_name, true, true);
+ }
+
+ /* Set $HOME to target user if not preserving user's value. */
+ if (reset_home)
+ sudo_setenv2("HOME", runas_pw->pw_dir, true, true);
+
+ /* Provide default values for $TERM and $PATH if they are not set. */
+ if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_TERM))
+ sudo_putenv("TERM=unknown", false, false);
+ if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_PATH))
+ sudo_setenv2("PATH", _PATH_STDPATH, false, true);
+
+ /* Set PS1 if SUDO_PS1 is set. */
+ if (ps1 != NULL)
+ sudo_putenv(ps1, true, true);
+
+ /* Add the SUDO_COMMAND envariable (cmnd + args). */
+ if (user_args) {
+ easprintf(&cp, "%s %s", user_cmnd, user_args);
+ sudo_setenv2("SUDO_COMMAND", cp, true, true);
+ efree(cp);
+ } else {
+ sudo_setenv2("SUDO_COMMAND", user_cmnd, true, true);
+ }
+
+ /* Add the SUDO_USER, SUDO_UID, SUDO_GID environment variables. */
+ sudo_setenv2("SUDO_USER", user_name, true, true);
+ snprintf(idbuf, sizeof(idbuf), "%u", (unsigned int) user_uid);
+ sudo_setenv2("SUDO_UID", idbuf, true, true);
+ snprintf(idbuf, sizeof(idbuf), "%u", (unsigned int) user_gid);
+ sudo_setenv2("SUDO_GID", idbuf, true, true);
+
+ /* Free old environment. */
+ efree(old_envp);
+ }
+
+ void
+ insert_env_vars(char * const envp[])
+ {
+ char * const *ep;
+
+ if (envp == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* Add user-specified environment variables. */
+ for (ep = envp; *ep != NULL; ep++)
+ sudo_putenv(*ep, true, true);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Validate the list of environment variables passed in on the command
+ * line against env_delete, env_check, and env_keep.
+ * Calls log_fatal() if any specified variables are not allowed.
+ */
+ void
+ validate_env_vars(char * const env_vars[])
+ {
+ char * const *ep;
+ char *eq, *bad = NULL;
+ size_t len, blen = 0, bsize = 0;
+ bool okvar;
+
+ if (env_vars == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* Add user-specified environment variables. */
+ for (ep = env_vars; *ep != NULL; ep++) {
+ if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt() &&
+ strncmp(*ep, "PATH=", 5) == 0) {
+ okvar = false;
+ } else if (def_env_reset) {
+ okvar = env_should_keep(*ep);
+ } else {
+ okvar = !env_should_delete(*ep);
+ }
+ if (okvar == false) {
+ /* Not allowed, add to error string, allocating as needed. */
+ if ((eq = strchr(*ep, '=')) != NULL)
+ *eq = '\0';
+ len = strlen(*ep) + 2;
+ if (blen + len >= bsize) {
+ do {
+ bsize += 1024;
+ } while (blen + len >= bsize);
+ bad = erealloc(bad, bsize);
+ bad[blen] = '\0';
+ }
+ strlcat(bad, *ep, bsize);
+ strlcat(bad, ", ", bsize);
+ blen += len;
+ if (eq != NULL)
+ *eq = '=';
+ }
+ }
+ if (bad != NULL) {
+ bad[blen - 2] = '\0'; /* remove trailing ", " */
+ log_fatal(NO_MAIL,
+ _("sorry, you are not allowed to set the following environment variables: %s"), bad);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ efree(bad);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Read in /etc/environment ala AIX and Linux.
+ * Lines may be in either of three formats:
+ * NAME=VALUE
+ * NAME="VALUE"
+ * NAME='VALUE'
+ * with an optional "export" prefix so the shell can source the file.
+ * Invalid lines, blank lines, or lines consisting solely of a comment
+ * character are skipped.
+ */
+ void
+ read_env_file(const char *path, int overwrite)
+ {
+ FILE *fp;
+ char *cp, *var, *val;
+ size_t var_len, val_len;
+
+ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ while ((var = sudo_parseln(fp)) != NULL) {
+ /* Skip blank or comment lines */
+ if (*var == '\0')
+ continue;
+
+ /* Skip optional "export " */
+ if (strncmp(var, "export", 6) == 0 && isspace((unsigned char) var[6])) {
+ var += 7;
+ while (isspace((unsigned char) *var)) {
+ var++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Must be of the form name=["']value['"] */
+ for (val = var; *val != '\0' && *val != '='; val++)
+ ;
+ if (var == val || *val != '=')
+ continue;
+ var_len = (size_t)(val - var);
+ val_len = strlen(++val);
+
+ /* Strip leading and trailing single/double quotes */
+ if ((val[0] == '\'' || val[0] == '\"') && val[0] == val[val_len - 1]) {
+ val[val_len - 1] = '\0';
+ val++;
+ val_len -= 2;
+ }
+
+ cp = emalloc(var_len + 1 + val_len + 1);
+ memcpy(cp, var, var_len + 1); /* includes '=' */
+ memcpy(cp + var_len + 1, val, val_len + 1); /* includes NUL */
+
+ sudo_putenv(cp, true, overwrite);
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+ }
+
+ void
+ init_envtables(void)
+ {
+ struct list_member *cur;
+ const char **p;
+
+ /* Fill in the "env_delete" list. */
+ for (p = initial_badenv_table; *p; p++) {
+ cur = ecalloc(1, sizeof(struct list_member));
+ cur->value = estrdup(*p);
+ cur->next = def_env_delete;
+ def_env_delete = cur;
+ }
+
+ /* Fill in the "env_check" list. */
+ for (p = initial_checkenv_table; *p; p++) {
+ cur = ecalloc(1, sizeof(struct list_member));
+ cur->value = estrdup(*p);
+ cur->next = def_env_check;
+ def_env_check = cur;
+ }
+
+ /* Fill in the "env_keep" list. */
+ for (p = initial_keepenv_table; *p; p++) {
+ cur = ecalloc(1, sizeof(struct list_member));
+ cur->value = estrdup(*p);
+ cur->next = def_env_keep;
+ def_env_keep = cur;
+ }
+ }
+
+ int
+ sudoers_hook_getenv(const char *name, char **value, void *closure)
+ {
+ static bool in_progress = false; /* avoid recursion */
+
+ if (in_progress || env.envp == NULL)
+ return SUDO_HOOK_RET_NEXT;
+
+ in_progress = true;
+ *value = sudo_getenv_nodebug(name);
+ in_progress = false;
+ return SUDO_HOOK_RET_STOP;
+ }
+
+ int
+ sudoers_hook_putenv(char *string, void *closure)
+ {
+ static bool in_progress = false; /* avoid recursion */
+
+ if (in_progress || env.envp == NULL)
+ return SUDO_HOOK_RET_NEXT;
+
+ in_progress = true;
+ sudo_putenv_nodebug(string, true, true);
+ in_progress = false;
+ return SUDO_HOOK_RET_STOP;
+ }
+
+ int
+ sudoers_hook_setenv(const char *name, const char *value, int overwrite, void *closure)
+ {
+ static bool in_progress = false; /* avoid recursion */
+
+ if (in_progress || env.envp == NULL)
+ return SUDO_HOOK_RET_NEXT;
+
+ in_progress = true;
+ sudo_setenv_nodebug(name, value, overwrite);
+ in_progress = false;
+ return SUDO_HOOK_RET_STOP;
+ }
+
+ int
+ sudoers_hook_unsetenv(const char *name, void *closure)
+ {
+ static bool in_progress = false; /* avoid recursion */
+
+ if (in_progress || env.envp == NULL)
+ return SUDO_HOOK_RET_NEXT;
+
+ in_progress = true;
+ sudo_unsetenv_nodebug(name);
+ in_progress = false;
+ return SUDO_HOOK_RET_STOP;
+ }
projects / debian / sudo / commitdiff