From: Bdale Garbee Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2012 16:23:23 +0000 (-0600) Subject: Merge tag 'debian/1.8.5p2-1' into squeeze X-Git-Tag: 1.8.5p2-1_bpo60+1~1 X-Git-Url: https://git.gag.com/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=6ad45aa23af5f5f3b54468937d6a13089201b891;p=debian%2Fsudo Merge tag 'debian/1.8.5p2-1' into squeeze Conflicts: debian/changelog plugins/sudoers/check.c plugins/sudoers/env.c --- 6ad45aa23af5f5f3b54468937d6a13089201b891 diff --cc debian/changelog index 4772750,e03915c..84dbd04 --- a/debian/changelog +++ b/debian/changelog @@@ -1,18 -1,135 +1,156 @@@ ++sudo (1.8.5p2-1~bpo60+1) squeeze-backports; urgency=low ++ ++ * backport of version targeted for wheezy release by user request ++ ++ -- Bdale Garbee Tue, 25 Sep 2012 10:20:29 -0600 ++ + sudo (1.8.5p2-1) unstable; urgency=low + + * new upstream version + * patch to use flock on hurd, run autoconf in rules, closes: #655883 + * patch to avoid calling unlink with null pointer on hurd, closes: #655948 + * patch to actually use hardening build flags, closes: #655417 + * fix sudo-ldap.postinst syntax issue, closes: #669576 + + -- Bdale Garbee Thu, 28 Jun 2012 12:01:37 -0600 + + sudo (1.8.3p2-1) unstable; urgency=high + + * new upstream version, closes: #657985 (CVE-2012-0809) + * patch from Pino Toscano to only use selinux on Linux, closes: #655894 + + -- Bdale Garbee Mon, 30 Jan 2012 16:11:54 -0700 + + sudo (1.8.3p1-3) unstable; urgency=low + + * patch from Moritz Muehlenhoff enables hardened build flags, closes: #655417 + * replacement postinst script from Mike Beattie using shell instead of Perl + * include systemd service file from Michael Stapelberg, closes: #639633 + * add init.d status support, closes: #641782 + * make sudo-ldap package manage a sudoers entry in nsswitch.conf, + closes: #610600, #639530 + * enable mail_badpass in the default sudoers file, closes: #641218 + * enable selinux support, closes: #655510 + + -- Bdale Garbee Wed, 11 Jan 2012 16:18:13 -0700 + + sudo (1.8.3p1-2) unstable; urgency=low + + * if upgrading from squeeze, and the sudoers file is unmodified, avoid + the packaging system prompting the user about a change they didn't make + now that sudoers is a conffile, closes: #612532, #636049 + * add a recommendation for the use of visudo to the sudoers.d/README file, + closes: #648104 + + -- Bdale Garbee Sat, 12 Nov 2011 16:27:13 -0700 + + sudo (1.8.3p1-1) unstable; urgency=low + + * new upstream version, closes: #646478 + + -- Bdale Garbee Thu, 27 Oct 2011 01:03:44 +0200 + + sudo (1.8.3-1) unstable; urgency=low + + * new upstream version, closes: #639391, #639568 + + -- Bdale Garbee Sat, 22 Oct 2011 23:49:16 -0600 + + sudo (1.8.2-2) unstable; urgency=low + + [ Luca Capello ] + * debian/rules improvements, closes: #642535 + + mv upstream sample.* files to the examples folder. + - do not call dh_installexamples. + + [ Bdale Garbee ] + * patch from upstream for SIGBUS on sparc64, closes: #640304 + * use common-session-noninteractive in the pam config to reduce log noise + when sudo is used in cron, etc, closes: #519700 + * patch from Steven McDonald to fix segfault on startup under certain + conditions, closes: #639568 + * add a NEWS entry regarding the secure_path change made in 1.8.2-1, + closes: #639336 + + -- Bdale Garbee Mon, 26 Sep 2011 21:55:56 -0600 + + sudo (1.8.2-1) unstable; urgency=low + + * new upstream version, closes: #637449, #621830 + * include common-session in pam config, closes: #519700, #607199 + * move secure_path from configure to default sudoers, closes: #85123, 85917 + * improve sudoers self-documentation, closes: #613639 + * drop --disable-setresuid since modern systems should not run 2.2 kernels + * lose the --with-devel configure option since it's breaking builds in + subdirectories for some reason + + -- Bdale Garbee Wed, 24 Aug 2011 13:33:11 -0600 + + sudo (1.7.4p6-1) unstable; urgency=low + + * new upstream version + * touch the right stamp name after configuring, closes: #611287 + * patch from Svante Signell to fix build problem on Hurd, closes: #611290 + + -- Bdale Garbee Wed, 09 Feb 2011 11:32:58 -0700 + + sudo (1.7.4p4-6) unstable; urgency=low + + * update /etc/sudoers.d/README now that sudoers is a conffile + * patch from upstream to fix special case in password checking code + when only the gid is changing, closes: #609641 + + -- Bdale Garbee Tue, 11 Jan 2011 10:22:39 -0700 + + sudo (1.7.4p4-5) unstable; urgency=low + + * patch from Jakub Wilk to add noopt and nostrip build option support, + closes: #605580 + * make sudoers a conffile, closes: #605130 + * add descriptions to LSB init headers, closes: #604619 + * change default sudoers %sudo entry to allow gid changes, closes: #602699 + * add Vcs entries to the control file + * use debhelper install files instead of explicit installs in rules + + -- Bdale Garbee Wed, 01 Dec 2010 20:32:31 -0700 + + sudo (1.7.4p4-4) unstable; urgency=low + + * patch from upstream to resolve problem always prompting for a password + when run without a tty, closes: #599376 + * patch from upstream to resolve interoperability problem between HOME in + env_keep and the -H flag, closes: #596493 + * change path syntax to avoid tar error when /var/run/sudo exists but is + empty, closes: #598877 + + -- Bdale Garbee Thu, 07 Oct 2010 15:59:06 -0600 + + sudo (1.7.4p4-3) unstable; urgency=low + + * make postinst clause for handling /var/run -> /var/lib transition less + fragile, closes: #585514 + * cope with upstream's Makefile trying to install ChangeLog in our doc + directory, closes: #597389 + * fix README.Debian to reflect that HOME is no longer preserved by default, + closes: #596847 + + -- Bdale Garbee Tue, 21 Sep 2010 23:53:08 -0600 + +sudo (1.7.4p4-2.squeeze.2) stable; urgency=low + + * patch from upstream to resolve interoperability problem between HOME in + env_keep and the -H flag, originally closed #596493, applying this to + to squeeze also closes: #614232 + + -- Bdale Garbee Sun, 20 Feb 2011 09:35:07 -0700 + +sudo (1.7.4p4-2.squeeze.1) testing; urgency=low + + * patch from upstream to fix special case in password checking code + when only the gid is changing, closes #609641 + + -- Bdale Garbee Wed, 26 Jan 2011 09:08:12 +1000 + sudo (1.7.4p4-2) unstable; urgency=low * add a NEWS item about change in $HOME handling that impacts programs diff --cc plugins/sudoers/env.c index 0000000,9b043b2..962228c mode 000000,100644..100644 --- a/plugins/sudoers/env.c +++ b/plugins/sudoers/env.c @@@ -1,0 -1,1103 +1,1112 @@@ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000-2005, 2007-2011 + * Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects + * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force + * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. + */ + + #include + + #include + #include + #include + #include + #ifdef STDC_HEADERS + # include + # include + #else + # ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H + # include + # endif + #endif /* STDC_HEADERS */ + #ifdef HAVE_STRING_H + # include + #endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */ + #ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H + # include + #endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */ + #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H + # include + #endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */ + #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H + # include + # ifndef LOGIN_SETENV + # define LOGIN_SETENV 0 + # endif + #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */ + #include + #include + #include + + #include "sudoers.h" + + /* + * Flags used in rebuild_env() + */ + #undef DID_TERM + #define DID_TERM 0x0001 + #undef DID_PATH + #define DID_PATH 0x0002 + #undef DID_HOME + #define DID_HOME 0x0004 + #undef DID_SHELL + #define DID_SHELL 0x0008 + #undef DID_LOGNAME + #define DID_LOGNAME 0x0010 + #undef DID_USER + #define DID_USER 0x0020 + #undef DID_USERNAME + #define DID_USERNAME 0x0040 + #undef DID_MAIL + #define DID_MAIL 0x0080 + #undef DID_MAX + #define DID_MAX 0x00ff + + #undef KEPT_TERM + #define KEPT_TERM 0x0100 + #undef KEPT_PATH + #define KEPT_PATH 0x0200 + #undef KEPT_HOME + #define KEPT_HOME 0x0400 + #undef KEPT_SHELL + #define KEPT_SHELL 0x0800 + #undef KEPT_LOGNAME + #define KEPT_LOGNAME 0x1000 + #undef KEPT_USER + #define KEPT_USER 0x2000 + #undef KEPT_USERNAME + #define KEPT_USERNAME 0x4000 + #undef KEPT_MAIL + #define KEPT_MAIL 0x8000 + #undef KEPT_MAX + #define KEPT_MAX 0xff00 + + struct environment { + char * const *old_envp; /* pointer the environment we passed back */ + char **envp; /* pointer to the new environment */ + size_t env_size; /* size of new_environ in char **'s */ + size_t env_len; /* number of slots used, not counting NULL */ + }; + + /* + * Copy of the sudo-managed environment. + */ + static struct environment env; + + /* + * Default table of "bad" variables to remove from the environment. + * XXX - how to omit TERMCAP if it starts with '/'? + */ + static const char *initial_badenv_table[] = { + "IFS", + "CDPATH", + "LOCALDOMAIN", + "RES_OPTIONS", + "HOSTALIASES", + "NLSPATH", + "PATH_LOCALE", + "LD_*", + "_RLD*", + #ifdef __hpux + "SHLIB_PATH", + #endif /* __hpux */ + #ifdef _AIX + "LDR_*", + "LIBPATH", + "AUTHSTATE", + #endif + #ifdef __APPLE__ + "DYLD_*", + #endif + #ifdef HAVE_KERB5 + "KRB5_CONFIG*", + "KRB5_KTNAME", + #endif /* HAVE_KERB5 */ + #ifdef HAVE_SECURID + "VAR_ACE", + "USR_ACE", + "DLC_ACE", + #endif /* HAVE_SECURID */ + "TERMINFO", /* terminfo, exclusive path to terminfo files */ + "TERMINFO_DIRS", /* terminfo, path(s) to terminfo files */ + "TERMPATH", /* termcap, path(s) to termcap files */ + "TERMCAP", /* XXX - only if it starts with '/' */ + "ENV", /* ksh, file to source before script runs */ + "BASH_ENV", /* bash, file to source before script runs */ + "PS4", /* bash, prefix for lines in xtrace mode */ + "GLOBIGNORE", /* bash, globbing patterns to ignore */ + "SHELLOPTS", /* bash, extra command line options */ + "JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS", /* java, extra command line options */ + "PERLIO_DEBUG ", /* perl, debugging output file */ + "PERLLIB", /* perl, search path for modules/includes */ + "PERL5LIB", /* perl 5, search path for modules/includes */ + "PERL5OPT", /* perl 5, extra command line options */ + "PERL5DB", /* perl 5, command used to load debugger */ + "FPATH", /* ksh, search path for functions */ + "NULLCMD", /* zsh, command for null file redirection */ + "READNULLCMD", /* zsh, command for null file redirection */ + "ZDOTDIR", /* zsh, search path for dot files */ + "TMPPREFIX", /* zsh, prefix for temporary files */ + "PYTHONHOME", /* python, module search path */ + "PYTHONPATH", /* python, search path */ + "PYTHONINSPECT", /* python, allow inspection */ + "PYTHONUSERBASE", /* python, per user site-packages directory */ + "RUBYLIB", /* ruby, library load path */ + "RUBYOPT", /* ruby, extra command line options */ + NULL + }; + + /* + * Default table of variables to check for '%' and '/' characters. + */ + static const char *initial_checkenv_table[] = { + "COLORTERM", + "LANG", + "LANGUAGE", + "LC_*", + "LINGUAS", + "TERM", + NULL + }; + + /* + * Default table of variables to preserve in the environment. + */ + static const char *initial_keepenv_table[] = { + "COLORS", + "DISPLAY", + "HOSTNAME", + "KRB5CCNAME", + "LS_COLORS", + "PATH", + "PS1", + "PS2", + "TZ", + "XAUTHORITY", + "XAUTHORIZATION", + NULL + }; + + /* + * Initialize env based on envp. + */ + void + env_init(char * const envp[]) + { + char * const *ep; + size_t len; + debug_decl(env_init, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + if (envp == NULL) { + /* Reset to initial state but keep a pointer to what we allocated. */ + envp = env.envp; + memset(&env, 0, sizeof(env)); + env.old_envp = envp; + } else { + /* Make private copy of envp. */ + for (ep = envp; *ep != NULL; ep++) + continue; + len = (size_t)(ep - envp); + + env.env_len = len; + env.env_size = len + 1 + 128; + env.envp = emalloc2(env.env_size, sizeof(char *)); + #ifdef ENV_DEBUG + memset(env.envp, 0, env.env_size * sizeof(char *)); + #endif + memcpy(env.envp, envp, len * sizeof(char *)); + env.envp[len] = '\0'; + + /* Free the old envp we allocated, if any. */ + if (env.old_envp != NULL) + efree((void *)env.old_envp); + } + + debug_return; + } + + /* + * Getter for private copy of the environment. + */ + char ** + env_get(void) + { + return env.envp; + } + + /* + * Similar to putenv(3) but operates on sudo's private copy of the + * environment (not environ) and it always overwrites. The dupcheck param + * determines whether we need to verify that the variable is not already set. + * Will only overwrite an existing variable if overwrite is set. + * Does not include warnings or debugging to avoid recursive calls. + */ + static int + sudo_putenv_nodebug(char *str, bool dupcheck, bool overwrite) + { + char **ep; + size_t len; + bool found = false; + + /* Make sure there is room for the new entry plus a NULL. */ + if (env.env_len + 2 > env.env_size) { + char **nenvp; + size_t nsize = env.env_size + 128; + nenvp = env.envp ? realloc(env.envp, nsize * sizeof(char *)) : + malloc(nsize * sizeof(char *)); + if (nenvp == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return -1; + } + env.envp = nenvp; + env.env_size = nsize; + #ifdef ENV_DEBUG + memset(env.envp + env.env_len, 0, + (env.env_size - env.env_len) * sizeof(char *)); + #endif + } + + #ifdef ENV_DEBUG + if (env.envp[env.env_len] != NULL) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + #endif + + if (dupcheck) { + len = (strchr(str, '=') - str) + 1; + for (ep = env.envp; !found && *ep != NULL; ep++) { + if (strncmp(str, *ep, len) == 0) { + if (overwrite) + *ep = str; + found = true; + } + } + /* Prune out duplicate variables. */ + if (found && overwrite) { + while (*ep != NULL) { + if (strncmp(str, *ep, len) == 0) { + char **cur = ep; + while ((*cur = *(cur + 1)) != NULL) + cur++; + } else { + ep++; + } + } + env.env_len = ep - env.envp; + } + } + + if (!found) { + ep = env.envp + env.env_len; + env.env_len++; + *ep++ = str; + *ep = NULL; + } + return 0; + } + + /* + * Similar to putenv(3) but operates on sudo's private copy of the + * environment (not environ) and it always overwrites. The dupcheck param + * determines whether we need to verify that the variable is not already set. + * Will only overwrite an existing variable if overwrite is set. + */ + static int + sudo_putenv(char *str, bool dupcheck, bool overwrite) + { + int rval; + debug_decl(sudo_putenv, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + rval = sudo_putenv_nodebug(str, dupcheck, overwrite); + if (rval == -1) { + #ifdef ENV_DEBUG + if (env.envp[env.env_len] != NULL) + errorx(1, _("sudo_putenv: corrupted envp, length mismatch")); + #endif + errorx(1, _("unable to allocate memory")); + } + debug_return_int(rval); + } + + /* + * Similar to setenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment. + * The dupcheck param determines whether we need to verify that the variable + * is not already set. + */ + static int + sudo_setenv2(const char *var, const char *val, bool dupcheck, bool overwrite) + { + char *estring; + size_t esize; + debug_decl(sudo_setenv2, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + esize = strlen(var) + 1 + strlen(val) + 1; + estring = emalloc(esize); + + /* Build environment string and insert it. */ + if (strlcpy(estring, var, esize) >= esize || + strlcat(estring, "=", esize) >= esize || + strlcat(estring, val, esize) >= esize) { + + errorx(1, _("internal error, sudo_setenv2() overflow")); + } + debug_return_int(sudo_putenv(estring, dupcheck, overwrite)); + } + + /* + * Similar to setenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment. + * Does not include warnings or debugging to avoid recursive calls. + */ + static int + sudo_setenv_nodebug(const char *var, const char *val, int overwrite) + { + char *estring; + size_t esize; + + esize = strlen(var) + 1 + strlen(val) + 1; + if ((estring = malloc(esize)) == NULL) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return -1; + } + + /* Build environment string and insert it. */ + if (strlcpy(estring, var, esize) >= esize || + strlcat(estring, "=", esize) >= esize || + strlcat(estring, val, esize) >= esize) { + + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + return sudo_putenv_nodebug(estring, true, overwrite); + } + + /* + * Similar to setenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment. + */ + int + sudo_setenv(const char *var, const char *val, int overwrite) + { + int rval; + debug_decl(sudo_setenv, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + rval = sudo_setenv_nodebug(var, val, overwrite); + if (rval == -1) { + if (errno == EINVAL) + errorx(1, _("internal error, sudo_setenv() overflow")); + errorx(1, _("unable to allocate memory")); + } + debug_return_int(rval); + } + + /* + * Similar to unsetenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment. + * Does not include warnings or debugging to avoid recursive calls. + */ + static int + sudo_unsetenv_nodebug(const char *var) + { + char **ep = env.envp; + size_t len; + + if (ep == NULL || var == NULL || *var == '\0' || strchr(var, '=') != NULL) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + len = strlen(var); + while (*ep != NULL) { + if (strncmp(var, *ep, len) == 0 && (*ep)[len] == '=') { + /* Found it; shift remainder + NULL over by one. */ + char **cur = ep; + while ((*cur = *(cur + 1)) != NULL) + cur++; + /* Keep going, could be multiple instances of the var. */ + } else { + ep++; + } + } + return 0; + } + + /* + * Similar to unsetenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment. + */ + int + sudo_unsetenv(const char *name) + { + int rval; + debug_decl(sudo_unsetenv, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + rval = sudo_unsetenv_nodebug(name); + + debug_return_int(rval); + } + + /* + * Similar to getenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment. + * Does not include warnings or debugging to avoid recursive calls. + */ + static char * + sudo_getenv_nodebug(const char *name) + { + char **ep, *val = NULL; + size_t namelen = 0; + + if (env.env_len != 0) { + /* For BSD compatibility, treat '=' in name like end of string. */ + while (name[namelen] != '\0' && name[namelen] != '=') + namelen++; + for (ep = env.envp; *ep != NULL; ep++) { + if (strncmp(*ep, name, namelen) == 0 && (*ep)[namelen] == '=') { + val = *ep + namelen + 1; + break; + } + } + } + return val; + } + + /* + * Similar to getenv(3) but operates on a private copy of the environment. + */ + char * + sudo_getenv(const char *name) + { + char *val; + debug_decl(sudo_getenv, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + val = sudo_getenv_nodebug(name); + + debug_return_str(val); + } + + /* + * Merge another environment with our private copy. + */ + void + env_merge(char * const envp[], bool overwrite) + { + char * const *ep; + debug_decl(env_merge, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + for (ep = envp; *ep != NULL; ep++) + sudo_putenv(*ep, true, overwrite); + + debug_return; + } + + /* + * Check the env_delete blacklist. + * Returns true if the variable was found, else false. + */ + static bool + matches_env_delete(const char *var) + { + struct list_member *cur; + size_t len; + bool iswild; + bool match = false; + debug_decl(matches_env_delete, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + /* Skip anything listed in env_delete. */ + for (cur = def_env_delete; cur; cur = cur->next) { + len = strlen(cur->value); + /* Deal with '*' wildcard */ + if (cur->value[len - 1] == '*') { + len--; + iswild = true; + } else + iswild = false; + if (strncmp(cur->value, var, len) == 0 && + (iswild || var[len] == '=')) { + match = true; + break; + } + } + debug_return_bool(match); + } + + /* + * Apply the env_check list. + * Returns true if the variable is allowed, false if denied + * or -1 if no match. + */ + static int + matches_env_check(const char *var) + { + struct list_member *cur; + size_t len; + bool iswild; + int keepit = -1; + debug_decl(matches_env_check, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + for (cur = def_env_check; cur; cur = cur->next) { + len = strlen(cur->value); + /* Deal with '*' wildcard */ + if (cur->value[len - 1] == '*') { + len--; + iswild = true; + } else + iswild = false; + if (strncmp(cur->value, var, len) == 0 && + (iswild || var[len] == '=')) { + keepit = !strpbrk(var, "/%"); + break; + } + } + debug_return_bool(keepit); + } + + /* + * Check the env_keep list. + * Returns true if the variable is allowed else false. + */ + static bool + matches_env_keep(const char *var) + { + struct list_member *cur; + size_t len; + bool iswild, keepit = false; + debug_decl(matches_env_keep, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + /* Preserve SHELL variable for "sudo -s". */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL) && strncmp(var, "SHELL=", 6) == 0) { + keepit = true; + goto done; + } + + for (cur = def_env_keep; cur; cur = cur->next) { + len = strlen(cur->value); + /* Deal with '*' wildcard */ + if (cur->value[len - 1] == '*') { + len--; + iswild = true; + } else + iswild = false; + if (strncmp(cur->value, var, len) == 0 && + (iswild || var[len] == '=')) { + keepit = true; + break; + } + } + done: + debug_return_bool(keepit); + } + + /* + * Look up var in the env_delete and env_check. + * Returns true if we should delete the variable, else false. + */ + static bool + env_should_delete(const char *var) + { + int delete_it; + debug_decl(env_should_delete, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV); + + delete_it = matches_env_delete(var); + if (!delete_it) + delete_it = matches_env_check(var) == false; + debug_return_bool(delete_it); + } + + /* + * Lookup var in the env_check and env_keep lists. + * Returns true if the variable is allowed else false. + */ + static bool + env_should_keep(const char *var) + { + int keepit; + debug_decl(env_should_keep, SUDO_DEBUG_ENV) + + keepit = matches_env_check(var); + if (keepit == -1) + keepit = matches_env_keep(var); + + debug_return_bool(keepit == true); + } + + static void + env_update_didvar(const char *ep, unsigned int *didvar) + { + switch (*ep) { + case 'H': + if (strncmp(ep, "HOME=", 5) == 0) + SET(*didvar, DID_HOME); + break; + case 'L': + if (strncmp(ep, "LOGNAME=", 8) == 0) + SET(*didvar, DID_LOGNAME); + break; + case 'M': + if (strncmp(ep, "MAIL=", 5) == 0) + SET(*didvar, DID_MAIL); + break; + case 'P': + if (strncmp(ep, "PATH=", 5) == 0) + SET(*didvar, DID_PATH); + break; + case 'S': + if (strncmp(ep, "SHELL=", 6) == 0) + SET(*didvar, DID_SHELL); + break; + case 'T': + if (strncmp(ep, "TERM=", 5) == 0) + SET(*didvar, DID_TERM); + break; + case 'U': + if (strncmp(ep, "USER=", 5) == 0) + SET(*didvar, DID_USER); + if (strncmp(ep, "USERNAME=", 5) == 0) + SET(*didvar, DID_USERNAME); + break; + } + } + + /* + * Build a new environment and ether clear potentially dangerous + * variables from the old one or start with a clean slate. + * Also adds sudo-specific variables (SUDO_*). + */ + void + rebuild_env(void) + { + char **old_envp, **ep, *cp, *ps1; + char idbuf[MAX_UID_T_LEN]; + unsigned int didvar; + bool reset_home = false; + + /* + * Either clean out the environment or reset to a safe default. + */ + ps1 = NULL; + didvar = 0; + env.env_len = 0; + env.env_size = 128; + old_envp = env.envp; + env.envp = emalloc2(env.env_size, sizeof(char *)); + #ifdef ENV_DEBUG + memset(env.envp, 0, env.env_size * sizeof(char *)); + #else + env.envp[0] = NULL; + #endif + + /* Reset HOME based on target user if configured to. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) { + if (def_always_set_home || + ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RESET_HOME | MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) || + (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL) && def_set_home)) + reset_home = true; + } + + if (def_env_reset || ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { + /* + * If starting with a fresh environment, initialize it based on + * /etc/environment or login.conf. For "sudo -i" we want those + * variables to override the invoking user's environment, so we + * defer reading them until later. + */ + if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { + #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H + /* Insert login class environment variables. */ + if (login_class) { + login_cap_t *lc = login_getclass(login_class); + if (lc != NULL) { + setusercontext(lc, runas_pw, runas_pw->pw_uid, + LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETENV); + login_close(lc); + } + } + #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */ + #if defined(_AIX) || (defined(__linux__) && !defined(HAVE_PAM)) + /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */ + read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, true); + #endif + for (ep = env.envp; *ep; ep++) + env_update_didvar(*ep, &didvar); + } + ++ /* Reset HOME based on target user if configured to. */ ++ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) { ++ if (def_always_set_home || ++ ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RESET_HOME | MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) || ++ (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL) && def_set_home)) ++ reset_home = TRUE; ++ } ++ ++ if (def_env_reset || ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { + /* Pull in vars we want to keep from the old environment. */ + for (ep = old_envp; *ep; ep++) { + bool keepit; + + /* Skip variables with values beginning with () (bash functions) */ + if ((cp = strchr(*ep, '=')) != NULL) { + if (strncmp(cp, "=() ", 3) == 0) + continue; + } + + /* + * Look up the variable in the env_check and env_keep lists. + */ + keepit = env_should_keep(*ep); + + /* + * Do SUDO_PS1 -> PS1 conversion. + * This must happen *after* env_should_keep() is called. + */ + if (strncmp(*ep, "SUDO_PS1=", 8) == 0) + ps1 = *ep + 5; + + if (keepit) { + /* Preserve variable. */ + sudo_putenv(*ep, false, false); + env_update_didvar(*ep, &didvar); + } + } + didvar |= didvar << 8; /* convert DID_* to KEPT_* */ + + /* + * Add in defaults. In -i mode these come from the runas user, + * otherwise they may be from the user's environment (depends + * on sudoers options). + */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { + sudo_setenv2("SHELL", runas_pw->pw_shell, + ISSET(didvar, DID_SHELL), true); + sudo_setenv2("LOGNAME", runas_pw->pw_name, + ISSET(didvar, DID_LOGNAME), true); + sudo_setenv2("USER", runas_pw->pw_name, + ISSET(didvar, DID_USER), true); + sudo_setenv2("USERNAME", runas_pw->pw_name, + ISSET(didvar, DID_USERNAME), true); + } else { + if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_SHELL)) + sudo_setenv2("SHELL", sudo_user.pw->pw_shell, false, true); + if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_LOGNAME)) + sudo_setenv2("LOGNAME", user_name, false, true); + if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_USER)) + sudo_setenv2("USER", user_name, false, true); + if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_USERNAME)) + sudo_setenv2("USERNAME", user_name, false, true); + } + + /* If we didn't keep HOME, reset it based on target user. */ + if (!ISSET(didvar, KEPT_HOME)) + reset_home = true; + + /* + * Set MAIL to target user in -i mode or if MAIL is not preserved + * from user's environment. + */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL) || !ISSET(didvar, KEPT_MAIL)) { + cp = _PATH_MAILDIR; + if (cp[sizeof(_PATH_MAILDIR) - 2] == '/') + easprintf(&cp, "MAIL=%s%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, runas_pw->pw_name); + else + easprintf(&cp, "MAIL=%s/%s", _PATH_MAILDIR, runas_pw->pw_name); + sudo_putenv(cp, ISSET(didvar, DID_MAIL), true); + } + } else { + /* + * Copy environ entries as long as they don't match env_delete or + * env_check. + */ + for (ep = old_envp; *ep; ep++) { + /* Skip variables with values beginning with () (bash functions) */ + if ((cp = strchr(*ep, '=')) != NULL) { + if (strncmp(cp, "=() ", 3) == 0) + continue; + } + + /* Add variable unless it matches a black list. */ + if (!env_should_delete(*ep)) { + if (strncmp(*ep, "SUDO_PS1=", 9) == 0) + ps1 = *ep + 5; + else if (strncmp(*ep, "PATH=", 5) == 0) + SET(didvar, DID_PATH); + else if (strncmp(*ep, "TERM=", 5) == 0) + SET(didvar, DID_TERM); + sudo_putenv(*ep, false, false); + } + } + } + /* Replace the PATH envariable with a secure one? */ + if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt()) { + sudo_setenv2("PATH", def_secure_path, true, true); + SET(didvar, DID_PATH); + } + + /* + * Set $USER, $LOGNAME and $USERNAME to target if "set_logname" is not + * disabled. We skip this if we are running a login shell (because + * they have already been set them) or sudoedit (because we want the + * editor to find the user's startup files). + */ + if (def_set_logname && !ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL|MODE_EDIT)) { + if (!ISSET(didvar, KEPT_LOGNAME)) + sudo_setenv2("LOGNAME", runas_pw->pw_name, true, true); + if (!ISSET(didvar, KEPT_USER)) + sudo_setenv2("USER", runas_pw->pw_name, true, true); + if (!ISSET(didvar, KEPT_USERNAME)) + sudo_setenv2("USERNAME", runas_pw->pw_name, true, true); + } + + /* Set $HOME to target user if not preserving user's value. */ + if (reset_home) + sudo_setenv2("HOME", runas_pw->pw_dir, true, true); + + /* Provide default values for $TERM and $PATH if they are not set. */ + if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_TERM)) + sudo_putenv("TERM=unknown", false, false); + if (!ISSET(didvar, DID_PATH)) + sudo_setenv2("PATH", _PATH_STDPATH, false, true); + + /* Set PS1 if SUDO_PS1 is set. */ + if (ps1 != NULL) + sudo_putenv(ps1, true, true); + + /* Add the SUDO_COMMAND envariable (cmnd + args). */ + if (user_args) { + easprintf(&cp, "%s %s", user_cmnd, user_args); + sudo_setenv2("SUDO_COMMAND", cp, true, true); + efree(cp); + } else { + sudo_setenv2("SUDO_COMMAND", user_cmnd, true, true); + } + + /* Add the SUDO_USER, SUDO_UID, SUDO_GID environment variables. */ + sudo_setenv2("SUDO_USER", user_name, true, true); + snprintf(idbuf, sizeof(idbuf), "%u", (unsigned int) user_uid); + sudo_setenv2("SUDO_UID", idbuf, true, true); + snprintf(idbuf, sizeof(idbuf), "%u", (unsigned int) user_gid); + sudo_setenv2("SUDO_GID", idbuf, true, true); + + /* Free old environment. */ + efree(old_envp); + } + + void + insert_env_vars(char * const envp[]) + { + char * const *ep; + + if (envp == NULL) + return; + + /* Add user-specified environment variables. */ + for (ep = envp; *ep != NULL; ep++) + sudo_putenv(*ep, true, true); + } + + /* + * Validate the list of environment variables passed in on the command + * line against env_delete, env_check, and env_keep. + * Calls log_fatal() if any specified variables are not allowed. + */ + void + validate_env_vars(char * const env_vars[]) + { + char * const *ep; + char *eq, *bad = NULL; + size_t len, blen = 0, bsize = 0; + bool okvar; + + if (env_vars == NULL) + return; + + /* Add user-specified environment variables. */ + for (ep = env_vars; *ep != NULL; ep++) { + if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt() && + strncmp(*ep, "PATH=", 5) == 0) { + okvar = false; + } else if (def_env_reset) { + okvar = env_should_keep(*ep); + } else { + okvar = !env_should_delete(*ep); + } + if (okvar == false) { + /* Not allowed, add to error string, allocating as needed. */ + if ((eq = strchr(*ep, '=')) != NULL) + *eq = '\0'; + len = strlen(*ep) + 2; + if (blen + len >= bsize) { + do { + bsize += 1024; + } while (blen + len >= bsize); + bad = erealloc(bad, bsize); + bad[blen] = '\0'; + } + strlcat(bad, *ep, bsize); + strlcat(bad, ", ", bsize); + blen += len; + if (eq != NULL) + *eq = '='; + } + } + if (bad != NULL) { + bad[blen - 2] = '\0'; /* remove trailing ", " */ + log_fatal(NO_MAIL, + _("sorry, you are not allowed to set the following environment variables: %s"), bad); + /* NOTREACHED */ + efree(bad); + } + } + + /* + * Read in /etc/environment ala AIX and Linux. + * Lines may be in either of three formats: + * NAME=VALUE + * NAME="VALUE" + * NAME='VALUE' + * with an optional "export" prefix so the shell can source the file. + * Invalid lines, blank lines, or lines consisting solely of a comment + * character are skipped. + */ + void + read_env_file(const char *path, int overwrite) + { + FILE *fp; + char *cp, *var, *val; + size_t var_len, val_len; + + if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) + return; + + while ((var = sudo_parseln(fp)) != NULL) { + /* Skip blank or comment lines */ + if (*var == '\0') + continue; + + /* Skip optional "export " */ + if (strncmp(var, "export", 6) == 0 && isspace((unsigned char) var[6])) { + var += 7; + while (isspace((unsigned char) *var)) { + var++; + } + } + + /* Must be of the form name=["']value['"] */ + for (val = var; *val != '\0' && *val != '='; val++) + ; + if (var == val || *val != '=') + continue; + var_len = (size_t)(val - var); + val_len = strlen(++val); + + /* Strip leading and trailing single/double quotes */ + if ((val[0] == '\'' || val[0] == '\"') && val[0] == val[val_len - 1]) { + val[val_len - 1] = '\0'; + val++; + val_len -= 2; + } + + cp = emalloc(var_len + 1 + val_len + 1); + memcpy(cp, var, var_len + 1); /* includes '=' */ + memcpy(cp + var_len + 1, val, val_len + 1); /* includes NUL */ + + sudo_putenv(cp, true, overwrite); + } + fclose(fp); + } + + void + init_envtables(void) + { + struct list_member *cur; + const char **p; + + /* Fill in the "env_delete" list. */ + for (p = initial_badenv_table; *p; p++) { + cur = ecalloc(1, sizeof(struct list_member)); + cur->value = estrdup(*p); + cur->next = def_env_delete; + def_env_delete = cur; + } + + /* Fill in the "env_check" list. */ + for (p = initial_checkenv_table; *p; p++) { + cur = ecalloc(1, sizeof(struct list_member)); + cur->value = estrdup(*p); + cur->next = def_env_check; + def_env_check = cur; + } + + /* Fill in the "env_keep" list. */ + for (p = initial_keepenv_table; *p; p++) { + cur = ecalloc(1, sizeof(struct list_member)); + cur->value = estrdup(*p); + cur->next = def_env_keep; + def_env_keep = cur; + } + } + + int + sudoers_hook_getenv(const char *name, char **value, void *closure) + { + static bool in_progress = false; /* avoid recursion */ + + if (in_progress || env.envp == NULL) + return SUDO_HOOK_RET_NEXT; + + in_progress = true; + *value = sudo_getenv_nodebug(name); + in_progress = false; + return SUDO_HOOK_RET_STOP; + } + + int + sudoers_hook_putenv(char *string, void *closure) + { + static bool in_progress = false; /* avoid recursion */ + + if (in_progress || env.envp == NULL) + return SUDO_HOOK_RET_NEXT; + + in_progress = true; + sudo_putenv_nodebug(string, true, true); + in_progress = false; + return SUDO_HOOK_RET_STOP; + } + + int + sudoers_hook_setenv(const char *name, const char *value, int overwrite, void *closure) + { + static bool in_progress = false; /* avoid recursion */ + + if (in_progress || env.envp == NULL) + return SUDO_HOOK_RET_NEXT; + + in_progress = true; + sudo_setenv_nodebug(name, value, overwrite); + in_progress = false; + return SUDO_HOOK_RET_STOP; + } + + int + sudoers_hook_unsetenv(const char *name, void *closure) + { + static bool in_progress = false; /* avoid recursion */ + + if (in_progress || env.envp == NULL) + return SUDO_HOOK_RET_NEXT; + + in_progress = true; + sudo_unsetenv_nodebug(name); + in_progress = false; + return SUDO_HOOK_RET_STOP; + }