--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2011 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ *
+ * For a brief history of sudo, please see the HISTORY file included
+ * with this distribution.
+ */
+
+#define _SUDO_MAIN
+
+#ifdef __TANDEM
+# include <floss.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <stddef.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# endif
+#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
+#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
+# if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_H) && !defined(STDC_HEADERS)
+# include <memory.h>
+# endif
+# include <string.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
+#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+# include <strings.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# include <unistd.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+# include <locale.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+# include <login_cap.h>
+# ifndef LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS
+# define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon"
+# endif
+# ifndef LOGIN_SETENV
+# define LOGIN_SETENV 0
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+# include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#endif
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+# include "compat/getaddrinfo.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "sudoers.h"
+#include "interfaces.h"
+#include "sudoers_version.h"
+#include "auth/sudo_auth.h"
+#include "secure_path.h"
+
+/*
+ * Prototypes
+ */
+static void init_vars(char * const *);
+static int set_cmnd(void);
+static void set_loginclass(struct passwd *);
+static void set_runaspw(const char *);
+static void set_runasgr(const char *);
+static int cb_runas_default(const char *);
+static int sudoers_policy_version(int verbose);
+static int deserialize_info(char * const args[], char * const settings[],
+ char * const user_info[]);
+static char *find_editor(int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out);
+static void create_admin_success_flag(void);
+
+/*
+ * Globals
+ */
+struct sudo_user sudo_user;
+struct passwd *list_pw;
+struct interface *interfaces;
+int long_list;
+uid_t timestamp_uid;
+extern int errorlineno;
+extern bool parse_error;
+extern char *errorfile;
+#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
+char *login_style;
+#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
+sudo_conv_t sudo_conv;
+sudo_printf_t sudo_printf;
+int sudo_mode;
+
+static int sudo_version;
+static char *prev_user;
+static char *runas_user;
+static char *runas_group;
+static struct sudo_nss_list *snl;
+static const char *interfaces_string;
+static sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp;
+
+/* XXX - must be extern for audit bits of sudo_auth.c */
+int NewArgc;
+char **NewArgv;
+
+/* Declared here instead of plugin_error.c for static sudo builds. */
+sigjmp_buf error_jmp;
+
+static int
+sudoers_policy_open(unsigned int version, sudo_conv_t conversation,
+ sudo_printf_t plugin_printf, char * const settings[],
+ char * const user_info[], char * const envp[], char * const args[])
+{
+ volatile int sources = 0;
+ sigaction_t sa;
+ struct sudo_nss *nss;
+ debug_decl(sudoers_policy_open, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ sudo_version = version;
+ if (!sudo_conv)
+ sudo_conv = conversation;
+ if (!sudo_printf)
+ sudo_printf = plugin_printf;
+
+ /* Plugin args are only specified for API version 1.2 and higher. */
+ if (sudo_version < SUDO_API_MKVERSION(1, 2))
+ args = NULL;
+
+ if (sigsetjmp(error_jmp, 1)) {
+ /* called via error(), errorx() or log_fatal() */
+ rewind_perms();
+ debug_return_bool(-1);
+ }
+
+ bindtextdomain("sudoers", LOCALEDIR);
+
+ /*
+ * Signal setup:
+ * Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt
+ * us at some point and avoid the logging.
+ * Install handler to wait for children when they exit.
+ */
+ zero_bytes(&sa, sizeof(sa));
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+ sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saved_sa_int);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &saved_sa_quit);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp);
+
+ sudo_setpwent();
+ sudo_setgrent();
+
+ /* Initialize environment functions (including replacements). */
+ env_init(envp);
+
+ /* Setup defaults data structures. */
+ init_defaults();
+
+ /* Parse args, settings and user_info */
+ sudo_mode = deserialize_info(args, settings, user_info);
+
+ init_vars(envp); /* XXX - move this later? */
+
+ /* Parse nsswitch.conf for sudoers order. */
+ snl = sudo_read_nss();
+
+ /* LDAP or NSS may modify the euid so we need to be root for the open. */
+ set_perms(PERM_INITIAL);
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
+
+ /* Open and parse sudoers, set global defaults */
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
+ if (nss->open(nss) == 0 && nss->parse(nss) == 0) {
+ sources++;
+ if (nss->setdefs(nss) != 0)
+ log_error(NO_STDERR, _("problem with defaults entries"));
+ }
+ }
+ if (sources == 0) {
+ warningx(_("no valid sudoers sources found, quitting"));
+ debug_return_bool(-1);
+ }
+
+ /* XXX - collect post-sudoers parse settings into a function */
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize external group plugin, if any.
+ */
+ if (def_group_plugin) {
+ if (group_plugin_load(def_group_plugin) != true)
+ def_group_plugin = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set runas passwd/group entries based on command line or sudoers.
+ * Note that if runas_group was specified without runas_user we
+ * defer setting runas_pw so the match routines know to ignore it.
+ */
+ if (runas_group != NULL) {
+ set_runasgr(runas_group);
+ if (runas_user != NULL)
+ set_runaspw(runas_user);
+ } else
+ set_runaspw(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default);
+
+ if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_RUNAS))
+ log_error(NO_STDERR, _("problem with defaults entries"));
+
+ if (def_fqdn)
+ set_fqdn(); /* deferred until after sudoers is parsed */
+
+ /* Set login class if applicable. */
+ set_loginclass(runas_pw ? runas_pw : sudo_user.pw);
+
+ restore_perms();
+
+ debug_return_bool(true);
+}
+
+static void
+sudoers_policy_close(int exit_status, int error_code)
+{
+ debug_decl(sudoers_policy_close, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ if (sigsetjmp(error_jmp, 1)) {
+ /* called via error(), errorx() or log_fatal() */
+ debug_return;
+ }
+
+ /* We do not currently log the exit status. */
+ if (error_code)
+ warningx(_("unable to execute %s: %s"), safe_cmnd, strerror(error_code));
+
+ /* Close the session we opened in sudoers_policy_init_session(). */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN|MODE_EDIT))
+ (void)sudo_auth_end_session(runas_pw);
+
+ /* Free remaining references to password and group entries. */
+ pw_delref(sudo_user.pw);
+ pw_delref(runas_pw);
+ if (runas_gr != NULL)
+ gr_delref(runas_gr);
+ if (user_group_list != NULL)
+ grlist_delref(user_group_list);
+
+ debug_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The init_session function is called before executing the command
+ * and before uid/gid changes occur.
+ */
+static int
+sudoers_policy_init_session(struct passwd *pwd, char **user_env[])
+{
+ debug_decl(sudoers_policy_init, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ /* user_env is only specified for API version 1.2 and higher. */
+ if (sudo_version < SUDO_API_MKVERSION(1, 2))
+ user_env = NULL;
+
+ if (sigsetjmp(error_jmp, 1)) {
+ /* called via error(), errorx() or log_fatal() */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ debug_return_bool(sudo_auth_begin_session(pwd, user_env));
+}
+
+static int
+sudoers_policy_main(int argc, char * const argv[], int pwflag, char *env_add[],
+ char **command_infop[], char **argv_out[], char **user_env_out[])
+{
+ static char *command_info[32]; /* XXX */
+ char **edit_argv = NULL;
+ struct sudo_nss *nss;
+ int cmnd_status = -1, validated;
+ volatile int info_len = 0;
+ volatile int rval = true;
+ debug_decl(sudoers_policy_main, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ if (sigsetjmp(error_jmp, 1)) {
+ /* error recovery via error(), errorx() or log_fatal() */
+ rval = -1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
+ if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
+ warningx(_("sudoers specifies that root is not allowed to sudo"));
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */
+ if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) {
+ if (!def_closefrom_override) {
+ warningx(_("you are not permitted to use the -C option"));
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ def_closefrom = user_closefrom;
+ }
+
+ set_perms(PERM_INITIAL);
+
+ /* Environment variables specified on the command line. */
+ if (env_add != NULL && env_add[0] != NULL)
+ sudo_user.env_vars = env_add;
+
+ /*
+ * Make a local copy of argc/argv, with special handling
+ * for pseudo-commands and the '-i' option.
+ */
+ if (argc == 0) {
+ NewArgc = 1;
+ NewArgv = emalloc2(NewArgc + 1, sizeof(char *));
+ NewArgv[0] = user_cmnd;
+ NewArgv[1] = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /* Must leave an extra slot before NewArgv for bash's --login */
+ NewArgc = argc;
+ NewArgv = emalloc2(NewArgc + 2, sizeof(char *));
+ memcpy(++NewArgv, argv, argc * sizeof(char *));
+ NewArgv[NewArgc] = NULL;
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) && runas_pw != NULL)
+ NewArgv[0] = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_shell);
+ }
+
+ /* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS))
+ def_preserve_groups = true;
+
+ /* Find command in path */
+ cmnd_status = set_cmnd();
+ if (cmnd_status == -1) {
+ rval = -1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+ if (!setlocale(LC_ALL, def_sudoers_locale)) {
+ warningx(_("unable to set locale to \"%s\", using \"C\""),
+ def_sudoers_locale);
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "C");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Check sudoers sources.
+ */
+ validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST;
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
+ validated = nss->lookup(nss, validated, pwflag);
+
+ if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
+ /* Handle "= auth" in netsvc.conf */
+ if (nss->ret_if_found)
+ break;
+ } else {
+ /* Handle [NOTFOUND=return] */
+ if (nss->ret_if_notfound)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (safe_cmnd == NULL)
+ safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+#endif
+
+ /* If only a group was specified, set runas_pw based on invoking user. */
+ if (runas_pw == NULL)
+ set_runaspw(user_name);
+
+ /*
+ * Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
+ */
+ if (def_timestampowner) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ if (*def_timestampowner == '#')
+ pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
+ else
+ pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
+ if (pw != NULL) {
+ timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ pw_delref(pw);
+ } else {
+ log_error(0, _("timestamp owner (%s): No such user"),
+ def_timestampowner);
+ timestamp_uid = ROOT_UID;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If no command line args and "shell_noargs" is not set, error out. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs) {
+ rval = -2; /* usage error */
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
+ if (def_requiretty) {
+ int fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, _("no tty"));
+ warningx(_("sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo"));
+ goto bad;
+ } else
+ (void) close(fd);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We don't reset the environment for sudoedit or if the user
+ * specified the -E command line flag and they have setenv privs.
+ */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT) ||
+ (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv))
+ def_env_reset = false;
+
+ /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */
+ rebuild_env();
+
+ /* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
+ rval = check_user(validated, sudo_mode);
+ if (rval != true)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
+ /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
+ if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
+ if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) {
+ if (sudo_user.pw != NULL)
+ pw_delref(sudo_user.pw);
+ sudo_user.pw = pw;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If the user was not allowed to run the command we are done. */
+ if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
+ if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, _("No user or host"));
+ log_denial(validated, 1);
+ } else {
+ if (def_path_info) {
+ /*
+ * We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can
+ * *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd
+ * have to say "not allowed to run foo" even when the problem
+ * is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set
+ * their path to just contain a single dir.
+ */
+ log_denial(validated,
+ !(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND));
+ if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
+ warningx(_("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd);
+ else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
+ warningx(_("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run."), user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
+ } else {
+ /* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */
+ log_denial(validated, 1);
+ }
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, _("validation failure"));
+ }
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* Create Ubuntu-style dot file to indicate sudo was successful. */
+ create_admin_success_flag();
+
+ /* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
+ if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, _("command in current directory"));
+ warningx(_("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run."), user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, _("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd);
+ warningx(_("%s: command not found"), user_cmnd);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) {
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) {
+ warningx(_("sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment"));
+ goto bad;
+ } else
+ validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
+ }
+
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) && (def_log_input || def_log_output)) {
+ if (def_iolog_file && def_iolog_dir) {
+ command_info[info_len++] = expand_iolog_path("iolog_path=",
+ def_iolog_dir, def_iolog_file, &sudo_user.iolog_file);
+ sudo_user.iolog_file++;
+ }
+ if (def_log_input) {
+ command_info[info_len++] = estrdup("iolog_stdin=true");
+ command_info[info_len++] = estrdup("iolog_ttyin=true");
+ }
+ if (def_log_output) {
+ command_info[info_len++] = estrdup("iolog_stdout=true");
+ command_info[info_len++] = estrdup("iolog_stderr=true");
+ command_info[info_len++] = estrdup("iolog_ttyout=true");
+ }
+ if (def_compress_io)
+ command_info[info_len++] = estrdup("iolog_compress=true");
+ }
+
+ log_allowed(validated);
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK))
+ rval = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw);
+ else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LIST))
+ display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); /* XXX - return val */
+
+ /* Cleanup sudoers sources */
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
+ nss->close(nss);
+ }
+ if (def_group_plugin)
+ group_plugin_unload();
+
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_CHECK|MODE_LIST))) {
+ /* rval already set appropriately */
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set umask based on sudoers.
+ * If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too
+ * unless umask_override is set.
+ */
+ if (def_umask != 0777) {
+ mode_t mask = def_umask;
+ if (!def_umask_override) {
+ mode_t omask = umask(mask);
+ mask |= omask;
+ umask(omask);
+ }
+ easprintf(&command_info[info_len++], "umask=0%o", (unsigned int)mask);
+ }
+
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ char *p;
+
+ /* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */
+ if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL)
+ p = NewArgv[0];
+ *p = '-';
+ NewArgv[0] = p;
+
+ /* Set cwd to run user's homedir. */
+ command_info[info_len++] = fmt_string("cwd", runas_pw->pw_dir);
+
+ /*
+ * Newer versions of bash require the --login option to be used
+ * in conjunction with the -c option even if the shell name starts
+ * with a '-'. Unfortunately, bash 1.x uses -login, not --login
+ * so this will cause an error for that.
+ */
+ if (NewArgc > 1 && strcmp(NewArgv[0], "-bash") == 0 &&
+ strcmp(NewArgv[1], "-c") == 0) {
+ /* Use the extra slot before NewArgv so we can store --login. */
+ NewArgv--;
+ NewArgc++;
+ NewArgv[0] = NewArgv[1];
+ NewArgv[1] = "--login";
+ }
+
+#if defined(_AIX) || (defined(__linux__) && !defined(HAVE_PAM))
+ /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
+ read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, true);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+ /* Set environment based on login class. */
+ if (login_class) {
+ login_cap_t *lc = login_getclass(login_class);
+ if (lc != NULL) {
+ setusercontext(lc, runas_pw, runas_pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETENV);
+ login_close(lc);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
+ }
+
+ /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
+ if (def_env_file)
+ read_env_file(def_env_file, false);
+
+ /* Insert user-specified environment variables. */
+ insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
+
+ /* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */
+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL);
+
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
+ char *editor = find_editor(NewArgc - 1, NewArgv + 1, &edit_argv);
+ if (editor == NULL)
+ goto bad;
+ command_info[info_len++] = fmt_string("command", editor);
+ command_info[info_len++] = estrdup("sudoedit=true");
+ } else {
+ command_info[info_len++] = fmt_string("command", safe_cmnd);
+ }
+ if (def_stay_setuid) {
+ easprintf(&command_info[info_len++], "runas_uid=%u",
+ (unsigned int)user_uid);
+ easprintf(&command_info[info_len++], "runas_gid=%u",
+ (unsigned int)user_gid);
+ easprintf(&command_info[info_len++], "runas_euid=%u",
+ (unsigned int)runas_pw->pw_uid);
+ easprintf(&command_info[info_len++], "runas_egid=%u",
+ runas_gr ? (unsigned int)runas_gr->gr_gid :
+ (unsigned int)runas_pw->pw_gid);
+ } else {
+ easprintf(&command_info[info_len++], "runas_uid=%u",
+ (unsigned int)runas_pw->pw_uid);
+ easprintf(&command_info[info_len++], "runas_gid=%u",
+ runas_gr ? (unsigned int)runas_gr->gr_gid :
+ (unsigned int)runas_pw->pw_gid);
+ }
+ if (def_preserve_groups) {
+ command_info[info_len++] = "preserve_groups=true";
+ } else {
+ int i, len;
+ gid_t egid;
+ size_t glsize;
+ char *cp, *gid_list;
+ struct group_list *grlist = get_group_list(runas_pw);
+
+ /* We reserve an extra spot in the list for the effective gid. */
+ glsize = sizeof("runas_groups=") - 1 +
+ ((grlist->ngids + 1) * (MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1));
+ gid_list = emalloc(glsize);
+ memcpy(gid_list, "runas_groups=", sizeof("runas_groups=") - 1);
+ cp = gid_list + sizeof("runas_groups=") - 1;
+
+ /* On BSD systems the effective gid is the first group in the list. */
+ egid = runas_gr ? (unsigned int)runas_gr->gr_gid :
+ (unsigned int)runas_pw->pw_gid;
+ len = snprintf(cp, glsize - (cp - gid_list), "%u", egid);
+ if (len < 0 || len >= glsize - (cp - gid_list))
+ errorx(1, _("internal error, runas_groups overflow"));
+ cp += len;
+ for (i = 0; i < grlist->ngids; i++) {
+ if (grlist->gids[i] != egid) {
+ len = snprintf(cp, glsize - (cp - gid_list), ",%u",
+ (unsigned int) grlist->gids[i]);
+ if (len < 0 || len >= glsize - (cp - gid_list))
+ errorx(1, _("internal error, runas_groups overflow"));
+ cp += len;
+ }
+ }
+ command_info[info_len++] = gid_list;
+ grlist_delref(grlist);
+ }
+ if (def_closefrom >= 0)
+ easprintf(&command_info[info_len++], "closefrom=%d", def_closefrom);
+ if (def_noexec)
+ command_info[info_len++] = estrdup("noexec=true");
+ if (def_set_utmp)
+ command_info[info_len++] = estrdup("set_utmp=true");
+ if (def_use_pty)
+ command_info[info_len++] = estrdup("use_pty=true");
+ if (def_utmp_runas)
+ command_info[info_len++] = fmt_string("utmp_user", runas_pw->pw_name);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+ if (def_use_loginclass)
+ command_info[info_len++] = fmt_string("login_class", login_class);
+#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (user_role != NULL)
+ command_info[info_len++] = fmt_string("selinux_role", user_role);
+ if (user_type != NULL)
+ command_info[info_len++] = fmt_string("selinux_type", user_type);
+#endif /* HAVE_SELINUX */
+
+ /* Must audit before uid change. */
+ audit_success(NewArgv);
+
+ *command_infop = command_info;
+
+ *argv_out = edit_argv ? edit_argv : NewArgv;
+
+ /* Get private version of the environment and zero out stashed copy. */
+ *user_env_out = env_get();
+ env_init(NULL);
+
+ goto done;
+
+bad:
+ rval = false;
+
+done:
+ rewind_perms();
+
+ /* Close the password and group files and free up memory. */
+ sudo_endpwent();
+ sudo_endgrent();
+
+ debug_return_bool(rval);
+}
+
+static int
+sudoers_policy_check(int argc, char * const argv[], char *env_add[],
+ char **command_infop[], char **argv_out[], char **user_env_out[])
+{
+ debug_decl(sudoers_policy_check, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
+ SET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN);
+
+ debug_return_bool(sudoers_policy_main(argc, argv, 0, env_add, command_infop,
+ argv_out, user_env_out));
+}
+
+static int
+sudoers_policy_validate(void)
+{
+ debug_decl(sudoers_policy_validate, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ user_cmnd = "validate";
+ SET(sudo_mode, MODE_VALIDATE);
+
+ debug_return_bool(sudoers_policy_main(0, NULL, I_VERIFYPW, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
+}
+
+static void
+sudoers_policy_invalidate(int remove)
+{
+ debug_decl(sudoers_policy_invalidate, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ user_cmnd = "kill";
+ if (sigsetjmp(error_jmp, 1) == 0) {
+ remove_timestamp(remove);
+ plugin_cleanup(0);
+ }
+
+ debug_return;
+}
+
+static int
+sudoers_policy_list(int argc, char * const argv[], int verbose,
+ const char *list_user)
+{
+ int rval;
+ debug_decl(sudoers_policy_list, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ user_cmnd = "list";
+ if (argc)
+ SET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK);
+ else
+ SET(sudo_mode, MODE_LIST);
+ if (verbose)
+ long_list = 1;
+ if (list_user) {
+ list_pw = sudo_getpwnam(list_user);
+ if (list_pw == NULL) {
+ warningx(_("unknown user: %s"), list_user);
+ debug_return_bool(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ rval = sudoers_policy_main(argc, argv, I_LISTPW, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (list_user) {
+ pw_delref(list_pw);
+ list_pw = NULL;
+ }
+
+ debug_return_bool(rval);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and
+ * load the ``interfaces'' array.
+ */
+static void
+init_vars(char * const envp[])
+{
+ char * const * ep;
+ debug_decl(init_vars, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TZSET
+ (void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */
+#endif /* HAVE_TZSET */
+
+ for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) {
+ /* XXX - don't fill in if empty string */
+ switch (**ep) {
+ case 'K':
+ if (strncmp("KRB5CCNAME=", *ep, 11) == 0)
+ user_ccname = *ep + 11;
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0)
+ user_path = *ep + 5;
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ if (!user_prompt && strncmp("SUDO_PROMPT=", *ep, 12) == 0)
+ user_prompt = *ep + 12;
+ else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0)
+ prev_user = *ep + 10;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password
+ * if necessary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we
+ * can read the shadow passwd file if necessary.
+ */
+ if ((sudo_user.pw = sudo_getpwuid(user_uid)) == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * It is not unusual for users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout
+ * file which can cause sudo to be run during reboot after the
+ * YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died.
+ */
+ if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE)
+ errorx(1, _("unknown uid: %u"), (unsigned int) user_uid);
+
+ /* Need to make a fake struct passwd for the call to log_fatal(). */
+ sudo_user.pw = sudo_fakepwnamid(user_name, user_uid, user_gid);
+ log_fatal(0, _("unknown uid: %u"), (unsigned int) user_uid);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get group list.
+ */
+ if (user_group_list == NULL)
+ user_group_list = get_group_list(sudo_user.pw);
+
+ /* Set runas callback. */
+ sudo_defs_table[I_RUNAS_DEFAULT].callback = cb_runas_default;
+
+ /* It is now safe to use log_fatal() and set_perms() */
+ debug_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fill in user_cmnd, user_args, user_base and user_stat variables
+ * and apply any command-specific defaults entries.
+ */
+static int
+set_cmnd(void)
+{
+ int rval;
+ char *path = user_path;
+ debug_decl(set_cmnd, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ /* Resolve the path and return. */
+ rval = FOUND;
+ user_stat = ecalloc(1, sizeof(struct stat));
+
+ /* Default value for cmnd, overridden below. */
+ if (user_cmnd == NULL)
+ user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
+
+ if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) {
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) {
+ if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt())
+ path = def_secure_path;
+ set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
+ rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path,
+ def_ignore_dot);
+ restore_perms();
+ if (rval != FOUND) {
+ /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */
+ set_perms(PERM_USER);
+ rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path,
+ def_ignore_dot);
+ restore_perms();
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* set user_args */
+ if (NewArgc > 1) {
+ char *to, *from, **av;
+ size_t size, n;
+
+ /* Alloc and build up user_args. */
+ for (size = 0, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++)
+ size += strlen(*av) + 1;
+ user_args = emalloc(size);
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ /*
+ * When running a command via a shell, the sudo front-end
+ * escapes potential meta chars. We unescape non-spaces
+ * for sudoers matching and logging purposes.
+ */
+ for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; (from = *av); av++) {
+ while (*from) {
+ if (from[0] == '\\' && !isspace((unsigned char)from[1]))
+ from++;
+ *to++ = *from++;
+ }
+ *to++ = ' ';
+ }
+ *--to = '\0';
+ } else {
+ for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++) {
+ n = strlcpy(to, *av, size - (to - user_args));
+ if (n >= size - (to - user_args))
+ errorx(1, _("internal error, set_cmnd() overflow"));
+ to += n;
+ *to++ = ' ';
+ }
+ *--to = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (strlen(user_cmnd) >= PATH_MAX)
+ errorx(1, _("%s: %s"), user_cmnd, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG));
+
+ if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL)
+ user_base++;
+ else
+ user_base = user_cmnd;
+
+ if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_CMND))
+ log_error(NO_STDERR, _("problem with defaults entries"));
+
+ debug_return_int(rval);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Open sudoers and sanity check mode/owner/type.
+ * Returns a handle to the sudoers file or NULL on error.
+ */
+FILE *
+open_sudoers(const char *sudoers, bool doedit, bool *keepopen)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+ FILE *fp = NULL;
+ debug_decl(open_sudoers, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS);
+
+ switch (sudo_secure_file(sudoers, sudoers_uid, sudoers_gid, &sb)) {
+ case SUDO_PATH_SECURE:
+ /*
+ * If we are expecting sudoers to be group readable but
+ * it is not, we must open the file as root, not uid 1.
+ */
+ if (sudoers_uid == ROOT_UID && (sudoers_mode & S_IRGRP)) {
+ if ((sb.st_mode & S_IRGRP) == 0) {
+ restore_perms();
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Open sudoers and make sure we can read it so we can present
+ * the user with a reasonable error message (unlike the lexer).
+ */
+ if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL) {
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO, _("unable to open %s"), sudoers);
+ } else {
+ if (sb.st_size != 0 && fgetc(fp) == EOF) {
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO, _("unable to read %s"),
+ sudoers);
+ fclose(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /* Rewind fp and set close on exec flag. */
+ rewind(fp);
+ (void) fcntl(fileno(fp), F_SETFD, 1);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case SUDO_PATH_MISSING:
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO, _("unable to stat %s"), sudoers);
+ break;
+ case SUDO_PATH_BAD_TYPE:
+ log_error(0, _("%s is not a regular file"), sudoers);
+ break;
+ case SUDO_PATH_WRONG_OWNER:
+ log_error(0, _("%s is owned by uid %u, should be %u"),
+ sudoers, (unsigned int) sb.st_uid, (unsigned int) sudoers_uid);
+ break;
+ case SUDO_PATH_WORLD_WRITABLE:
+ log_error(0, _("%s is world writable"), sudoers);
+ break;
+ case SUDO_PATH_GROUP_WRITABLE:
+ log_error(0, _("%s is owned by gid %u, should be %u"),
+ sudoers, (unsigned int) sb.st_gid, (unsigned int) sudoers_gid);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ restore_perms(); /* change back to root */
+
+ debug_return_ptr(fp);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+static void
+set_loginclass(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ const int errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY;
+ login_cap_t *lc;
+ debug_decl(set_loginclass, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ if (!def_use_loginclass)
+ debug_return;
+
+ if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
+ if (user_uid != 0 &&
+ strcmp(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default, "root") != 0)
+ errorx(1, _("only root can use `-c %s'"), login_class);
+ } else {
+ login_class = pw->pw_class;
+ if (!login_class || !*login_class)
+ login_class =
+ (pw->pw_uid == 0) ? LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS : LOGIN_DEFCLASS;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure specified login class is valid. */
+ lc = login_getclass(login_class);
+ if (!lc || !lc->lc_class || strcmp(lc->lc_class, login_class) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Don't make it a fatal error if the user didn't specify the login
+ * class themselves. We do this because if login.conf gets
+ * corrupted we want the admin to be able to use sudo to fix it.
+ */
+ if (login_class)
+ log_fatal(errflags, _("unknown login class: %s"), login_class);
+ else
+ log_error(errflags, _("unknown login class: %s"), login_class);
+ def_use_loginclass = false;
+ }
+ login_close(lc);
+ debug_return;
+}
+#else
+static void
+set_loginclass(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
+
+/*
+ * Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost.
+ */
+void
+set_fqdn(void)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *res0, hint;
+ char *p;
+ debug_decl(set_fqdn, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ zero_bytes(&hint, sizeof(hint));
+ hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+ hint.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
+ if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) {
+ log_error(MSG_ONLY, _("unable to resolve host %s"), user_host);
+ } else {
+ if (user_shost != user_host)
+ efree(user_shost);
+ efree(user_host);
+ user_host = estrdup(res0->ai_canonname);
+ freeaddrinfo(res0);
+ }
+ if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.')) != NULL)
+ user_shost = estrndup(user_host, (size_t)(p - user_host));
+ else
+ user_shost = user_host;
+ debug_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as
+ * and store it in runas_pw. By default, commands run as "root".
+ */
+static void
+set_runaspw(const char *user)
+{
+ debug_decl(set_runaspw, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ if (runas_pw != NULL)
+ pw_delref(runas_pw);
+ if (*user == '#') {
+ if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1))) == NULL)
+ runas_pw = sudo_fakepwnam(user, runas_gr ? runas_gr->gr_gid : 0);
+ } else {
+ if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
+ log_fatal(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, _("unknown user: %s"), user);
+ }
+ debug_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get group entry for the group we are going to run commands as
+ * and store it in runas_gr.
+ */
+static void
+set_runasgr(const char *group)
+{
+ debug_decl(set_runasgr, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ if (runas_gr != NULL)
+ gr_delref(runas_gr);
+ if (*group == '#') {
+ if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrgid(atoi(group + 1))) == NULL)
+ runas_gr = sudo_fakegrnam(group);
+ } else {
+ if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrnam(group)) == NULL)
+ log_fatal(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, _("unknown group: %s"), group);
+ }
+ debug_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Callback for runas_default sudoers setting.
+ */
+static int
+cb_runas_default(const char *user)
+{
+ /* Only reset runaspw if user didn't specify one. */
+ if (!runas_user && !runas_group)
+ set_runaspw(user);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cleanup hook for error()/errorx()
+ */
+void
+plugin_cleanup(int gotsignal)
+{
+ struct sudo_nss *nss;
+
+ if (!gotsignal) {
+ debug_decl(plugin_cleanup, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+ if (snl != NULL) {
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss)
+ nss->close(nss);
+ }
+ if (def_group_plugin)
+ group_plugin_unload();
+ sudo_endpwent();
+ sudo_endgrent();
+ debug_return;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+sudoers_policy_version(int verbose)
+{
+ debug_decl(sudoers_policy_version, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ if (sigsetjmp(error_jmp, 1)) {
+ /* error recovery via error(), errorx() or log_fatal() */
+ debug_return_bool(-1);
+ }
+
+ sudo_printf(SUDO_CONV_INFO_MSG, _("Sudoers policy plugin version %s\n"),
+ PACKAGE_VERSION);
+ sudo_printf(SUDO_CONV_INFO_MSG, _("Sudoers file grammar version %d\n"),
+ SUDOERS_GRAMMAR_VERSION);
+
+ if (verbose) {
+ sudo_printf(SUDO_CONV_INFO_MSG, _("\nSudoers path: %s\n"), sudoers_file);
+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP
+# ifdef _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF
+ sudo_printf(SUDO_CONV_INFO_MSG, _("nsswitch path: %s\n"), _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF);
+# endif
+ sudo_printf(SUDO_CONV_INFO_MSG, _("ldap.conf path: %s\n"), _PATH_LDAP_CONF);
+ sudo_printf(SUDO_CONV_INFO_MSG, _("ldap.secret path: %s\n"), _PATH_LDAP_SECRET);
+#endif
+ dump_auth_methods();
+ dump_defaults();
+ sudo_printf(SUDO_CONV_INFO_MSG, "\n");
+ if (interfaces_string != NULL) {
+ dump_interfaces(interfaces_string);
+ sudo_printf(SUDO_CONV_INFO_MSG, "\n");
+ }
+ }
+ debug_return_bool(true);
+}
+
+static int
+deserialize_info(char * const args[], char * const settings[], char * const user_info[])
+{
+ char * const *cur;
+ const char *p, *groups = NULL;
+ const char *debug_flags = NULL;
+ int flags = 0;
+ debug_decl(deserialize_info, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+#define MATCHES(s, v) (strncmp(s, v, sizeof(v) - 1) == 0)
+
+ /* Parse sudo.conf plugin args. */
+ if (args != NULL) {
+ for (cur = args; *cur != NULL; cur++) {
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "sudoers_file=")) {
+ sudoers_file = *cur + sizeof("sudoers_file=") - 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "sudoers_uid=")) {
+ sudoers_uid = (uid_t) atoi(*cur + sizeof("sudoers_uid=") - 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "sudoers_gid=")) {
+ sudoers_gid = (gid_t) atoi(*cur + sizeof("sudoers_gid=") - 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "sudoers_mode=")) {
+ sudoers_mode = (mode_t) strtol(*cur + sizeof("sudoers_mode=") - 1,
+ NULL, 8);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Parse command line settings. */
+ user_closefrom = -1;
+ for (cur = settings; *cur != NULL; cur++) {
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "closefrom=")) {
+ user_closefrom = atoi(*cur + sizeof("closefrom=") - 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "debug_flags=")) {
+ debug_flags = *cur + sizeof("debug_flags=") - 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "runas_user=")) {
+ runas_user = *cur + sizeof("runas_user=") - 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "runas_group=")) {
+ runas_group = *cur + sizeof("runas_group=") - 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "prompt=")) {
+ user_prompt = *cur + sizeof("prompt=") - 1;
+ def_passprompt_override = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "set_home=")) {
+ if (atobool(*cur + sizeof("set_home=") - 1) == true)
+ SET(flags, MODE_RESET_HOME);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "preserve_environment=")) {
+ if (atobool(*cur + sizeof("preserve_environment=") - 1) == true)
+ SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "run_shell=")) {
+ if (atobool(*cur + sizeof("run_shell=") - 1) == true)
+ SET(flags, MODE_SHELL);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "login_shell=")) {
+ if (atobool(*cur + sizeof("login_shell=") - 1) == true) {
+ SET(flags, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL);
+ def_env_reset = true;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "implied_shell=")) {
+ if (atobool(*cur + sizeof("implied_shell=") - 1) == true)
+ SET(flags, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "preserve_groups=")) {
+ if (atobool(*cur + sizeof("preserve_groups=") - 1) == true)
+ SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "ignore_ticket=")) {
+ if (atobool(*cur + sizeof("ignore_ticket=") - 1) == true)
+ SET(flags, MODE_IGNORE_TICKET);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "noninteractive=")) {
+ if (atobool(*cur + sizeof("noninteractive=") - 1) == true)
+ SET(flags, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "sudoedit=")) {
+ if (atobool(*cur + sizeof("sudoedit=") - 1) == true)
+ SET(flags, MODE_EDIT);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "login_class=")) {
+ login_class = *cur + sizeof("login_class=") - 1;
+ def_use_loginclass = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "selinux_role=")) {
+ user_role = *cur + sizeof("selinux_role=") - 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "selinux_type=")) {
+ user_type = *cur + sizeof("selinux_type=") - 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_SELINUX */
+#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "bsdauth_type=")) {
+ login_style = *cur + sizeof("bsdauth_type=") - 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETPROGNAME) && !defined(HAVE___PROGNAME)
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "progname=")) {
+ setprogname(*cur + sizeof("progname=") - 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "network_addrs=")) {
+ interfaces_string = *cur + sizeof("network_addrs=") - 1;
+ set_interfaces(interfaces_string);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (cur = user_info; *cur != NULL; cur++) {
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "user=")) {
+ user_name = estrdup(*cur + sizeof("user=") - 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "uid=")) {
+ user_uid = (uid_t) atoi(*cur + sizeof("uid=") - 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "gid=")) {
+ p = *cur + sizeof("gid=") - 1;
+ user_gid = (gid_t) atoi(p);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "groups=")) {
+ groups = *cur + sizeof("groups=") - 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "cwd=")) {
+ user_cwd = estrdup(*cur + sizeof("cwd=") - 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "tty=")) {
+ user_tty = user_ttypath = estrdup(*cur + sizeof("tty=") - 1);
+ if (strncmp(user_tty, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
+ user_tty += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "host=")) {
+ user_host = user_shost = estrdup(*cur + sizeof("host=") - 1);
+ if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.')))
+ user_shost = estrndup(user_host, (size_t)(p - user_host));
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "lines=")) {
+ sudo_user.lines = atoi(*cur + sizeof("lines=") - 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (MATCHES(*cur, "cols=")) {
+ sudo_user.cols = atoi(*cur + sizeof("cols=") - 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ if (user_cwd == NULL)
+ user_cwd = "unknown";
+ if (user_tty == NULL)
+ user_tty = "unknown"; /* user_ttypath remains NULL */
+
+ if (groups != NULL && groups[0] != '\0') {
+ const char *cp;
+ GETGROUPS_T *gids;
+ int ngids;
+
+ /* Count number of groups, including passwd gid. */
+ ngids = 2;
+ for (cp = groups; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+ if (*cp == ',')
+ ngids++;
+ }
+
+ /* The first gid in the list is the passwd group gid. */
+ gids = emalloc2(ngids, sizeof(GETGROUPS_T));
+ gids[0] = user_gid;
+ ngids = 1;
+ cp = groups;
+ for (;;) {
+ gids[ngids] = atoi(cp);
+ if (gids[0] != gids[ngids])
+ ngids++;
+ cp = strchr(cp, ',');
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ break;
+ cp++; /* skip over comma */
+ }
+ set_group_list(user_name, gids, ngids);
+ efree(gids);
+ }
+
+ /* Setup debugging if indicated. */
+ if (debug_flags != NULL) {
+ sudo_debug_init(NULL, debug_flags);
+ for (cur = settings; *cur != NULL; cur++)
+ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, "settings: %s", *cur);
+ for (cur = user_info; *cur != NULL; cur++)
+ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, "user_info: %s", *cur);
+ }
+
+#undef MATCHES
+ debug_return_int(flags);
+}
+
+static char *
+resolve_editor(char *editor, int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out)
+{
+ char *cp, **nargv, *editor_path = NULL;
+ int ac, i, nargc;
+ bool wasblank;
+ debug_decl(resolve_editor, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ editor = estrdup(editor); /* becomes part of argv_out */
+
+ /*
+ * Split editor into an argument vector; editor is reused (do not free).
+ * The EDITOR and VISUAL environment variables may contain command
+ * line args so look for those and alloc space for them too.
+ */
+ nargc = 1;
+ for (wasblank = false, cp = editor; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+ if (isblank((unsigned char) *cp))
+ wasblank = true;
+ else if (wasblank) {
+ wasblank = false;
+ nargc++;
+ }
+ }
+ /* If we can't find the editor in the user's PATH, give up. */
+ cp = strtok(editor, " \t");
+ if (cp == NULL ||
+ find_path(cp, &editor_path, NULL, getenv("PATH"), 0) != FOUND) {
+ efree(editor);
+ debug_return_str(NULL);
+ }
+ nargv = (char **) emalloc2(nargc + 1 + nfiles + 1, sizeof(char *));
+ for (ac = 0; cp != NULL && ac < nargc; ac++) {
+ nargv[ac] = cp;
+ cp = strtok(NULL, " \t");
+ }
+ nargv[ac++] = "--";
+ for (i = 0; i < nfiles; )
+ nargv[ac++] = files[i++];
+ nargv[ac] = NULL;
+
+ *argv_out = nargv;
+ debug_return_str(editor_path);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine which editor to use. We don't need to worry about restricting
+ * this to a "safe" editor since it runs with the uid of the invoking user,
+ * not the runas (privileged) user.
+ */
+static char *
+find_editor(int nfiles, char **files, char ***argv_out)
+{
+ char *cp, *editor, *editor_path = NULL, **ev, *ev0[4];
+ debug_decl(find_editor, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ /*
+ * If any of SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL or EDITOR are set, choose the first one.
+ */
+ ev0[0] = "SUDO_EDITOR";
+ ev0[1] = "VISUAL";
+ ev0[2] = "EDITOR";
+ ev0[3] = NULL;
+ for (ev = ev0; *ev != NULL; ev++) {
+ if ((editor = getenv(*ev)) != NULL && *editor != '\0') {
+ editor_path = resolve_editor(editor, nfiles, files, argv_out);
+ if (editor_path != NULL)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (editor_path == NULL) {
+ /* def_editor could be a path, split it up */
+ editor = estrdup(def_editor);
+ cp = strtok(editor, ":");
+ while (cp != NULL && editor_path == NULL) {
+ editor_path = resolve_editor(cp, nfiles, files, argv_out);
+ cp = strtok(NULL, ":");
+ }
+ if (editor_path)
+ efree(editor);
+ }
+ if (!editor_path) {
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, _("%s: command not found"), editor);
+ warningx(_("%s: command not found"), editor);
+ }
+ debug_return_str(editor_path);
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_ADMIN_FLAG
+static void
+create_admin_success_flag(void)
+{
+ struct stat statbuf;
+ char flagfile[PATH_MAX];
+ int fd, n;
+ debug_decl(create_admin_success_flag, SUDO_DEBUG_PLUGIN)
+
+ /* Check whether the user is in the admin group. */
+ if (!user_in_group(sudo_user.pw, "admin"))
+ debug_return;
+
+ /* Build path to flag file. */
+ n = snprintf(flagfile, sizeof(flagfile), "%s/.sudo_as_admin_successful",
+ user_dir);
+ if (n <= 0 || n >= sizeof(flagfile))
+ debug_return;
+
+ /* Create admin flag file if it doesn't already exist. */
+ set_perms(PERM_USER);
+ if (stat(flagfile, &statbuf) != 0) {
+ fd = open(flagfile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0644);
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ restore_perms();
+ debug_return;
+}
+#else /* !USE_ADMIN_FLAG */
+static void
+create_admin_success_flag(void)
+{
+ /* STUB */
+}
+#endif /* USE_ADMIN_FLAG */
+
+static void
+sudoers_policy_register_hooks(int version, int (*register_hook)(struct sudo_hook *hook))
+{
+ struct sudo_hook hook;
+
+ memset(&hook, 0, sizeof(hook));
+ hook.hook_version = SUDO_HOOK_VERSION;
+
+ hook.hook_type = SUDO_HOOK_SETENV;
+ hook.hook_fn = sudoers_hook_setenv;
+ register_hook(&hook);
+
+ hook.hook_type = SUDO_HOOK_UNSETENV;
+ hook.hook_fn = sudoers_hook_unsetenv;
+ register_hook(&hook);
+
+ hook.hook_type = SUDO_HOOK_GETENV;
+ hook.hook_fn = sudoers_hook_getenv;
+ register_hook(&hook);
+
+ hook.hook_type = SUDO_HOOK_PUTENV;
+ hook.hook_fn = sudoers_hook_putenv;
+ register_hook(&hook);
+}
+
+struct policy_plugin sudoers_policy = {
+ SUDO_POLICY_PLUGIN,
+ SUDO_API_VERSION,
+ sudoers_policy_open,
+ sudoers_policy_close,
+ sudoers_policy_version,
+ sudoers_policy_check,
+ sudoers_policy_list,
+ sudoers_policy_validate,
+ sudoers_policy_invalidate,
+ sudoers_policy_init_session,
+ sudoers_policy_register_hooks
+};
projects / debian / sudo / blobdiff