X-Git-Url: https://git.gag.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=sudo.c;h=159a2c8351c53811f2194062894653d41b49922b;hb=85f14572d38db7bfbd2485fce9a3c956331c7afb;hp=4052ad4911d8fa397ba42c9f106104f06b347a02;hpb=4cc6a09e8f9028ef10631ccd17b88361356a6425;p=debian%2Fsudo diff --git a/sudo.c b/sudo.c index 4052ad4..159a2c8 100644 --- a/sudo.c +++ b/sudo.c @@ -1,46 +1,37 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2002 Todd C. Miller - * All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2010 Todd C. Miller * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * 4. Products derived from this software may not be called "Sudo" nor - * may "Sudo" appear in their names without specific prior written - * permission from the author. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, - * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL - * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, - * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; - * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, - * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR - * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF - * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects + * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force + * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. * * For a brief history of sudo, please see the HISTORY file included * with this distribution. */ -#define _SUDO_SUDO_C +#define _SUDO_MAIN + +#ifdef __TANDEM +# include +#endif -#include "config.h" +#include #include #include +#include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT @@ -61,20 +52,25 @@ # include # endif # include -#else -# ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H -# include -# endif #endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */ +#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H +# include +#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */ #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H # include #endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */ #include +#include #include #include #include #include -#include +#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE +# include +#endif #include #include #if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS) @@ -92,112 +88,141 @@ # define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon" # endif #endif +#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H +# include +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP +# include +#endif #include "sudo.h" +#include "lbuf.h" #include "interfaces.h" -#include "version.h" +#include + +#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS +# include "nonunix.h" +#endif -#ifndef lint -static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.318 2002/01/15 23:43:59 millert Exp $"; -#endif /* lint */ +#if defined(HAVE_PAM) && !defined(NO_PAM_SESSION) +# define CMND_WAIT TRUE +#else +# define CMND_WAIT FALSE +#endif /* * Prototypes */ -static int init_vars __P((int)); -static int parse_args __P((void)); -static void check_sudoers __P((void)); +static void init_vars __P((char **)); +static int set_cmnd __P((int)); static void initial_setup __P((void)); static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *)); -static void usage __P((int)); -static void usage_excl __P((int)); +static void set_project __P((struct passwd *)); +static void set_runasgr __P((char *)); +static void set_runaspw __P((char *)); +static void show_version __P((void)); static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void)); -extern void list_matches __P((void)); -extern char **rebuild_env __P((int, char **)); -extern char **zero_env __P((char **)); -extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *)); -extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t)); +static void create_admin_success_flag __P((void)); +extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **, char **)); +int run_command __P((const char *path, char *argv[], char *envp[], uid_t uid, int dowait)); /* XXX should be in sudo.h */ /* * Globals */ -int Argc; -char **Argv; -int NewArgc = 0; -char **NewArgv = NULL; +int Argc, NewArgc; +char **Argv, **NewArgv; +char *prev_user; +int user_closefrom = -1; struct sudo_user sudo_user; -struct passwd *auth_pw; -FILE *sudoers_fp = NULL; +struct passwd *auth_pw, *list_pw; struct interface *interfaces; int num_interfaces; int tgetpass_flags; +int long_list; +uid_t timestamp_uid; extern int errorlineno; +extern int parse_error; +extern char *errorfile; #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) static struct rlimit corelimit; -#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */ +#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */ +#if defined(__linux__) +static struct rlimit nproclimit; +#endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H login_cap_t *lc; #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */ -#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H -char *login_style; -#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */ -void (*set_perms) __P((int, int)); +sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp; +char *runas_user; +char *runas_group; +static struct sudo_nss_list *snl; +int sudo_mode; +/* For getopt(3) */ +extern char *optarg; +extern int optind; int main(argc, argv, envp) int argc; - char **argv; - char **envp; + char *argv[]; + char *envp[]; { - int validated; - int fd; - int cmnd_status; - int sudo_mode; - int pwflag; - char **new_environ; + int sources = 0, validated; + int fd, cmnd_status, pwflag, rc = 0; sigaction_t sa; - extern int printmatches; - extern char **environ; + struct sudo_nss *nss; +#if defined(SUDO_DEVEL) && defined(__OpenBSD__) + extern char *malloc_options; + malloc_options = "AFGJPR"; +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE + setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); +#endif + + Argv = argv; + if ((Argc = argc) < 1) + usage(1); /* Must be done as the first thing... */ #if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS) - (void) set_auth_parameters(argc, argv); + (void) set_auth_parameters(Argc, Argv); # ifdef HAVE_INITPRIVS initprivs(); # endif #endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */ - /* Zero out the environment. */ - environ = zero_env(envp); - - Argv = argv; - Argc = argc; - - if (geteuid() != 0) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, %s must be setuid root.\n", Argv[0]); - exit(1); - } + if (geteuid() != 0) + errorx(1, "must be setuid root"); /* - * Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt - * us at some point and avoid the logging. + * Signal setup: + * Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt + * us at some point and avoid the logging. + * Install handler to wait for children when they exit. */ + zero_bytes(&sa, sizeof(sa)); sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN; - (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL); - (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL); - (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saved_sa_int); + (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &saved_sa_quit); + (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp); + + /* Initialize environment functions (including replacements). */ + env_init(FALSE); /* - * Setup signal handlers, turn off core dumps, and close open files. + * Turn off core dumps and make sure fds 0-2 are open. */ initial_setup(); - setpwent(); + sudo_setpwent(); + sudo_setgrent(); /* Parse our arguments. */ - sudo_mode = parse_args(); + sudo_mode = parse_args(Argc, Argv); /* Setup defaults data structures. */ init_defaults(); @@ -206,27 +231,22 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) load_interfaces(); pwflag = 0; - if (sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL) + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) user_cmnd = "shell"; - else + else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) + user_cmnd = "sudoedit"; + else { switch (sudo_mode) { case MODE_VERSION: - (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version); - if (getuid() == 0) { - putchar('\n'); - dump_auth_methods(); - dump_defaults(); - dump_interfaces(); - dump_badenv(); - } - exit(0); + show_version(); break; case MODE_HELP: usage(0); break; case MODE_VALIDATE: + case MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_INVALIDATE: user_cmnd = "validate"; - pwflag = I_VERIFYPW_I; + pwflag = I_VERIFYPW; break; case MODE_KILL: case MODE_INVALIDATE: @@ -238,170 +258,287 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) exit(0); break; case MODE_LIST: + case MODE_LIST|MODE_INVALIDATE: user_cmnd = "list"; - pwflag = I_LISTPW_I; - printmatches = 1; + pwflag = I_LISTPW; + break; + case MODE_CHECK: + case MODE_CHECK|MODE_INVALIDATE: + pwflag = I_LISTPW; break; } + } /* Must have a command to run... */ if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0) usage(1); - cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode); + init_vars(envp); /* XXX - move this later? */ - check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */ +#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS + sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_init(); /* initialise nonunix groups impl */ +#endif /* USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS */ - /* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */ - validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag); + /* Parse nsswitch.conf for sudoers order. */ + snl = sudo_read_nss(); - /* - * If we have POSIX saved uids and the stay_setuid flag was not set, - * set the real, effective and saved uids to 0 and use set_perms_fallback() - * instead of set_perms_posix(). - */ -#if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION) - if (!def_flag(I_STAY_SETUID) && set_perms == set_perms_posix) { - if (setuid(0)) { - perror("setuid(0)"); - exit(1); + /* Open and parse sudoers, set global defaults */ + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) { + if (nss->open(nss) == 0 && nss->parse(nss) == 0) { + sources++; + if (nss->setdefs(nss) != 0) + log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries"); } - set_perms = set_perms_fallback; } -#endif + if (sources == 0) + log_error(0, "no valid sudoers sources found, quitting"); + + /* XXX - collect post-sudoers parse settings into a function */ /* - * Look up runas user passwd struct. If we are given a uid then - * there may be no corresponding passwd(5) entry (which is OK). + * Set runas passwd/group entries based on command line or sudoers. + * Note that if runas_group was specified without runas_user we + * defer setting runas_pw so the match routines know to ignore it. */ - if (**user_runas == '#') { - runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1)); - if (runas_pw == NULL) { - runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd)); - (void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd)); - runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(*user_runas + 1); - } - } else { - runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas); - if (runas_pw == NULL) - log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", *user_runas); - } - if (safe_cmnd == NULL) - safe_cmnd = user_cmnd; + if (runas_group != NULL) { + set_runasgr(runas_group); + if (runas_user != NULL) + set_runaspw(runas_user); + } else + set_runaspw(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default); + + if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_RUNAS)) + log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries"); + + if (def_fqdn) + set_fqdn(); /* deferred until after sudoers is parsed */ - /* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */ + /* Set login class if applicable. */ + set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw); + + /* Update initial shell now that runas is set. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) + NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell; + + /* This goes after sudoers is parsed since it may have timestamp options. */ if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) { remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL)); + cleanup(0); exit(0); } - if (validated & VALIDATE_ERROR) - log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS, - errorlineno); - /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */ - if (user_uid == 0 && !def_flag(I_ROOT_SUDO)) { - (void) fputs("You are already root, you don't need to use sudo.\n", - stderr); + if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) { + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n", + getprogname()); exit(1); } + /* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */ + if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) { + if (!def_closefrom_override) + errorx(1, "you are not permitted to use the -C option"); + else + def_closefrom = user_closefrom; + } + + cmnd_status = set_cmnd(sudo_mode); + +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE + if (!setlocale(LC_ALL, def_sudoers_locale)) { + warningx("unable to set locale to \"%s\", using \"C\"", + def_sudoers_locale); + setlocale(LC_ALL, "C"); + } +#endif + + validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST; + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) { + validated = nss->lookup(nss, validated, pwflag); + + if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) { + /* Handle "= auth" in netsvc.conf */ + if (nss->ret_if_found) + break; + } else { + /* Handle [NOTFOUND=return] */ + if (nss->ret_if_notfound) + break; + } + } + + if (safe_cmnd == NULL) + safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd); + +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE + setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); +#endif + + /* If only a group was specified, set runas_pw based on invoking user. */ + if (runas_pw == NULL) + set_runaspw(user_name); + + /* + * Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified. + */ + if (def_timestampowner) { + struct passwd *pw; + + if (*def_timestampowner == '#') + pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1)); + else + pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner); + if (!pw) + log_error(0, "timestamp owner (%s): No such user", + def_timestampowner); + timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid; + } + /* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */ - if (sudo_mode & MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS) - def_flag(I_PRESERVE_GROUPS) = TRUE; + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS)) + def_preserve_groups = TRUE; /* If no command line args and "set_home" is not set, error out. */ - if ((sudo_mode & MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_flag(I_SHELL_NOARGS)) + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs) usage(1); - /* May need to set $HOME to target user if we are running a command. */ - if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN) && (def_flag(I_ALWAYS_SET_HOME) || - ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL) && def_flag(I_SET_HOME)))) - sudo_mode |= MODE_RESET_HOME; - /* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */ - if (def_flag(I_REQUIRETTY)) { - if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1) + if (def_requiretty) { + if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { + audit_failure(NewArgv, "no tty"); log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo"); - else + } else (void) close(fd); } + /* Use askpass value from sudoers unless user specified their own. */ + if (def_askpass && !user_askpass) + user_askpass = def_askpass; + + /* + * We don't reset the environment for sudoedit or if the user + * specified the -E command line flag and they have setenv privs. + */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT) || + (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv)) + def_env_reset = FALSE; + + /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */ + rebuild_env(def_noexec); + /* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */ auth_pw = get_authpw(); - /* Require a password unless the NOPASS tag was set. */ - if (!(validated & FLAG_NOPASS)) - check_user(); + /* Require a password if sudoers says so. */ + if (def_authenticate) + check_user(validated, sudo_mode); + + /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */ + /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */ + if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) { + if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) { + struct passwd *pw; + + if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) { + sudo_user.pw = pw; +#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP + mbr_uid_to_uuid(user_uid, user_uuid); +#endif + } + } + } - /* Build up custom environment that avoids any nasty bits. */ - new_environ = rebuild_env(sudo_mode, envp); + if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) { + /* Create Ubuntu-style dot file to indicate sudo was successful. */ + create_admin_success_flag(); - if (validated & VALIDATE_OK) { /* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */ if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); - exit(1); + audit_failure(NewArgv, "command in current directory"); + errorx(1, "ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); } else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0], - user_cmnd); - exit(1); + audit_failure(NewArgv, "%s: command not found", user_cmnd); + errorx(1, "%s: command not found", user_cmnd); } - log_auth(validated, 1); - if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE) - exit(0); - else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) { - list_matches(); - exit(0); + /* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) { + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) + log_error(NO_MAIL, + "sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment"); + else + validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars); } - /* Reset signal handlers before we exec. */ - sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); - sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; - sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL; - (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL); - (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL); - (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL); +#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_IO_LOGDIR + /* Get next session ID so we can log it. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) && (def_log_input || def_log_output)) + io_nextid(); +#endif + log_allowed(validated); + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK)) + rc = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); + else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LIST)) + display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); + + /* Cleanup sudoers sources */ + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) + nss->close(nss); + +#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS + /* Finished with the groupcheck code */ + sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_cleanup(); +#endif - /* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */ - if (def_ival(I_UMASK) != 0777) - (void) umask(def_mode(I_UMASK)); + /* Deferred exit due to sudo_ldap_close() */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_CHECK|MODE_LIST))) + exit(rc); - /* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */ -#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) - (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit); -#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */ + /* Must audit before uid change. */ + audit_success(NewArgv); - /* Become specified user or root. */ - set_perms(PERM_RUNAS, sudo_mode); + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { + char *p; - /* Close the password and group files */ - endpwent(); - endgrent(); + /* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */ + if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL) + p = NewArgv[0]; + *p = '-'; + NewArgv[0] = p; - /* Install the new environment. */ - environ = new_environ; +#if defined(__linux__) || defined(_AIX) + /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */ + read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, TRUE); +#endif + } -#ifndef PROFILING - if ((sudo_mode & MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0) - exit(0); - else - EXEC(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */ -#else - exit(0); -#endif /* PROFILING */ - /* - * If we got here then the exec() failed... - */ - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: unable to exec %s: %s\n", - Argv[0], safe_cmnd, strerror(errno)); - exit(127); - } else if ((validated & FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) { - log_auth(validated, 1); + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) { + /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */ + if (def_env_file) + read_env_file(def_env_file, FALSE); + + /* Insert user-specified environment variables. */ + insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars); + } + + /* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */ + (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL); + + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) { + exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv, envp)); + } else { + exit(run_command(safe_cmnd, NewArgv, env_get(), runas_pw->pw_uid, + CMND_WAIT)); + } + } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST)) { + audit_failure(NewArgv, "No user or host"); + log_denial(validated, 1); exit(1); - } else if (validated & VALIDATE_NOT_OK) { - if (def_flag(I_PATH_INFO)) { + } else { + if (def_path_info) { /* * We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can * *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd @@ -409,21 +546,17 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) * is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set * their path to just contain a single dir. */ - log_auth(validated, + log_denial(validated, !(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)); if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0], - user_cmnd); + warningx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd); else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); + warningx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); } else { /* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */ - log_auth(validated, 1); + log_denial(validated, 1); } - exit(1); - } else { - /* should never get here */ - log_auth(validated, 1); + audit_failure(NewArgv, "validation failure"); exit(1); } exit(0); /* not reached */ @@ -433,19 +566,16 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) * Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and * load the ``interfaces'' array. */ -static int -init_vars(sudo_mode) - int sudo_mode; +static void +init_vars(envp) + char **envp; { - char *p, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; - int nohostname, rval; + char *p, **ep, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1]; + int nohostname; /* Sanity check command from user. */ - if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= MAXPATHLEN) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: Pathname too long\n", Argv[0], - NewArgv[0]); - exit(1); - } + if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX) + errorx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]); #ifdef HAVE_TZSET (void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */ @@ -454,7 +584,7 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode) /* Default value for cmnd and cwd, overridden later. */ if (user_cmnd == NULL) user_cmnd = NewArgv[0]; - (void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown"); + (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd)); /* * We avoid gethostbyname() if possible since we don't want @@ -463,31 +593,56 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode) * "shost" is the unqualified form of the hostname. */ nohostname = gethostname(thost, sizeof(thost)); - if (nohostname) + if (nohostname) { user_host = user_shost = "localhost"; - else { + } else { + thost[sizeof(thost) - 1] = '\0'; user_host = estrdup(thost); - if (def_flag(I_FQDN)) { - /* Defer call to set_fqdn() until log_error() is safe. */ - user_shost = user_host; + if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) { + *p = '\0'; + user_shost = estrdup(user_host); + *p = '.'; } else { - if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) { - *p = '\0'; - user_shost = estrdup(user_host); - *p = '.'; - } else { - user_shost = user_host; - } + user_shost = user_host; } } - if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO))) { - if (strncmp(p, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0) - p += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1; - user_tty = estrdup(p); + if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO)) || + (p = ttyname(STDERR_FILENO))) { + user_tty = user_ttypath = estrdup(p); + if (strncmp(user_tty, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0) + user_tty += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1; } else user_tty = "unknown"; + for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) { + /* XXX - don't fill in if empty string */ + switch (**ep) { + case 'D': + if (strncmp("DISPLAY=", *ep, 8) == 0) + user_display = *ep + 8; + break; + case 'K': + if (strncmp("KRB5CCNAME=", *ep, 11) == 0) + user_ccname = *ep + 11; + break; + case 'P': + if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0) + user_path = *ep + 5; + break; + case 'S': + if (strncmp("SHELL=", *ep, 6) == 0) + user_shell = *ep + 6; + else if (!user_prompt && strncmp("SUDO_PROMPT=", *ep, 12) == 0) + user_prompt = *ep + 12; + else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0) + prev_user = *ep + 10; + else if (strncmp("SUDO_ASKPASS=", *ep, 13) == 0) + user_askpass = *ep + 13; + break; + } + } + /* * Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password * if necessary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we @@ -499,23 +654,35 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode) char pw_name[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1]; pw.pw_uid = getuid(); - (void) sprintf(pw_name, "%ld", (long) pw.pw_uid); + (void) snprintf(pw_name, sizeof(pw_name), "%lu", + (unsigned long) pw.pw_uid); pw.pw_name = pw_name; sudo_user.pw = &pw; - log_error(0, "uid %ld does not exist in the passwd file!", - (long) pw.pw_uid); + /* + * If we are in -k/-K mode, just spew to stderr. It is not unusual for + * users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout file which can cause sudo to + * be run during reboot after the YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died. + */ + if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) + errorx(1, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name); + log_error(0, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name); } +#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP + mbr_uid_to_uuid(user_uid, user_uuid); +#endif if (user_shell == NULL || *user_shell == '\0') - user_shell = sudo_user.pw->pw_shell; + user_shell = estrdup(sudo_user.pw->pw_shell); /* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */ - /* - * Must defer set_fqdn() until it is safe to call log_error() - */ - if (def_flag(I_FQDN)) - set_fqdn(); +#ifdef HAVE_GETGROUPS + if ((user_ngroups = getgroups(0, NULL)) > 0) { + user_groups = emalloc2(user_ngroups, sizeof(GETGROUPS_T)); + if (getgroups(user_ngroups, user_groups) < 0) + log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get group vector"); + } +#endif if (nohostname) log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname"); @@ -523,58 +690,110 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode) /* * Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root. */ - set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode); + set_perms(PERM_USER); if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) { - set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode); + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't get working directory!\n", - Argv[0]); - (void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown"); + warningx("cannot get working directory"); + (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd)); } } else - set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode); + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* - * If we were given the '-s' option (run shell) we need to redo + * If we were given the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options we need to redo * NewArgv and NewArgc. */ - if ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) { - char **dst, **src = NewArgv; - - NewArgv = (char **) emalloc (sizeof(char *) * (++NewArgc + 1)); - if (user_shell && *user_shell) { - NewArgv[0] = user_shell; - } else { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to determine shell.", Argv[0]); - exit(1); + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) { + NewArgv--; + NewArgc++; + NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit"; + } else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) { + char **av; + + /* Allocate an extra slot for execve() failure (ENOEXEC). */ + av = (char **) emalloc2(5, sizeof(char *)); + av++; + + av[0] = user_shell; /* may be updated later */ + if (NewArgc > 0) { + size_t cmnd_size = 1024; + char *cmnd, *src, *dst, **ap; + + cmnd = dst = emalloc(cmnd_size); + for (ap = NewArgv; *ap != NULL; ap++) { + for (src = *ap; *src != '\0'; src++) { + /* reserve room for an escaped char + space */ + if (cmnd_size < (dst - cmnd) + 3) { + char *new_cmnd; + cmnd_size <<= 1; + new_cmnd = erealloc(cmnd, cmnd_size); + dst = new_cmnd + (dst - cmnd); + cmnd = new_cmnd; + } + if (isalnum((unsigned char)*src) || *src == '_' || *src == '-') { + *dst++ = *src; + } else { + /* quote potential meta character */ + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = *src; + } + } + *dst++ = ' '; + } + if (cmnd != dst) + dst--; /* replace last space with a NUL */ + *dst = '\0'; + av[1] = "-c"; + av[2] = cmnd; + NewArgc = 2; } - - /* copy the args from Argv */ - for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst) - ; + av[++NewArgc] = NULL; + NewArgv = av; } +} - /* Set login class if applicable. */ - set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw); +/* + * Fill in user_cmnd, user_args, user_base and user_stat variables + * and apply any command-specific defaults entries. + */ +static int +set_cmnd(sudo_mode) + int sudo_mode; +{ + int rval; + char *path = user_path; + + /* Set project if applicable. */ + set_project(runas_pw); /* Resolve the path and return. */ - if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN)) { - /* XXX - should call this as runas user, not root. */ - rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_path); - if (rval != FOUND) { - /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */ - set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode); - rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_path); - set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode); + rval = FOUND; + user_stat = emalloc(sizeof(struct stat)); + if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) { + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) { + if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt()) + path = def_secure_path; + set_perms(PERM_RUNAS); + rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path, + def_ignore_dot); + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); + if (rval != FOUND) { + /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */ + set_perms(PERM_USER); + rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path, + def_ignore_dot); + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); + } } /* set user_args */ if (NewArgc > 1) { char *to, **from; - size_t size; + size_t size, n; - /* If MODE_SHELL not set then NewArgv is contiguous so just count */ - if (!(sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) { + /* If we didn't realloc NewArgv it is contiguous so just count. */ + if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) { size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) + strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1; } else { @@ -582,217 +801,201 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode) size += strlen(*from) + 1; } - /* alloc and copy. */ - to = user_args = (char *) emalloc(size); - for (from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) { - (void) strcpy(to, *from); - to += strlen(*from); + /* Alloc and build up user_args. */ + user_args = (char *) emalloc(size); + for (to = user_args, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) { + n = strlcpy(to, *from, size - (to - user_args)); + if (n >= size - (to - user_args)) + errorx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow"); + to += n; *to++ = ' '; } *--to = '\0'; } - } else - rval = FOUND; + } + if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL) + user_base++; + else + user_base = user_cmnd; + + if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_CMND)) + log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries"); + + if (!runas_user && !runas_group) + set_runaspw(def_runas_default); /* may have been updated above */ return(rval); } /* - * Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3). + * Setup the execution environment immediately prior to the call to execve() + * Returns TRUE on success and FALSE on failure. */ -static int -parse_args() +int +exec_setup(rbac_enabled, ttyname, ttyfd) + int rbac_enabled; + const char *ttyname; + int ttyfd; { - int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is suod to be run in? */ - int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */ + int rval = FALSE; + +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + if (rbac_enabled) { + if (selinux_setup(user_role, user_type, ttyname, ttyfd) == -1) + goto done; + } +#endif - NewArgv = Argv + 1; - NewArgc = Argc - 1; + /* Close the password and group files and free up memory. */ + sudo_endpwent(); + sudo_endgrent(); - if (NewArgc == 0) { /* no options and no command */ - rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL); - return(rval); + /* + * For sudoedit, the command runas a the user with no additional setup. + */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) { + set_perms(PERM_FULL_USER); + rval = TRUE; + goto done; } - while (NewArgc > 0 && NewArgv[0][0] == '-') { - if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0') { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Please use single character options\n", - Argv[0]); - usage(1); + /* + * Set umask based on sudoers. + * If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too + * unless umask_override is set. + */ + if (def_umask != 0777) { + if (def_umask_override) { + umask(def_umask); + } else { + mode_t mask = umask(def_umask); + mask |= def_umask; + if (mask != def_umask) + umask(mask); } + } - switch (NewArgv[0][1]) { - case 'p': - /* Must have an associated prompt. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); + /* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */ +#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) + (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit); +#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */ - user_prompt = NewArgv[1]; + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) + set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS); - /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */ - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; - case 'u': - /* Must have an associated runas user. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); - - user_runas = &NewArgv[1]; + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { + /* Change to target user's homedir. */ + if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1) { + warning("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir); + goto done; + } + } - /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */ - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; -#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H - case 'a': - /* Must have an associated authentication style. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); + /* + * Restore nproc resource limit if pam_limits didn't do it for us. + * We must do this *after* the uid change to avoid potential EAGAIN + * from setuid(). + */ +#if defined(__linux__) + { + struct rlimit rl; + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl) == 0) { + if (rl.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY && rl.rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) + (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &nproclimit); + } + } +#endif - login_style = NewArgv[1]; + rval = TRUE; - /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */ - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; -#endif -#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H - case 'c': - /* Must have an associated login class. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); +done: + return(rval); +} - login_class = NewArgv[1]; - def_flag(I_USE_LOGINCLASS) = TRUE; +/* + * Run the command and wait for it to complete. + */ +int +run_command(path, argv, envp, uid, dowait) + const char *path; + char *argv[]; + char *envp[]; + uid_t uid; + int dowait; +{ + struct command_status cstat; + int exitcode = 1; - /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */ - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; +#ifdef PROFILING + exit(0); #endif - case 'b': - rval |= MODE_BACKGROUND; - break; - case 'v': - rval = MODE_VALIDATE; - if (excl && excl != 'v') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'v'; - break; - case 'k': - rval = MODE_INVALIDATE; - if (excl && excl != 'k') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'k'; - break; - case 'K': - rval = MODE_KILL; - if (excl && excl != 'K') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'K'; - break; - case 'L': - rval = MODE_LISTDEFS; - if (excl && excl != 'L') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'L'; - break; - case 'l': - rval = MODE_LIST; - if (excl && excl != 'l') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'l'; - break; - case 'V': - rval = MODE_VERSION; - if (excl && excl != 'V') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'V'; - break; - case 'h': - rval = MODE_HELP; - if (excl && excl != 'h') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'h'; - break; - case 's': - rval |= MODE_SHELL; - if (excl && excl != 's') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 's'; - break; - case 'H': - rval |= MODE_RESET_HOME; - break; - case 'P': - rval |= MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS; - break; - case 'S': - tgetpass_flags |= TGP_STDIN; - break; - case '-': - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - if (rval == MODE_RUN) - rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL); - return(rval); - case '\0': - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: '-' requires an argument\n", - Argv[0]); - usage(1); - default: - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Illegal option %s\n", Argv[0], - NewArgv[0]); - usage(1); - } - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - } - - if (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & MODE_RUN)) - usage(1); - return(rval); + cstat.type = CMD_INVALID; + cstat.val = 0; + + sudo_execve(path, argv, envp, uid, &cstat, dowait, + ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND)); + + switch (cstat.type) { + case CMD_ERRNO: + /* exec_setup() or execve() returned an error. */ + warningx("unable to execute %s: %s", path, strerror(cstat.val)); + exitcode = 127; + break; + case CMD_WSTATUS: + /* Command ran, exited or was killed. */ + if (WIFEXITED(cstat.val)) + exitcode = WEXITSTATUS(cstat.val); + else if (WIFSIGNALED(cstat.val)) + exitcode = WTERMSIG(cstat.val) | 128; + break; + default: + warningx("unexpected child termination condition: %d", cstat.type); + break; + } +#ifdef HAVE_PAM + pam_end_session(); +#endif /* HAVE_PAM */ +#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_IO_LOGDIR + io_log_close(); +#endif + return(exitcode); } /* - * Sanity check sudoers mode/owner/type. - * Leaves a file pointer to the sudoers file open in ``fp''. + * Open sudoers and sanity check mode/owner/type. + * Returns a handle to the sudoers file or NULL on error. */ -static void -check_sudoers() +FILE * +open_sudoers(sudoers, doedit, keepopen) + const char *sudoers; + int doedit; + int *keepopen; { struct stat statbuf; - int rootstat, i; - char c; + FILE *fp = NULL; + int rootstat; /* * Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default. - * Only works if filesystem is readable/writable by root. + * Only works if file system is readable/writable by root. */ - if ((rootstat = lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 && + if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf)) == 0 && SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 && (statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) { - if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: fixed mode on %s\n", - Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS); - statbuf.st_mode |= SUDOERS_MODE; + if (chmod(sudoers, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) { + warningx("fixed mode on %s", sudoers); + SET(statbuf.st_mode, SUDOERS_MODE); if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) { - if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: set group on %s\n", - Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS); + if (chown(sudoers, (uid_t) -1, SUDOERS_GID) == 0) { + warningx("set group on %s", sudoers); statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID; - } else { - (void) fprintf(stderr,"%s: Unable to set group on %s: %s\n", - Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno)); - } + } else + warning("unable to set group on %s", sudoers); } - } else { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to fix mode on %s: %s\n", - Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno)); - } + } else + warning("unable to fix mode on %s", sudoers); } /* @@ -800,41 +1003,43 @@ check_sudoers() * file owner. We already did a stat as root, so use that * data if we can't stat as sudoers file owner. */ - set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS, 0); + set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS); - if (rootstat != 0 && lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0) - log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf) != 0) + log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't stat %s", sudoers); else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) - log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS); - else if (statbuf.st_size == 0) - log_error(0, "%s is zero length", _PATH_SUDOERS); + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is not a regular file", sudoers); else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE) - log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS, - (statbuf.st_mode & 07777), SUDOERS_MODE); + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", sudoers, + (unsigned int) (statbuf.st_mode & 07777), + (unsigned int) SUDOERS_MODE); else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID) - log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS, - (long) statbuf.st_uid, SUDOERS_UID); + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers, + (unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_UID); else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) - log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS, - (long) statbuf.st_gid, SUDOERS_GID); + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers, + (unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_GID); + else if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL) + log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't open %s", sudoers); else { - /* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */ - for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) { - errno = 0; - if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL || - fread(&c, sizeof(c), 1, sudoers_fp) != 1) { - sudoers_fp = NULL; - if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) - break; - } else - break; - sleep(1); + /* + * Make sure we can actually read sudoers so we can present the + * user with a reasonable error message (unlike the lexer). + */ + if (statbuf.st_size != 0 && fgetc(fp) == EOF) { + log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't read %s", sudoers); + fclose(fp); + fp = NULL; } - if (sudoers_fp == NULL) - log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); } - set_perms(PERM_ROOT, 0); /* change back to root */ + if (fp != NULL) { + rewind(fp); + (void) fcntl(fileno(fp), F_SETFD, 1); + } + + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* change back to root */ + return(fp); } /* @@ -844,52 +1049,54 @@ check_sudoers() static void initial_setup() { - int fd, maxfd; -#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT + int miss[3], devnull = -1; +#if defined(__linux__) || (defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)) struct rlimit rl; #endif - sigaction_t sa; +#if defined(__linux__) + /* + * Unlimit the number of processes since Linux's setuid() will + * apply resource limits when changing uid and return EAGAIN if + * nproc would be violated by the uid switch. + */ + (void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &nproclimit); + rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl)) { + memcpy(&rl, &nproclimit, sizeof(struct rlimit)); + rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max; + (void)setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl); + } +#endif /* __linux__ */ #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) /* * Turn off core dumps. */ (void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit); - rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = 0; + memcpy(&rl, &corelimit, sizeof(struct rlimit)); + rl.rlim_cur = 0; (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl); -#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */ +#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */ /* - * Close any open fd's other than stdin, stdout and stderr. + * stdin, stdout and stderr must be open; set them to /dev/null + * if they are closed and close all other fds. */ -#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF - maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) - 1; -#else - maxfd = getdtablesize() - 1; -#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */ -#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE - if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl) == 0) { - if (rl.rlim_max != RLIM_INFINITY && rl.rlim_max <= maxfd) - maxfd = rl.rlim_max - 1; + miss[STDIN_FILENO] = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1; + miss[STDOUT_FILENO] = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1; + miss[STDERR_FILENO] = fcntl(STDERR_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1; + if (miss[STDIN_FILENO] || miss[STDOUT_FILENO] || miss[STDERR_FILENO]) { + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0644)) == -1) + error(1, "unable to open %s", _PATH_DEVNULL); + if (miss[STDIN_FILENO] && dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) + error(1, "dup2"); + if (miss[STDOUT_FILENO] && dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) + error(1, "dup2"); + if (miss[STDERR_FILENO] && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) + error(1, "dup2"); + if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) + close(devnull); } -#endif /* RLIMIT_NOFILE */ - - for (fd = maxfd; fd > STDERR_FILENO; fd--) - (void) close(fd); - - /* Catch children as they die... */ - sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); - sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; - sa.sa_handler = reapchild; - (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, NULL); - - /* Set set_perms pointer to the correct function */ -#if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION) - if (sysconf(_SC_SAVED_IDS) == 1 && sysconf(_SC_VERSION) >= 199009) - set_perms = set_perms_posix; - else -#endif - set_perms = set_perms_fallback; } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H @@ -910,11 +1117,9 @@ set_loginclass(pw) errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT; if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) { - if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: only root can use -c %s\n", - Argv[0], login_class); - exit(1); - } + if (user_uid != 0 && + strcmp(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default, "root") != 0) + errorx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class); } else { login_class = pw->pw_class; if (!login_class || !*login_class) @@ -937,23 +1142,105 @@ set_loginclass(pw) } #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */ +#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H +static void +set_project(pw) + struct passwd *pw; +{ + int errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT; + int errval; + struct project proj; + struct project *resultp = '\0'; + char buf[1024]; + + /* + * Collect the default project for the user and settaskid + */ + setprojent(); + if (resultp = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &proj, buf, sizeof(buf))) { + errval = setproject(resultp->pj_name, pw->pw_name, TASK_NORMAL); + if (errval != 0) { + switch(errval) { + case SETPROJ_ERR_TASK: + if (errno == EAGAIN) + log_error(errflags, "resource control limit has been reached"); + else if (errno == ESRCH) + log_error(errflags, "user \"%s\" is not a member of " + "project \"%s\"", pw->pw_name, resultp->pj_name); + else if (errno == EACCES) + log_error(errflags, "the invoking task is final"); + else + log_error(errflags, "could not join project \"%s\"", + resultp->pj_name); + break; + case SETPROJ_ERR_POOL: + if (errno == EACCES) + log_error(errflags, "no resource pool accepting " + "default bindings exists for project \"%s\"", + resultp->pj_name); + else if (errno == ESRCH) + log_error(errflags, "specified resource pool does " + "not exist for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name); + else + log_error(errflags, "could not bind to default " + "resource pool for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name); + break; + default: + if (errval <= 0) { + log_error(errflags, "setproject failed for project \"%s\"", + resultp->pj_name); + } else { + log_error(errflags, "warning, resource control assignment " + "failed for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name); + } + } + } + } else { + log_error(errflags, "getdefaultproj() error: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + endprojent(); +} +#else +static void +set_project(pw) + struct passwd *pw; +{ +} +#endif /* HAVE_PROJECT_H */ + /* * Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost. */ void set_fqdn() { +#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO + struct addrinfo *res0, hint; +#else struct hostent *hp; +#endif char *p; +#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO + zero_bytes(&hint, sizeof(hint)); + hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + hint.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) { +#else if (!(hp = gethostbyname(user_host))) { +#endif log_error(MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT, - "unable to lookup %s via gethostbyname()", user_host); + "unable to resolve host %s", user_host); } else { if (user_shost != user_host) - free(user_shost); - free(user_host); + efree(user_shost); + efree(user_host); +#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO + user_host = estrdup(res0->ai_canonname); + freeaddrinfo(res0); +#else user_host = estrdup(hp->h_name); +#endif } if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) { *p = '\0'; @@ -964,32 +1251,63 @@ set_fqdn() } } +/* + * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as. + * By default, this is "root". Updates runas_pw as a side effect. + */ +static void +set_runaspw(user) + char *user; +{ + if (*user == '#') { + if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1))) == NULL) + runas_pw = sudo_fakepwnam(user, runas_gr ? runas_gr->gr_gid : 0); + } else { + if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { + audit_failure(NewArgv, "unknown user: %s", user); + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown user: %s", user); + } + } +} + +/* + * Get group entry for the group we are going to run commands as. + * Updates runas_pw as a side effect. + */ +static void +set_runasgr(group) + char *group; +{ + if (*group == '#') { + if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrgid(atoi(group + 1))) == NULL) + runas_gr = sudo_fakegrnam(group); + } else { + if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrnam(group)) == NULL) + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown group: %s", group); + } +} + /* * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as. - * By default, this is the user invoking sudo... + * By default, this is the user invoking sudo. In the most common + * case, this matches sudo_user.pw or runas_pw. */ static struct passwd * get_authpw() { struct passwd *pw; - if (def_ival(I_ROOTPW)) { + if (def_rootpw) { if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL) - log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!"); - } else if (def_ival(I_RUNASPW)) { - if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_str(I_RUNAS_DEFAULT))) == NULL) - log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!", - def_str(I_RUNAS_DEFAULT)); - } else if (def_ival(I_TARGETPW)) { - if (**user_runas == '#') { - if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1))) == NULL) - log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", - user_runas); - } else { - if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas)) == NULL) - log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!", - user_runas); - } + log_error(0, "unknown uid: 0"); + } else if (def_runaspw) { + if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL) + log_error(0, "unknown user: %s", def_runas_default); + } else if (def_targetpw) { + if (runas_pw->pw_name == NULL) + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown uid: %lu", + (unsigned long) runas_pw->pw_uid); + pw = runas_pw; } else pw = sudo_user.pw; @@ -997,33 +1315,89 @@ get_authpw() } /* - * Tell which options are mutually exclusive and exit. + * Cleanup hook for error()/errorx() */ +void +cleanup(gotsignal) + int gotsignal; +{ + struct sudo_nss *nss; + + if (!gotsignal) { + if (snl != NULL) { + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) + nss->close(nss); + } +#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS + sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_cleanup(); +#endif + sudo_endpwent(); + sudo_endgrent(); +#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_IO_LOGDIR + io_log_close(); +#endif + } + term_restore(STDIN_FILENO, 0); +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + selinux_restore_tty(); +#endif +} + static void -usage_excl(exit_val) - int exit_val; +show_version() { - (void) fprintf(stderr, - "Only one of the -h, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used\n"); - usage(exit_val); + (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", PACKAGE_VERSION); + if (getuid() == 0) { + putchar('\n'); + (void) printf("Configure args: %s\n", CONFIGURE_ARGS); + (void) printf("Sudoers path: %s\n", _PATH_SUDOERS); +#ifdef HAVE_LDAP +# ifdef _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF + (void) printf("nsswitch path: %s\n", _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF); +# endif + (void) printf("ldap.conf path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_CONF); + (void) printf("ldap.secret path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_SECRET); +#endif + dump_auth_methods(); + dump_defaults(); + dump_interfaces(); + } + exit(0); } -/* - * Give usage message and exit. - */ +#ifdef USE_ADMIN_FLAG static void -usage(exit_val) - int exit_val; +create_admin_success_flag() { + struct stat statbuf; + char flagfile[PATH_MAX]; + int fd, n; + + /* Check whether the user is in the admin group. */ + if (!user_in_group(sudo_user.pw, "admin")) + return; + + /* Build path to flag file. */ + n = snprintf(flagfile, sizeof(flagfile), "%s/.sudo_as_admin_successful", + user_dir); + if (n <= 0 || n >= sizeof(flagfile)) + return; + + /* Create admin flag file if it doesn't already exist. */ + set_perms(PERM_USER); + if (stat(flagfile, &statbuf) == 0) { + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); + return; + } - (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: sudo -V | -h | -L | -l | -v | -k | -K | %s", - "[-H] [-P] [-S] [-b] [-p prompt]\n [-u username/#uid] "); -#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H - (void) fprintf(stderr, "[-c class] "); -#endif -#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H - (void) fprintf(stderr, "[-a auth_type] "); -#endif - (void) fprintf(stderr, "-s | \n"); - exit(exit_val); + fd = open(flagfile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0644); + close(fd); + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); +} +#else /* !USE_ADMIN_FLAG */ +static void +create_admin_success_flag() +{ + /* STUB */ } +#endif /* USE_ADMIN_FLAG */