--- /dev/null
+.\" Copyright (c) 1994-1996, 1998-2005, 2007-2012
+.\" Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+.\"
+.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+.\"
+.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+.\" ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+.\" Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+.\" Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+.\"
+.nr SL @SEMAN@
+.nr BA @BAMAN@
+.nr LC @LCMAN@
+.nr PT @password_timeout@
+.\"
+.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.23 (Pod::Simple 3.14)
+.\"
+.\" Standard preamble:
+.\" ========================================================================
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+..
+.\}
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+. ds /
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+.if t \{\
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+.\}
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+.\}
+.rm #[ #] #H #V #F C
+.\" ========================================================================
+.\"
+.IX Title "SUDO @mansectsu@"
+.TH SUDO @mansectsu@ "March 15, 2012" "1.8.5" "MAINTENANCE COMMANDS"
+.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
+.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
+.if n .ad l
+.nh
+.SH "NAME"
+sudo, sudoedit \- execute a command as another user
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
+\&\fBsudo\fR \fB\-h\fR | \fB\-K\fR | \fB\-k\fR | \fB\-V\fR
+.PP
+\&\fBsudo\fR \fB\-v\fR [\fB\-AknS\fR]
+.if \n(BA [\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
+[\fB\-g\fR\ \fIgroup\ name\fR|\fI#gid\fR] [\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR]
+[\fB\-u\fR\ \fIuser\ name\fR|\fI#uid\fR]
+.PP
+\&\fBsudo\fR \fB\-l[l]\fR [\fB\-AknS\fR]
+.if \n(BA [\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
+[\fB\-g\fR\ \fIgroup\ name\fR|\fI#gid\fR] [\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR]
+[\fB\-U\fR\ \fIuser\ name\fR] [\fB\-u\fR\ \fIuser\ name\fR|\fI#uid\fR] [\fIcommand\fR]
+.PP
+\&\fBsudo\fR [\fB\-AbEHnPS\fR]
+.if \n(BA [\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
+[\fB\-C\fR\ \fIfd\fR]
+.if \n(LC [\fB\-c\fR\ \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR]
+[\fB\-g\fR\ \fIgroup\ name\fR|\fI#gid\fR] [\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR]
+.if \n(SL [\fB\-r\fR\ \fIrole\fR] [\fB\-t\fR\ \fItype\fR]
+[\fB\-u\fR\ \fIuser\ name\fR|\fI#uid\fR]
+[\fB\s-1VAR\s0\fR=\fIvalue\fR] [\fB\-i\fR\ |\ \fB\-s\fR] [\fIcommand\fR]
+.PP
+\&\fBsudoedit\fR [\fB\-AnS\fR]
+.if \n(BA [\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
+[\fB\-C\fR\ \fIfd\fR]
+.if \n(LC [\fB\-c\fR\ \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR]
+[\fB\-g\fR\ \fIgroup\ name\fR|\fI#gid\fR] [\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR]
+[\fB\-u\fR\ \fIuser\ name\fR|\fI#uid\fR] file ...
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
+\&\fBsudo\fR allows a permitted user to execute a \fIcommand\fR as the
+superuser or another user, as specified by the security policy.
+The real and effective uid and gid are set to match those of the
+target user, as specified in the password database, and the group
+vector is initialized based on the group database (unless the \fB\-P\fR
+option was specified).
+.PP
+\&\fBsudo\fR supports a plugin architecture for security policies and
+input/output logging. Third parties can develop and distribute
+their own policy and I/O logging modules to work seamlessly with
+the \fBsudo\fR front end. The default security policy is \fIsudoers\fR,
+which is configured via the file \fI@sysconfdir@/sudoers\fR, or via
+\&\s-1LDAP\s0. See the \s-1PLUGINS\s0 section for more information.
+.PP
+The security policy determines what privileges, if any, a user has
+to run \fBsudo\fR. The policy may require that users authenticate
+themselves with a password or another authentication mechanism. If
+authentication is required, \fBsudo\fR will exit if the user's password
+is not entered within a configurable time limit. This limit is
+policy-specific; the default password prompt timeout for the
+\&\fIsudoers\fR security policy is
+.ie \n(PT \f(CW\*(C`@password_timeout@\*(C'\fR minutes.
+.el unlimited.
+.PP
+Security policies may support credential caching to allow the user
+to run \fBsudo\fR again for a period of time without requiring
+authentication. The \fIsudoers\fR policy caches credentials for
+\&\f(CW\*(C`@timeout@\*(C'\fR minutes, unless overridden in \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@). By
+running \fBsudo\fR with the \fB\-v\fR option, a user can update the cached
+credentials without running a \fIcommand\fR.
+.PP
+When invoked as \fBsudoedit\fR, the \fB\-e\fR option (described below),
+is implied.
+.PP
+Security policies may log successful and failed attempts to use
+\&\fBsudo\fR. If an I/O plugin is configured, the running command's
+input and output may be logged as well.
+.SH "OPTIONS"
+.IX Header "OPTIONS"
+\&\fBsudo\fR accepts the following command line options:
+.IP "\-A" 12
+.IX Item "-A"
+Normally, if \fBsudo\fR requires a password, it will read it from the
+user's terminal. If the \fB\-A\fR (\fIaskpass\fR) option is specified,
+a (possibly graphical) helper program is executed to read the user's
+password and output the password to the standard output. If the
+\&\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_ASKPASS\*(C'\fR environment variable is set, it specifies the path
+to the helper program. Otherwise, if \fI@sysconfdir@/sudo.conf\fR
+contains a line specifying the askpass program, that value will be
+used. For example:
+.Sp
+.Vb 2
+\& # Path to askpass helper program
+\& Path askpass /usr/X11R6/bin/ssh\-askpass
+.Ve
+.Sp
+If no askpass program is available, sudo will exit with an error.
+.if \n(BA \{\
+.IP "\-a \fItype\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-a type"
+The \fB\-a\fR (\fIauthentication type\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to use the
+specified authentication type when validating the user, as allowed
+by \fI/etc/login.conf\fR. The system administrator may specify a list
+of sudo-specific authentication methods by adding an \*(L"auth-sudo\*(R"
+entry in \fI/etc/login.conf\fR. This option is only available on systems
+that support \s-1BSD\s0 authentication.
+\}
+.IP "\-b" 12
+.IX Item "-b"
+The \fB\-b\fR (\fIbackground\fR) option tells \fBsudo\fR to run the given
+command in the background. Note that if you use the \fB\-b\fR
+option you cannot use shell job control to manipulate the process.
+Most interactive commands will fail to work properly in background
+mode.
+.IP "\-C \fIfd\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-C fd"
+Normally, \fBsudo\fR will close all open file descriptors other than
+standard input, standard output and standard error. The \fB\-C\fR
+(\fIclose from\fR) option allows the user to specify a starting point
+above the standard error (file descriptor three). Values less than
+three are not permitted. The security policy may restrict the
+user's ability to use the \fB\-C\fR option. The \fIsudoers\fR policy only
+permits use of the \fB\-C\fR option when the administrator has enabled
+the \fIclosefrom_override\fR option.
+.if \n(LC \{\
+.IP "\-c \fIclass\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-c class"
+The \fB\-c\fR (\fIclass\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to run the specified command
+with resources limited by the specified login class. The \fIclass\fR
+argument can be either a class name as defined in \fI/etc/login.conf\fR,
+or a single '\-' character. Specifying a \fIclass\fR of \f(CW\*(C`\-\*(C'\fR indicates
+that the command should be run restricted by the default login
+capabilities for the user the command is run as. If the \fIclass\fR
+argument specifies an existing user class, the command must be run
+as root, or the \fBsudo\fR command must be run from a shell that is already
+root. This option is only available on systems with \s-1BSD\s0 login classes.
+\}
+.IP "\-E" 12
+.IX Item "-E"
+The \fB\-E\fR (\fIpreserve\fR \fIenvironment\fR) option indicates to the
+security policy that the user wishes to preserve their existing
+environment variables. The security policy may return an error if
+the \fB\-E\fR option is specified and the user does not have permission
+to preserve the environment.
+.IP "\-e" 12
+.IX Item "-e"
+The \fB\-e\fR (\fIedit\fR) option indicates that, instead of running a
+command, the user wishes to edit one or more files. In lieu of a
+command, the string \*(L"sudoedit\*(R" is used when consulting the security
+policy. If the user is authorized by the policy, the following
+steps are taken:
+.RS 12
+.IP "1." 4
+Temporary copies are made of the files to be edited with the owner
+set to the invoking user.
+.IP "2." 4
+The editor specified by the policy is run to edit the temporary files.
+The \fIsudoers\fR policy uses the \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'\fR and \f(CW\*(C`EDITOR\*(C'\fR
+environment variables (in that order). If none of \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'\fR,
+\&\f(CW\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`EDITOR\*(C'\fR are set, the first program listed in the
+\&\fIeditor\fR \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@) option is used.
+.IP "3." 4
+If they have been modified, the temporary files are copied back to
+their original location and the temporary versions are removed.
+.RE
+.RS 12
+.Sp
+If the specified file does not exist, it will be created. Note
+that unlike most commands run by \fBsudo\fR, the editor is run with
+the invoking user's environment unmodified. If, for some reason,
+\&\fBsudo\fR is unable to update a file with its edited version, the
+user will receive a warning and the edited copy will remain in a
+temporary file.
+.RE
+.IP "\-g \fIgroup\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-g group"
+Normally, \fBsudo\fR runs a command with the primary group set to the
+one specified by the password database for the user the command is
+being run as (by default, root). The \fB\-g\fR (\fIgroup\fR) option causes
+\&\fBsudo\fR to run the command with the primary group set to \fIgroup\fR
+instead. To specify a \fIgid\fR instead of a \fIgroup name\fR, use
+\&\fI#gid\fR. When running commands as a \fIgid\fR, many shells require
+that the '#' be escaped with a backslash ('\e'). If no \fB\-u\fR option
+is specified, the command will be run as the invoking user (not
+root). In either case, the primary group will be set to \fIgroup\fR.
+.IP "\-H" 12
+.IX Item "-H"
+The \fB\-H\fR (\fI\s-1HOME\s0\fR) option requests that the security policy set
+the \f(CW\*(C`HOME\*(C'\fR environment variable to the home directory of the target
+user (root by default) as specified by the password database.
+Depending on the policy, this may be the default behavior.
+.IP "\-h" 12
+.IX Item "-h"
+The \fB\-h\fR (\fIhelp\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to print a short help message
+to the standard output and exit.
+.IP "\-i [command]" 12
+.IX Item "-i [command]"
+The \fB\-i\fR (\fIsimulate initial login\fR) option runs the shell specified
+by the password database entry of the target user as a login shell.
+This means that login-specific resource files such as \f(CW\*(C`.profile\*(C'\fR
+or \f(CW\*(C`.login\*(C'\fR will be read by the shell. If a command is specified,
+it is passed to the shell for execution via the shell's \fB\-c\fR option.
+If no command is specified, an interactive shell is executed.
+\&\fBsudo\fR attempts to change to that user's home directory before
+running the shell. The security policy shall initialize the
+environment to a minimal set of variables, similar to what is present
+when a user logs in. The \fICommand Environment\fR section in the
+\&\fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@) manual documents how the \fB\-i\fR option affects the
+environment in which a command is run when the \fIsudoers\fR policy
+is in use.
+.IP "\-K" 12
+.IX Item "-K"
+The \fB\-K\fR (sure \fIkill\fR) option is like \fB\-k\fR except that it removes
+the user's cached credentials entirely and may not be used in
+conjunction with a command or other option. This option does not
+require a password. Not all security policies support credential
+caching.
+.IP "\-k [command]" 12
+.IX Item "-k [command]"
+When used alone, the \fB\-k\fR (\fIkill\fR) option to \fBsudo\fR invalidates
+the user's cached credentials. The next time \fBsudo\fR is run a
+password will be required. This option does not require a password
+and was added to allow a user to revoke \fBsudo\fR permissions from a
+\&.logout file. Not all security policies support credential
+caching.
+.Sp
+When used in conjunction with a command or an option that may require
+a password, the \fB\-k\fR option will cause \fBsudo\fR to ignore the user's
+cached credentials. As a result, \fBsudo\fR will prompt for a password
+(if one is required by the security policy) and will not update the
+user's cached credentials.
+.IP "\-l[l] [\fIcommand\fR]" 12
+.IX Item "-l[l] [command]"
+If no \fIcommand\fR is specified, the \fB\-l\fR (\fIlist\fR) option will list
+the allowed (and forbidden) commands for the invoking user (or the
+user specified by the \fB\-U\fR option) on the current host. If a
+\&\fIcommand\fR is specified and is permitted by the security policy,
+the fully-qualified path to the command is displayed along with any
+command line arguments. If \fIcommand\fR is specified but not allowed,
+\&\fBsudo\fR will exit with a status value of 1. If the \fB\-l\fR option
+is specified with an \fBl\fR argument (i.e. \fB\-ll\fR), or if \fB\-l\fR is
+specified multiple times, a longer list format is used.
+.IP "\-n" 12
+.IX Item "-n"
+The \fB\-n\fR (\fInon-interactive\fR) option prevents \fBsudo\fR from prompting
+the user for a password. If a password is required for the command
+to run, \fBsudo\fR will display an error messages and exit.
+.IP "\-P" 12
+.IX Item "-P"
+The \fB\-P\fR (\fIpreserve\fR \fIgroup vector\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to
+preserve the invoking user's group vector unaltered. By default,
+the \fIsudoers\fR policy will initialize the group vector to the list
+of groups the target user is in. The real and effective group IDs,
+however, are still set to match the target user.
+.IP "\-p \fIprompt\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-p prompt"
+The \fB\-p\fR (\fIprompt\fR) option allows you to override the default
+password prompt and use a custom one. The following percent (`\f(CW\*(C`%\*(C'\fR')
+escapes are supported by the \fIsudoers\fR policy:
+.RS 12
+.ie n .IP "%H" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW%H\fR" 4
+.IX Item "%H"
+expanded to the host name including the domain name (on if
+the machine's host name is fully qualified or the \fIfqdn\fR option
+is set in \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@))
+.ie n .IP "%h" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW%h\fR" 4
+.IX Item "%h"
+expanded to the local host name without the domain name
+.ie n .IP "%p" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW%p\fR" 4
+.IX Item "%p"
+expanded to the name of the user whose password is being requested
+(respects the \fIrootpw\fR, \fItargetpw\fR and \fIrunaspw\fR flags in
+\&\fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@))
+.ie n .IP "%U" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW%U\fR" 4
+.IX Item "%U"
+expanded to the login name of the user the command will be run as
+(defaults to root unless the \f(CW\*(C`\-u\*(C'\fR option is also specified)
+.ie n .IP "%u" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW%u\fR" 4
+.IX Item "%u"
+expanded to the invoking user's login name
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`%%\*(C'" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`%%\*(C'\fR" 4
+.IX Item "%%"
+two consecutive \f(CW\*(C`%\*(C'\fR characters are collapsed into a single \f(CW\*(C`%\*(C'\fR character
+.RE
+.RS 12
+.Sp
+The prompt specified by the \fB\-p\fR option will override the system
+password prompt on systems that support \s-1PAM\s0 unless the
+\&\fIpassprompt_override\fR flag is disabled in \fIsudoers\fR.
+.RE
+.if \n(SL \{\
+.IP "\-r \fIrole\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-r role"
+The \fB\-r\fR (\fIrole\fR) option causes the new (SELinux) security context to
+have the role specified by \fIrole\fR.
+\}
+.IP "\-S" 12
+.IX Item "-S"
+The \fB\-S\fR (\fIstdin\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to read the password from
+the standard input instead of the terminal device. The password must
+be followed by a newline character.
+.IP "\-s [command]" 12
+.IX Item "-s [command]"
+The \fB\-s\fR (\fIshell\fR) option runs the shell specified by the \fI\s-1SHELL\s0\fR
+environment variable if it is set or the shell as specified in the
+password database. If a command is specified, it is passed to the
+shell for execution via the shell's \fB\-c\fR option. If no command
+is specified, an interactive shell is executed.
+.if \n(SL \{\
+.IP "\-t \fItype\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-t type"
+The \fB\-t\fR (\fItype\fR) option causes the new (SELinux) security context to
+have the type specified by \fItype\fR. If no type is specified, the default
+type is derived from the specified role.
+\}
+.IP "\-U \fIuser\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-U user"
+The \fB\-U\fR (\fIother user\fR) option is used in conjunction with the
+\&\fB\-l\fR option to specify the user whose privileges should be listed.
+The security policy may restrict listing other users' privileges.
+The \fIsudoers\fR policy only allows root or a user with the \f(CW\*(C`ALL\*(C'\fR
+privilege on the current host to use this option.
+.IP "\-u \fIuser\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-u user"
+The \fB\-u\fR (\fIuser\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to run the specified
+command as a user other than \fIroot\fR. To specify a \fIuid\fR instead
+of a \fIuser name\fR, use \fI#uid\fR. When running commands as a \fIuid\fR,
+many shells require that the '#' be escaped with a backslash ('\e').
+Security policies may restrict \fIuid\fRs to those listed in the
+password database. The \fIsudoers\fR policy allows \fIuid\fRs that are
+not in the password database as long as the \fItargetpw\fR option is
+not set. Other security policies may not support this.
+.IP "\-V" 12
+.IX Item "-V"
+The \fB\-V\fR (\fIversion\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to print its version
+string and the version string of the security policy plugin and any
+I/O plugins. If the invoking user is already root the \fB\-V\fR option
+will display the arguments passed to configure when \fIsudo\fR was
+built and plugins may display more verbose information such as
+default options.
+.IP "\-v" 12
+.IX Item "-v"
+When given the \fB\-v\fR (\fIvalidate\fR) option, \fBsudo\fR will update the
+user's cached credentials, authenticating the user's password if
+necessary. For the \fIsudoers\fR plugin, this extends the \fBsudo\fR
+timeout for another \f(CW\*(C`@timeout@\*(C'\fR minutes (or whatever the timeout
+is set to in \fIsudoers\fR) but does not run a command. Not all
+security policies support cached credentials.
+.IP "\-\-" 12
+The \fB\-\-\fR option indicates that \fBsudo\fR should stop processing command
+line arguments.
+.PP
+Environment variables to be set for the command may also be passed
+on the command line in the form of \fB\s-1VAR\s0\fR=\fIvalue\fR, e.g.
+\&\fB\s-1LD_LIBRARY_PATH\s0\fR=\fI/usr/local/pkg/lib\fR. Variables passed on the
+command line are subject to the same restrictions as normal environment
+variables with one important exception. If the \fIsetenv\fR option
+is set in \fIsudoers\fR, the command to be run has the \f(CW\*(C`SETENV\*(C'\fR tag
+set or the command matched is \f(CW\*(C`ALL\*(C'\fR, the user may set variables
+that would otherwise be forbidden. See \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@) for more information.
+.SH "PLUGINS"
+.IX Header "PLUGINS"
+Plugins are dynamically loaded based on the contents of the
+\&\fI@sysconfdir@/sudo.conf\fR file. If no \fI@sysconfdir@/sudo.conf\fR
+file is present, or it contains no \f(CW\*(C`Plugin\*(C'\fR lines, \fBsudo\fR
+will use the traditional \fIsudoers\fR security policy and I/O logging,
+which corresponds to the following \fI@sysconfdir@/sudo.conf\fR file.
+.PP
+.Vb 10
+\& #
+\& # Default @sysconfdir@/sudo.conf file
+\& #
+\& # Format:
+\& # Plugin plugin_name plugin_path plugin_options ...
+\& # Path askpass /path/to/askpass
+\& # Path noexec /path/to/sudo_noexec.so
+\& # Debug sudo /var/log/sudo_debug all@warn
+\& # Set disable_coredump true
+\& #
+\& # The plugin_path is relative to @prefix@/libexec unless
+\& # fully qualified.
+\& # The plugin_name corresponds to a global symbol in the plugin
+\& # that contains the plugin interface structure.
+\& # The plugin_options are optional.
+\& #
+\& Plugin policy_plugin sudoers.so
+\& Plugin io_plugin sudoers.so
+.Ve
+.PP
+A \f(CW\*(C`Plugin\*(C'\fR line consists of the \f(CW\*(C`Plugin\*(C'\fR keyword, followed by the
+\&\fIsymbol_name\fR and the \fIpath\fR to the shared object containing the
+plugin. The \fIsymbol_name\fR is the name of the \f(CW\*(C`struct policy_plugin\*(C'\fR
+or \f(CW\*(C`struct io_plugin\*(C'\fR in the plugin shared object. The \fIpath\fR
+may be fully qualified or relative. If not fully qualified it is
+relative to the \fI@prefix@/libexec\fR directory. Any additional
+parameters after the \fIpath\fR are passed as arguments to the plugin's
+\&\fIopen\fR function. Lines that don't begin with \f(CW\*(C`Plugin\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`Path\*(C'\fR,
+\&\f(CW\*(C`Debug\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`Set\*(C'\fR are silently ignored.
+.PP
+For more information, see the \fIsudo_plugin\fR\|(@mansectsu@) manual.
+.SH "PATHS"
+.IX Header "PATHS"
+A \f(CW\*(C`Path\*(C'\fR line consists of the \f(CW\*(C`Path\*(C'\fR keyword, followed by the
+name of the path to set and its value. E.g.
+.PP
+.Vb 2
+\& Path noexec @noexec_file@
+\& Path askpass /usr/X11R6/bin/ssh\-askpass
+.Ve
+.PP
+The following plugin-agnostic paths may be set in the
+\&\fI@sysconfdir@/sudo.conf\fR file.
+.IP "askpass" 16
+.IX Item "askpass"
+The fully qualified path to a helper program used to read the user's
+password when no terminal is available. This may be the case when
+\&\fBsudo\fR is executed from a graphical (as opposed to text-based)
+application. The program specified by \fIaskpass\fR should display
+the argument passed to it as the prompt and write the user's password
+to the standard output. The value of \fIaskpass\fR may be overridden
+by the \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_ASKPASS\*(C'\fR environment variable.
+.IP "noexec" 16
+.IX Item "noexec"
+The fully-qualified path to a shared library containing dummy
+versions of the \fIexecv()\fR, \fIexecve()\fR and \fIfexecve()\fR library functions
+that just return an error. This is used to implement the \fInoexec\fR
+functionality on systems that support \f(CW\*(C`LD_PRELOAD\*(C'\fR or its equivalent.
+Defaults to \fI@noexec_file@\fR.
+.SH "DEBUG FLAGS"
+.IX Header "DEBUG FLAGS"
+\&\fBsudo\fR versions 1.8.4 and higher support a flexible debugging
+framework that can help track down what \fBsudo\fR is doing internally
+if there is a problem.
+.PP
+A \f(CW\*(C`Debug\*(C'\fR line consists of the \f(CW\*(C`Debug\*(C'\fR keyword, followed by the
+name of the program to debug (\fBsudo\fR, \fBvisudo\fR, \fBsudoreplay\fR),
+the debug file name and a comma-separated list of debug flags.
+The debug flag syntax used by \fBsudo\fR and the \fIsudoers\fR plugin is
+\&\fIsubsystem\fR@\fIpriority\fR but the plugin is free to use a different
+format so long as it does not include a command \f(CW\*(C`,\*(C'\fR.
+.PP
+For instance:
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& Debug sudo /var/log/sudo_debug all@warn,plugin@info
+.Ve
+.PP
+would log all debugging statements at the \fIwarn\fR level and higher
+in addition to those at the \fIinfo\fR level for the plugin subsystem.
+.PP
+Currently, only one \f(CW\*(C`Debug\*(C'\fR entry per program is supported. The
+\&\f(CW\*(C`sudo\*(C'\fR \f(CW\*(C`Debug\*(C'\fR entry is shared by the \fBsudo\fR front end, \fBsudoedit\fR
+and the plugins. A future release may add support for per-plugin
+\&\f(CW\*(C`Debug\*(C'\fR lines and/or support for multiple debugging files for a
+single program.
+.PP
+The priorities used by the \fBsudo\fR front end, in order of decreasing
+severity, are: \fIcrit\fR, \fIerr\fR, \fIwarn\fR, \fInotice\fR, \fIdiag\fR, \fIinfo\fR,
+\&\fItrace\fR and \fIdebug\fR. Each priority, when specified, also includes
+all priorities higher than it. For example, a priority of \fInotice\fR
+would include debug messages logged at \fInotice\fR and higher.
+.PP
+The following subsystems are used by \fBsudo\fR:
+.IP "\fIall\fR" 10
+.IX Item "all"
+matches every subsystem
+.IP "\fIargs\fR" 10
+.IX Item "args"
+command line argument processing
+.IP "\fIconv\fR" 10
+.IX Item "conv"
+user conversation
+.IP "\fIedit\fR" 10
+.IX Item "edit"
+sudoedit
+.IP "\fIexec\fR" 10
+.IX Item "exec"
+command execution
+.IP "\fImain\fR" 10
+.IX Item "main"
+\&\fBsudo\fR main function
+.IP "\fInetif\fR" 10
+.IX Item "netif"
+network interface handling
+.IP "\fIpcomm\fR" 10
+.IX Item "pcomm"
+communication with the plugin
+.IP "\fIplugin\fR" 10
+.IX Item "plugin"
+plugin configuration
+.IP "\fIpty\fR" 10
+.IX Item "pty"
+pseudo-tty related code
+.IP "\fIselinux\fR" 10
+.IX Item "selinux"
+SELinux-specific handling
+.IP "\fIutil\fR" 10
+.IX Item "util"
+utility functions
+.IP "\fIutmp\fR" 10
+.IX Item "utmp"
+utmp handling
+.SH "RETURN VALUES"
+.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
+Upon successful execution of a program, the exit status from \fBsudo\fR
+will simply be the exit status of the program that was executed.
+.PP
+Otherwise, \fBsudo\fR exits with a value of 1 if there is a
+configuration/permission problem or if \fBsudo\fR cannot execute the
+given command. In the latter case the error string is printed to
+the standard error. If \fBsudo\fR cannot \fIstat\fR\|(2) one or more entries
+in the user's \f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR, an error is printed on stderr. (If the
+directory does not exist or if it is not really a directory, the
+entry is ignored and no error is printed.) This should not happen
+under normal circumstances. The most common reason for \fIstat\fR\|(2)
+to return \*(L"permission denied\*(R" is if you are running an automounter
+and one of the directories in your \f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR is on a machine that is
+currently unreachable.
+.SH "SECURITY NOTES"
+.IX Header "SECURITY NOTES"
+\&\fBsudo\fR tries to be safe when executing external commands.
+.PP
+To prevent command spoofing, \fBsudo\fR checks \*(L".\*(R" and "" (both denoting
+current directory) last when searching for a command in the user's
+\&\s-1PATH\s0 (if one or both are in the \s-1PATH\s0). Note, however, that the
+actual \f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR environment variable is \fInot\fR modified and is passed
+unchanged to the program that \fBsudo\fR executes.
+.PP
+Please note that \fBsudo\fR will normally only log the command it
+explicitly runs. If a user runs a command such as \f(CW\*(C`sudo su\*(C'\fR or
+\&\f(CW\*(C`sudo sh\*(C'\fR, subsequent commands run from that shell are not subject
+to \fBsudo\fR's security policy. The same is true for commands that
+offer shell escapes (including most editors). If I/O logging is
+enabled, subsequent commands will have their input and/or output
+logged, but there will not be traditional logs for those commands.
+Because of this, care must be taken when giving users access to
+commands via \fBsudo\fR to verify that the command does not inadvertently
+give the user an effective root shell. For more information, please
+see the \f(CW\*(C`PREVENTING SHELL ESCAPES\*(C'\fR section in \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@).
+.PP
+To prevent the disclosure of potentially sensitive information,
+\&\fBsudo\fR disables core dumps by default while it is executing (they
+are re-enabled for the command that is run). To aid in debugging
+\&\fBsudo\fR crashes, you may wish to re-enable core dumps by setting
+\&\*(L"disable_coredump\*(R" to false in the \fI@sysconfdir@/sudo.conf\fR file.
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& Set disable_coredump false
+.Ve
+.PP
+Note that by default, most operating systems disable core dumps
+from setuid programs, which includes \fBsudo\fR. To actually get a
+\&\fBsudo\fR core file you may need to enable core dumps for setuid
+processes. On \s-1BSD\s0 and Linux systems this is accomplished via the
+sysctl command, on Solaris the coreadm command can be used.
+.SH "ENVIRONMENT"
+.IX Header "ENVIRONMENT"
+\&\fBsudo\fR utilizes the following environment variables. The security
+policy has control over the content of the command's environment.
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`EDITOR\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`EDITOR\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "EDITOR"
+Default editor to use in \fB\-e\fR (sudoedit) mode if neither \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'\fR
+nor \f(CW\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'\fR is set
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`MAIL\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`MAIL\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "MAIL"
+In \fB\-i\fR mode or when \fIenv_reset\fR is enabled in \fIsudoers\fR, set
+to the mail spool of the target user
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`HOME\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`HOME\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "HOME"
+Set to the home directory of the target user if \fB\-i\fR or \fB\-H\fR are
+specified, \fIenv_reset\fR or \fIalways_set_home\fR are set in \fIsudoers\fR,
+or when the \fB\-s\fR option is specified and \fIset_home\fR is set in
+\&\fIsudoers\fR
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`PATH\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "PATH"
+May be overridden by the security policy.
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SHELL\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SHELL\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SHELL"
+Used to determine shell to run with \f(CW\*(C`\-s\*(C'\fR option
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_ASKPASS\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_ASKPASS\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_ASKPASS"
+Specifies the path to a helper program used to read the password
+if no terminal is available or if the \f(CW\*(C`\-A\*(C'\fR option is specified.
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_COMMAND\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_COMMAND\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_COMMAND"
+Set to the command run by sudo
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_EDITOR"
+Default editor to use in \fB\-e\fR (sudoedit) mode
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_GID\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_GID\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_GID"
+Set to the group \s-1ID\s0 of the user who invoked sudo
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_PROMPT\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_PROMPT\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_PROMPT"
+Used as the default password prompt
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_PS1\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_PS1\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_PS1"
+If set, \f(CW\*(C`PS1\*(C'\fR will be set to its value for the program being run
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_UID\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_UID\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_UID"
+Set to the user \s-1ID\s0 of the user who invoked sudo
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_USER\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_USER\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_USER"
+Set to the login of the user who invoked sudo
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`USER\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`USER\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "USER"
+Set to the target user (root unless the \fB\-u\fR option is specified)
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "VISUAL"
+Default editor to use in \fB\-e\fR (sudoedit) mode if \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'\fR
+is not set
+.SH "FILES"
+.IX Header "FILES"
+.ie n .IP "\fI@sysconfdir@/sudo.conf\fR" 24
+.el .IP "\fI@sysconfdir@/sudo.conf\fR" 24
+.IX Item "@sysconfdir@/sudo.conf"
+\&\fBsudo\fR front end configuration
+.SH "EXAMPLES"
+.IX Header "EXAMPLES"
+Note: the following examples assume a properly configured security policy.
+.PP
+To get a file listing of an unreadable directory:
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& $ sudo ls /usr/local/protected
+.Ve
+.PP
+To list the home directory of user yaz on a machine where the
+file system holding ~yaz is not exported as root:
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& $ sudo \-u yaz ls ~yaz
+.Ve
+.PP
+To edit the \fIindex.html\fR file as user www:
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& $ sudo \-u www vi ~www/htdocs/index.html
+.Ve
+.PP
+To view system logs only accessible to root and users in the adm group:
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& $ sudo \-g adm view /var/log/syslog
+.Ve
+.PP
+To run an editor as jim with a different primary group:
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& $ sudo \-u jim \-g audio vi ~jim/sound.txt
+.Ve
+.PP
+To shutdown a machine:
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& $ sudo shutdown \-r +15 "quick reboot"
+.Ve
+.PP
+To make a usage listing of the directories in the /home
+partition. Note that this runs the commands in a sub-shell
+to make the \f(CW\*(C`cd\*(C'\fR and file redirection work.
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& $ sudo sh \-c "cd /home ; du \-s * | sort \-rn > USAGE"
+.Ve
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
+\&\fIgrep\fR\|(1), \fIsu\fR\|(1), \fIstat\fR\|(2),
+.if \n(LC \&\fIlogin_cap\fR\|(3),
+\&\fIpasswd\fR\|(@mansectform@), \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@), \fIsudo_plugin\fR\|(@mansectsu@), \fIsudoreplay\fR\|(@mansectsu@), \fIvisudo\fR\|(@mansectsu@)
+.SH "AUTHORS"
+.IX Header "AUTHORS"
+Many people have worked on \fBsudo\fR over the years; this
+version consists of code written primarily by:
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& Todd C. Miller
+.Ve
+.PP
+See the \s-1CONTRIBUTORS\s0 file in the \fBsudo\fR distribution
+(http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/contributors.html) for a list of people
+who have contributed to \fBsudo\fR.
+.SH "HISTORY"
+.IX Header "HISTORY"
+See the \s-1HISTORY\s0 file in the \fBsudo\fR distribution
+(http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/history.html) for a brief history of sudo.
+.SH "CAVEATS"
+.IX Header "CAVEATS"
+There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell
+if that user is allowed to run arbitrary commands via \fBsudo\fR.
+Also, many programs (such as editors) allow the user to run commands
+via shell escapes, thus avoiding \fBsudo\fR's checks. However, on
+most systems it is possible to prevent shell escapes with the
+\&\fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@) module's \fInoexec\fR functionality.
+.PP
+It is not meaningful to run the \f(CW\*(C`cd\*(C'\fR command directly via sudo, e.g.,
+.PP
+.Vb 1
+\& $ sudo cd /usr/local/protected
+.Ve
+.PP
+since when the command exits the parent process (your shell) will
+still be the same. Please see the \s-1EXAMPLES\s0 section for more information.
+.PP
+Running shell scripts via \fBsudo\fR can expose the same kernel bugs that
+make setuid shell scripts unsafe on some operating systems (if your \s-1OS\s0
+has a /dev/fd/ directory, setuid shell scripts are generally safe).
+.SH "BUGS"
+.IX Header "BUGS"
+If you feel you have found a bug in \fBsudo\fR, please submit a bug report
+at http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/bugs/
+.SH "SUPPORT"
+.IX Header "SUPPORT"
+Limited free support is available via the sudo-users mailing list,
+see http://www.sudo.ws/mailman/listinfo/sudo\-users to subscribe or
+search the archives.
+.SH "DISCLAIMER"
+.IX Header "DISCLAIMER"
+\&\fBsudo\fR is provided ``\s-1AS\s0 \s-1IS\s0'' and any express or implied warranties,
+including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability
+and fitness for a particular purpose are disclaimed. See the \s-1LICENSE\s0
+file distributed with \fBsudo\fR or http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/license.html
+for complete details.
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