X-Git-Url: https://git.gag.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=sudo.c;h=159a2c8351c53811f2194062894653d41b49922b;hb=4caa124853fc7152ada5797144498078861086c2;hp=026c9cd53b29bc470fb0abbdbe846047678109ce;hpb=1de836999bb812865b719d5be5c455cb57c76158;p=debian%2Fsudo diff --git a/sudo.c b/sudo.c index 026c9cd..159a2c8 100644 --- a/sudo.c +++ b/sudo.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2007 Todd C. Miller + * Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2010 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT @@ -51,20 +52,15 @@ # include # endif # include -#else -# ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H -# include -# endif #endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */ +#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H +# include +#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */ #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H # include #endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */ -#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H -# include -#else -# include "emul/err.h" -#endif /* HAVE_ERR_H */ #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -96,38 +92,40 @@ # include # include #endif +#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP +# include +#endif #include "sudo.h" +#include "lbuf.h" #include "interfaces.h" -#include "version.h" +#include -#ifndef lint -__unused __unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.369.2.31 2007/09/13 23:06:51 millert Exp $"; -#endif /* lint */ +#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS +# include "nonunix.h" +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_PAM) && !defined(NO_PAM_SESSION) +# define CMND_WAIT TRUE +#else +# define CMND_WAIT FALSE +#endif /* * Prototypes */ -static int init_vars __P((int, char **)); -static int parse_args __P((int, char **)); -static void check_sudoers __P((void)); +static void init_vars __P((char **)); +static int set_cmnd __P((int)); static void initial_setup __P((void)); static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *)); static void set_project __P((struct passwd *)); -static void usage __P((int)) - __attribute__((__noreturn__)); -static void usage_excl __P((int)) - __attribute__((__noreturn__)); -static void usage_excl __P((int)); +static void set_runasgr __P((char *)); +static void set_runaspw __P((char *)); +static void show_version __P((void)); static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void)); +static void create_admin_success_flag __P((void)); extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **, char **)); -extern void list_matches __P((void)); -extern char **rebuild_env __P((char **, int, int)); -extern void validate_env_vars __P((struct list_member *)); -extern char **insert_env_vars __P((char **, struct list_member *)); -extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *)); -extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t)); -extern struct passwd *sudo_pwdup __P((const struct passwd *)); +int run_command __P((const char *path, char *argv[], char *envp[], uid_t uid, int dowait)); /* XXX should be in sudo.h */ /* * Globals @@ -135,40 +133,50 @@ extern struct passwd *sudo_pwdup __P((const struct passwd *)); int Argc, NewArgc; char **Argv, **NewArgv; char *prev_user; +int user_closefrom = -1; struct sudo_user sudo_user; -struct passwd *auth_pw; -FILE *sudoers_fp; +struct passwd *auth_pw, *list_pw; struct interface *interfaces; int num_interfaces; int tgetpass_flags; +int long_list; uid_t timestamp_uid; extern int errorlineno; +extern int parse_error; +extern char *errorfile; #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) static struct rlimit corelimit; #endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */ +#if defined(__linux__) +static struct rlimit nproclimit; +#endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H login_cap_t *lc; #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */ -#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H -char *login_style; -#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */ -sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp, saved_sa_chld; +sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp; +char *runas_user; +char *runas_group; +static struct sudo_nss_list *snl; +int sudo_mode; +/* For getopt(3) */ +extern char *optarg; +extern int optind; int main(argc, argv, envp) int argc; - char **argv; - char **envp; + char *argv[]; + char *envp[]; { - int validated; - int fd; - int cmnd_status; - int sudo_mode; - int pwflag; + int sources = 0, validated; + int fd, cmnd_status, pwflag, rc = 0; sigaction_t sa; - extern int printmatches; - extern char **environ; + struct sudo_nss *nss; +#if defined(SUDO_DEVEL) && defined(__OpenBSD__) + extern char *malloc_options; + malloc_options = "AFGJPR"; +#endif #ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); @@ -187,7 +195,7 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) #endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */ if (geteuid() != 0) - errx(1, "must be setuid root"); + errorx(1, "must be setuid root"); /* * Signal setup: @@ -195,20 +203,23 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) * us at some point and avoid the logging. * Install handler to wait for children when they exit. */ + zero_bytes(&sa, sizeof(sa)); sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN; (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saved_sa_int); (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &saved_sa_quit); (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp); - sa.sa_handler = reapchild; - (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, &saved_sa_chld); + + /* Initialize environment functions (including replacements). */ + env_init(FALSE); /* - * Turn off core dumps and close open files. + * Turn off core dumps and make sure fds 0-2 are open. */ initial_setup(); - setpwent(); + sudo_setpwent(); + sudo_setgrent(); /* Parse our arguments. */ sudo_mode = parse_args(Argc, Argv); @@ -224,23 +235,16 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) user_cmnd = "shell"; else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) user_cmnd = "sudoedit"; - else + else { switch (sudo_mode) { case MODE_VERSION: - (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version); - if (getuid() == 0) { - putchar('\n'); - (void) printf("Sudoers path: %s\n", _PATH_SUDOERS); - dump_auth_methods(); - dump_defaults(); - dump_interfaces(); - } - exit(0); + show_version(); break; case MODE_HELP: usage(0); break; case MODE_VALIDATE: + case MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_INVALIDATE: user_cmnd = "validate"; pwflag = I_VERIFYPW; break; @@ -254,44 +258,127 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) exit(0); break; case MODE_LIST: + case MODE_LIST|MODE_INVALIDATE: user_cmnd = "list"; pwflag = I_LISTPW; - printmatches = 1; + break; + case MODE_CHECK: + case MODE_CHECK|MODE_INVALIDATE: + pwflag = I_LISTPW; break; } + } /* Must have a command to run... */ if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0) usage(1); - cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode, environ); + init_vars(envp); /* XXX - move this later? */ -#ifdef HAVE_LDAP - validated = sudo_ldap_check(pwflag); +#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS + sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_init(); /* initialise nonunix groups impl */ +#endif /* USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS */ - /* Skip reading /etc/sudoers if LDAP told us to */ - if (def_ignore_local_sudoers); /* skips */ - else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && !printmatches); /* skips */ - else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && printmatches) - { - check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */ + /* Parse nsswitch.conf for sudoers order. */ + snl = sudo_read_nss(); - /* User is found in LDAP and we want a list of all sudo commands the - * user can do, so consult sudoers but throw away result. - */ - sudoers_lookup(pwflag); + /* Open and parse sudoers, set global defaults */ + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) { + if (nss->open(nss) == 0 && nss->parse(nss) == 0) { + sources++; + if (nss->setdefs(nss) != 0) + log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries"); + } + } + if (sources == 0) + log_error(0, "no valid sudoers sources found, quitting"); + + /* XXX - collect post-sudoers parse settings into a function */ + + /* + * Set runas passwd/group entries based on command line or sudoers. + * Note that if runas_group was specified without runas_user we + * defer setting runas_pw so the match routines know to ignore it. + */ + if (runas_group != NULL) { + set_runasgr(runas_group); + if (runas_user != NULL) + set_runaspw(runas_user); + } else + set_runaspw(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default); + + if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_RUNAS)) + log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries"); + + if (def_fqdn) + set_fqdn(); /* deferred until after sudoers is parsed */ + + /* Set login class if applicable. */ + set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw); + + /* Update initial shell now that runas is set. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) + NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell; + + /* This goes after sudoers is parsed since it may have timestamp options. */ + if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) { + remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL)); + cleanup(0); + exit(0); + } + + /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */ + if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) { + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n", + getprogname()); + exit(1); + } + + /* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */ + if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) { + if (!def_closefrom_override) + errorx(1, "you are not permitted to use the -C option"); + else + def_closefrom = user_closefrom; + } + + cmnd_status = set_cmnd(sudo_mode); + +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE + if (!setlocale(LC_ALL, def_sudoers_locale)) { + warningx("unable to set locale to \"%s\", using \"C\"", + def_sudoers_locale); + setlocale(LC_ALL, "C"); } - else #endif - { - check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */ - /* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */ - validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag); + validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST; + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) { + validated = nss->lookup(nss, validated, pwflag); + + if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) { + /* Handle "= auth" in netsvc.conf */ + if (nss->ret_if_found) + break; + } else { + /* Handle [NOTFOUND=return] */ + if (nss->ret_if_notfound) + break; + } } + if (safe_cmnd == NULL) safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd); +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE + setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); +#endif + + /* If only a group was specified, set runas_pw based on invoking user. */ + if (runas_pw == NULL) + set_runaspw(user_name); + /* * Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified. */ @@ -299,33 +386,15 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) struct passwd *pw; if (*def_timestampowner == '#') - pw = getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1)); + pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1)); else - pw = getpwnam(def_timestampowner); + pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner); if (!pw) log_error(0, "timestamp owner (%s): No such user", def_timestampowner); timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid; } - /* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */ - if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) { - remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL)); - exit(0); - } - - if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR)) - log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS, - errorlineno); - - /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */ - if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, - "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n", - getprogname()); - exit(1); - } - /* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS)) def_preserve_groups = TRUE; @@ -336,48 +405,65 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) /* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */ if (def_requiretty) { - if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1) + if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { + audit_failure(NewArgv, "no tty"); log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo"); - else + } else (void) close(fd); } - /* User may have overriden environment resetting via the -E flag. */ - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && ISSET(validated, FLAG_SETENV)) - def_env_reset = FALSE; + /* Use askpass value from sudoers unless user specified their own. */ + if (def_askpass && !user_askpass) + user_askpass = def_askpass; + + /* + * We don't reset the environment for sudoedit or if the user + * specified the -E command line flag and they have setenv privs. + */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT) || + (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv)) + def_env_reset = FALSE; /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */ - environ = rebuild_env(environ, sudo_mode, ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOEXEC)); + rebuild_env(def_noexec); /* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */ auth_pw = get_authpw(); /* Require a password if sudoers says so. */ - if (!ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOPASS)) - check_user(validated); + if (def_authenticate) + check_user(validated, sudo_mode); /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */ - if (user_uid == 0 && prev_user != NULL && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) { + /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */ + if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) { + if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) { struct passwd *pw; if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) { - efree(sudo_user.pw); sudo_user.pw = pw; +#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP + mbr_uid_to_uuid(user_uid, user_uuid); +#endif } + } } if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) { + /* Create Ubuntu-style dot file to indicate sudo was successful. */ + create_admin_success_flag(); + /* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */ if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) { - warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); - exit(1); + audit_failure(NewArgv, "command in current directory"); + errorx(1, "ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); } else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) { - warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd); - exit(1); + audit_failure(NewArgv, "%s: command not found", user_cmnd); + errorx(1, "%s: command not found", user_cmnd); } /* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */ - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !ISSET(validated, FLAG_SETENV)) { + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) { if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment"); @@ -385,33 +471,32 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars); } - log_auth(validated, 1); - if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE) - exit(0); - else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) { - list_matches(); -#ifdef HAVE_LDAP - sudo_ldap_list_matches(); +#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_IO_LOGDIR + /* Get next session ID so we can log it. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) && (def_log_input || def_log_output)) + io_nextid(); +#endif + log_allowed(validated); + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK)) + rc = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); + else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LIST)) + display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); + + /* Cleanup sudoers sources */ + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) + nss->close(nss); + +#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS + /* Finished with the groupcheck code */ + sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_cleanup(); #endif - exit(0); - } - - /* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */ - if (def_umask != 0777) - (void) umask(def_umask); - - /* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */ -#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) - (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit); -#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */ - /* Become specified user or root if executing a command. */ - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) - set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS); + /* Deferred exit due to sudo_ldap_close() */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_CHECK|MODE_LIST))) + exit(rc); - /* Close the password and group files */ - endpwent(); - endgrent(); + /* Must audit before uid change. */ + audit_success(NewArgv); if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { char *p; @@ -422,46 +507,37 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) *p = '-'; NewArgv[0] = p; - /* Change to target user's homedir. */ - if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1) - warn("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir); +#if defined(__linux__) || defined(_AIX) + /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */ + read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, TRUE); +#endif } - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) - exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv, envp)); + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) { + /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */ + if (def_env_file) + read_env_file(def_env_file, FALSE); - /* Insert user-specified environment variables. */ - environ = insert_env_vars(environ, sudo_user.env_vars); + /* Insert user-specified environment variables. */ + insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars); + } /* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL); (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL); (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL); - (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &saved_sa_chld, NULL); -#ifndef PROFILING - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0) - exit(0); - else - execve(safe_cmnd, NewArgv, environ); -#else - exit(0); -#endif /* PROFILING */ - /* - * If we got here then the exec() failed... - */ - if (errno == ENOEXEC) { - NewArgv--; /* at least one extra slot... */ - NewArgv[0] = "sh"; - NewArgv[1] = safe_cmnd; - execve(_PATH_BSHELL, NewArgv, environ); + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) { + exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv, envp)); + } else { + exit(run_command(safe_cmnd, NewArgv, env_get(), runas_pw->pw_uid, + CMND_WAIT)); } - warn("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd); - exit(127); - } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) { - log_auth(validated, 1); + } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST)) { + audit_failure(NewArgv, "No user or host"); + log_denial(validated, 1); exit(1); - } else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_NOT_OK)) { + } else { if (def_path_info) { /* * We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can @@ -470,20 +546,17 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) * is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set * their path to just contain a single dir. */ - log_auth(validated, + log_denial(validated, !(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)); if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) - warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd); + warningx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd); else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) - warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); + warningx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); } else { /* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */ - log_auth(validated, 1); + log_denial(validated, 1); } - exit(1); - } else { - /* should never get here */ - log_auth(validated, 1); + audit_failure(NewArgv, "validation failure"); exit(1); } exit(0); /* not reached */ @@ -493,17 +566,16 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) * Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and * load the ``interfaces'' array. */ -static int -init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) - int sudo_mode; +static void +init_vars(envp) char **envp; { - char *p, **ep, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; - int nohostname, rval; + char *p, **ep, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1]; + int nohostname; /* Sanity check command from user. */ if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX) - errx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]); + errorx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]); #ifdef HAVE_TZSET (void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */ @@ -520,11 +592,11 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) * "host" is the (possibly fully-qualified) hostname and * "shost" is the unqualified form of the hostname. */ - sudo_user.host_fqdn_queried = FALSE; nohostname = gethostname(thost, sizeof(thost)); - if (nohostname) + if (nohostname) { user_host = user_shost = "localhost"; - else { + } else { + thost[sizeof(thost) - 1] = '\0'; user_host = estrdup(thost); if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) { *p = '\0'; @@ -535,7 +607,8 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) } } - if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO))) { + if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO)) || + (p = ttyname(STDERR_FILENO))) { user_tty = user_ttypath = estrdup(p); if (strncmp(user_tty, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0) user_tty += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1; @@ -543,7 +616,16 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) user_tty = "unknown"; for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) { + /* XXX - don't fill in if empty string */ switch (**ep) { + case 'D': + if (strncmp("DISPLAY=", *ep, 8) == 0) + user_display = *ep + 8; + break; + case 'K': + if (strncmp("KRB5CCNAME=", *ep, 11) == 0) + user_ccname = *ep + 11; + break; case 'P': if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0) user_path = *ep + 5; @@ -555,8 +637,9 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) user_prompt = *ep + 12; else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0) prev_user = *ep + 10; + else if (strncmp("SUDO_ASKPASS=", *ep, 13) == 0) + user_askpass = *ep + 13; break; - } } @@ -581,37 +664,29 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) * users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout file which can cause sudo to * be run during reboot after the YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died. */ - if (sudo_mode & (MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_KILL)) - errx(1, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name); - log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name); + if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) + errorx(1, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name); + log_error(0, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name); } +#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP + mbr_uid_to_uuid(user_uid, user_uuid); +#endif if (user_shell == NULL || *user_shell == '\0') - user_shell = sudo_user.pw->pw_shell; + user_shell = estrdup(sudo_user.pw->pw_shell); /* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */ #ifdef HAVE_GETGROUPS if ((user_ngroups = getgroups(0, NULL)) > 0) { - user_groups = emalloc2(user_ngroups, MAX(sizeof(gid_t), sizeof(int))); + user_groups = emalloc2(user_ngroups, sizeof(GETGROUPS_T)); if (getgroups(user_ngroups, user_groups) < 0) log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get group vector"); - } else - user_ngroups = 0; + } #endif - if (def_fqdn) - set_fqdn(); /* may call log_error() */ - if (nohostname) log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname"); - /* We don't query FQDN yet, it might get disabled later. Querying is done - * when host matching is executed and def_fqdn still true */ - - set_runaspw(*user_runas); /* may call log_error() */ - if (*user_runas[0] == '#' && runas_pw->pw_name && runas_pw->pw_name[0]) - *user_runas = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_name); - /* * Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root. */ @@ -619,7 +694,7 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) { set_perms(PERM_ROOT); if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) { - warnx("cannot get working directory"); + warningx("cannot get working directory"); (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd)); } } else @@ -629,28 +704,65 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) * If we were given the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options we need to redo * NewArgv and NewArgc. */ - if ((sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) { - char **dst, **src = NewArgv; + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) { + NewArgv--; + NewArgc++; + NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit"; + } else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) { + char **av; /* Allocate an extra slot for execve() failure (ENOEXEC). */ - NewArgv = (char **) emalloc2((++NewArgc + 2), sizeof(char *)); - NewArgv++; - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) - NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit"; - else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) - NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell; - else if (user_shell && *user_shell) - NewArgv[0] = user_shell; - else - errx(1, "unable to determine shell"); - - /* copy the args from NewArgv */ - for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst) - continue; + av = (char **) emalloc2(5, sizeof(char *)); + av++; + + av[0] = user_shell; /* may be updated later */ + if (NewArgc > 0) { + size_t cmnd_size = 1024; + char *cmnd, *src, *dst, **ap; + + cmnd = dst = emalloc(cmnd_size); + for (ap = NewArgv; *ap != NULL; ap++) { + for (src = *ap; *src != '\0'; src++) { + /* reserve room for an escaped char + space */ + if (cmnd_size < (dst - cmnd) + 3) { + char *new_cmnd; + cmnd_size <<= 1; + new_cmnd = erealloc(cmnd, cmnd_size); + dst = new_cmnd + (dst - cmnd); + cmnd = new_cmnd; + } + if (isalnum((unsigned char)*src) || *src == '_' || *src == '-') { + *dst++ = *src; + } else { + /* quote potential meta character */ + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = *src; + } + } + *dst++ = ' '; + } + if (cmnd != dst) + dst--; /* replace last space with a NUL */ + *dst = '\0'; + av[1] = "-c"; + av[2] = cmnd; + NewArgc = 2; + } + av[++NewArgc] = NULL; + NewArgv = av; } +} - /* Set login class if applicable. */ - set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw); +/* + * Fill in user_cmnd, user_args, user_base and user_stat variables + * and apply any command-specific defaults entries. + */ +static int +set_cmnd(sudo_mode) + int sudo_mode; +{ + int rval; + char *path = user_path; /* Set project if applicable. */ set_project(runas_pw); @@ -658,16 +770,19 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) /* Resolve the path and return. */ rval = FOUND; user_stat = emalloc(sizeof(struct stat)); - if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) { - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) { - /* XXX - default_runas may be modified during parsing of sudoers */ + if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) { + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) { + if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt()) + path = def_secure_path; set_perms(PERM_RUNAS); - rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path); + rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path, + def_ignore_dot); set_perms(PERM_ROOT); if (rval != FOUND) { /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */ set_perms(PERM_USER); - rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path); + rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path, + def_ignore_dot); set_perms(PERM_ROOT); } } @@ -678,7 +793,7 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) size_t size, n; /* If we didn't realloc NewArgv it is contiguous so just count. */ - if (!(sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) { + if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) { size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) + strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1; } else { @@ -691,7 +806,7 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) for (to = user_args, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) { n = strlcpy(to, *from, size - (to - user_args)); if (n >= size - (to - user_args)) - errx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow"); + errorx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow"); to += n; *to++ = ' '; } @@ -703,237 +818,184 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) else user_base = user_cmnd; + if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_CMND)) + log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries"); + + if (!runas_user && !runas_group) + set_runaspw(def_runas_default); /* may have been updated above */ + return(rval); } /* - * Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3). + * Setup the execution environment immediately prior to the call to execve() + * Returns TRUE on success and FALSE on failure. */ -static int -parse_args(argc, argv) - int argc; - char **argv; +int +exec_setup(rbac_enabled, ttyname, ttyfd) + int rbac_enabled; + const char *ttyname; + int ttyfd; { - int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is sudo to be run in? */ - int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */ + int rval = FALSE; - NewArgv = argv + 1; - NewArgc = argc - 1; - - /* First, check to see if we were invoked as "sudoedit". */ - if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) { - rval = MODE_EDIT; - excl = 'e'; - } else - rval = MODE_RUN; - - while (NewArgc > 0) { - if (NewArgv[0][0] == '-') { - if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0') - warnx("please use single character options"); - - switch (NewArgv[0][1]) { - case 'p': - /* Must have an associated prompt. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); - - user_prompt = NewArgv[1]; - - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; - case 'u': - /* Must have an associated runas user. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); - - user_runas = &NewArgv[1]; - - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; -#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H - case 'a': - /* Must have an associated authentication style. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); - - login_style = NewArgv[1]; - - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + if (rbac_enabled) { + if (selinux_setup(user_role, user_type, ttyname, ttyfd) == -1) + goto done; + } #endif -#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H - case 'c': - /* Must have an associated login class. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); - login_class = NewArgv[1]; - def_use_loginclass = TRUE; + /* Close the password and group files and free up memory. */ + sudo_endpwent(); + sudo_endgrent(); - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; -#endif - case 'b': - SET(rval, MODE_BACKGROUND); - break; - case 'e': - rval = MODE_EDIT; - if (excl && excl != 'e') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'e'; - break; - case 'v': - rval = MODE_VALIDATE; - if (excl && excl != 'v') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'v'; - break; - case 'i': - SET(rval, (MODE_LOGIN_SHELL | MODE_SHELL)); - def_env_reset = TRUE; - if (excl && excl != 'i') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'i'; - break; - case 'k': - rval = MODE_INVALIDATE; - if (excl && excl != 'k') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'k'; - break; - case 'K': - rval = MODE_KILL; - if (excl && excl != 'K') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'K'; - break; - case 'L': - rval = MODE_LISTDEFS; - if (excl && excl != 'L') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'L'; - break; - case 'l': - rval = MODE_LIST; - if (excl && excl != 'l') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'l'; - break; - case 'V': - rval = MODE_VERSION; - if (excl && excl != 'V') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'V'; - break; - case 'h': - rval = MODE_HELP; - if (excl && excl != 'h') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'h'; - break; - case 's': - SET(rval, MODE_SHELL); - if (excl && excl != 's') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 's'; - break; - case 'H': - SET(rval, MODE_RESET_HOME); - break; - case 'P': - SET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS); - break; - case 'S': - SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN); - break; - case 'E': - SET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV); - break; - case '-': - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - goto args_done; - case '\0': - warnx("'-' requires an argument"); - usage(1); - default: - warnx("illegal option `%s'", NewArgv[0]); - usage(1); - } - } else if (NewArgv[0][0] != '/' && strchr(NewArgv[0], '=') != NULL) { - /* Could be an environment variable. */ - struct list_member *ev; - ev = emalloc(sizeof(*ev)); - ev->value = NewArgv[0]; - ev->next = sudo_user.env_vars; - sudo_user.env_vars = ev; + /* + * For sudoedit, the command runas a the user with no additional setup. + */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) { + set_perms(PERM_FULL_USER); + rval = TRUE; + goto done; + } + + /* + * Set umask based on sudoers. + * If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too + * unless umask_override is set. + */ + if (def_umask != 0777) { + if (def_umask_override) { + umask(def_umask); } else { - /* Not an arg */ - break; + mode_t mask = umask(def_umask); + mask |= def_umask; + if (mask != def_umask) + umask(mask); } - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; } -args_done: - - if (ISSET(rval, MODE_EDIT) && - (ISSET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) || sudo_user.env_vars != NULL)) { - if (ISSET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) - warnx("the `-E' option is not valid in edit mode"); - if (sudo_user.env_vars != NULL) - warnx("you may not specify environment variables in edit mode"); - usage(1); + + /* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */ +#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) + (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit); +#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */ + + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) + set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS); + + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { + /* Change to target user's homedir. */ + if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1) { + warning("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir); + goto done; + } } - if (user_runas != NULL && !ISSET(rval, (MODE_EDIT|MODE_RUN))) { - if (excl != '\0') - warnx("the `-u' and '-%c' options may not be used together", excl); - usage(1); + /* + * Restore nproc resource limit if pam_limits didn't do it for us. + * We must do this *after* the uid change to avoid potential EAGAIN + * from setuid(). + */ +#if defined(__linux__) + { + struct rlimit rl; + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl) == 0) { + if (rl.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY && rl.rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) + (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &nproclimit); + } } - if ((NewArgc == 0 && (rval & MODE_EDIT)) || - (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)))) - usage(1); - if (NewArgc == 0 && rval == MODE_RUN) - SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL)); +#endif + rval = TRUE; + +done: return(rval); } /* - * Sanity check sudoers mode/owner/type. - * Leaves a file pointer to the sudoers file open in ``fp''. + * Run the command and wait for it to complete. */ -static void -check_sudoers() +int +run_command(path, argv, envp, uid, dowait) + const char *path; + char *argv[]; + char *envp[]; + uid_t uid; + int dowait; +{ + struct command_status cstat; + int exitcode = 1; + +#ifdef PROFILING + exit(0); +#endif + + cstat.type = CMD_INVALID; + cstat.val = 0; + + sudo_execve(path, argv, envp, uid, &cstat, dowait, + ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND)); + + switch (cstat.type) { + case CMD_ERRNO: + /* exec_setup() or execve() returned an error. */ + warningx("unable to execute %s: %s", path, strerror(cstat.val)); + exitcode = 127; + break; + case CMD_WSTATUS: + /* Command ran, exited or was killed. */ + if (WIFEXITED(cstat.val)) + exitcode = WEXITSTATUS(cstat.val); + else if (WIFSIGNALED(cstat.val)) + exitcode = WTERMSIG(cstat.val) | 128; + break; + default: + warningx("unexpected child termination condition: %d", cstat.type); + break; + } +#ifdef HAVE_PAM + pam_end_session(); +#endif /* HAVE_PAM */ +#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_IO_LOGDIR + io_log_close(); +#endif + return(exitcode); +} + +/* + * Open sudoers and sanity check mode/owner/type. + * Returns a handle to the sudoers file or NULL on error. + */ +FILE * +open_sudoers(sudoers, doedit, keepopen) + const char *sudoers; + int doedit; + int *keepopen; { struct stat statbuf; - int rootstat, i; + FILE *fp = NULL; + int rootstat; /* * Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default. * Only works if file system is readable/writable by root. */ - if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 && + if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf)) == 0 && SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 && (statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) { - if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) { - warnx("fixed mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + if (chmod(sudoers, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) { + warningx("fixed mode on %s", sudoers); SET(statbuf.st_mode, SUDOERS_MODE); if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) { - if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) { - warnx("set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + if (chown(sudoers, (uid_t) -1, SUDOERS_GID) == 0) { + warningx("set group on %s", sudoers); statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID; } else - warn("unable to set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + warning("unable to set group on %s", sudoers); } } else - warn("unable to fix mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + warning("unable to fix mode on %s", sudoers); } /* @@ -943,54 +1005,70 @@ check_sudoers() */ set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS); - if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0) - log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf) != 0) + log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't stat %s", sudoers); else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) - log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS); - else if (statbuf.st_size == 0) - log_error(0, "%s is zero length", _PATH_SUDOERS); + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is not a regular file", sudoers); else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE) - log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS, + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", sudoers, (unsigned int) (statbuf.st_mode & 07777), (unsigned int) SUDOERS_MODE); else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID) - log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS, + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers, (unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_UID); else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) - log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS, + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers, (unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_GID); + else if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL) + log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't open %s", sudoers); else { - /* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */ - for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) { - errno = 0; - if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL || - fgetc(sudoers_fp) == EOF) { - if (sudoers_fp != NULL) - fclose(sudoers_fp); - sudoers_fp = NULL; - if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) - break; - } else - break; - sleep(1); + /* + * Make sure we can actually read sudoers so we can present the + * user with a reasonable error message (unlike the lexer). + */ + if (statbuf.st_size != 0 && fgetc(fp) == EOF) { + log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't read %s", sudoers); + fclose(fp); + fp = NULL; } - if (sudoers_fp == NULL) - log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + } + + if (fp != NULL) { + rewind(fp); + (void) fcntl(fileno(fp), F_SETFD, 1); } set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* change back to root */ + return(fp); } /* * Close all open files (except std*) and turn off core dumps. + * Also sets the set_perms() pointer to the correct function. */ static void initial_setup() { int miss[3], devnull = -1; -#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) +#if defined(__linux__) || (defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)) struct rlimit rl; +#endif +#if defined(__linux__) + /* + * Unlimit the number of processes since Linux's setuid() will + * apply resource limits when changing uid and return EAGAIN if + * nproc would be violated by the uid switch. + */ + (void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &nproclimit); + rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl)) { + memcpy(&rl, &nproclimit, sizeof(struct rlimit)); + rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max; + (void)setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl); + } +#endif /* __linux__ */ +#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) /* * Turn off core dumps. */ @@ -1008,16 +1086,17 @@ initial_setup() miss[STDOUT_FILENO] = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1; miss[STDERR_FILENO] = fcntl(STDERR_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1; if (miss[STDIN_FILENO] || miss[STDOUT_FILENO] || miss[STDERR_FILENO]) { - if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0644)) != -1) { - if (miss[STDIN_FILENO]) - (void) dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO); - if (miss[STDOUT_FILENO]) - (void) dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO); - if (miss[STDERR_FILENO]) - (void) dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO); - } + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0644)) == -1) + error(1, "unable to open %s", _PATH_DEVNULL); + if (miss[STDIN_FILENO] && dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) + error(1, "dup2"); + if (miss[STDOUT_FILENO] && dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) + error(1, "dup2"); + if (miss[STDERR_FILENO] && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) + error(1, "dup2"); + if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) + close(devnull); } - closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H @@ -1038,8 +1117,9 @@ set_loginclass(pw) errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT; if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) { - if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0) - errx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class); + if (user_uid != 0 && + strcmp(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default, "root") != 0) + errorx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class); } else { login_class = pw->pw_class; if (!login_class || !*login_class) @@ -1142,7 +1222,7 @@ set_fqdn() char *p; #ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO - memset(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint)); + zero_bytes(&hint, sizeof(hint)); hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hint.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) { @@ -1169,35 +1249,42 @@ set_fqdn() } else { user_shost = user_host; } - sudo_user.host_fqdn_queried = TRUE; } /* * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as. * By default, this is "root". Updates runas_pw as a side effect. */ -int +static void set_runaspw(user) char *user; { - if (runas_pw != NULL) { - if (user_runas != &def_runas_default) - return(TRUE); /* don't override -u option */ - efree(runas_pw); - } if (*user == '#') { - runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1)); - if (runas_pw == NULL) { - runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd)); - (void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd)); - runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(user + 1); + if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1))) == NULL) + runas_pw = sudo_fakepwnam(user, runas_gr ? runas_gr->gr_gid : 0); + } else { + if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { + audit_failure(NewArgv, "unknown user: %s", user); + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown user: %s", user); } + } +} + +/* + * Get group entry for the group we are going to run commands as. + * Updates runas_pw as a side effect. + */ +static void +set_runasgr(group) + char *group; +{ + if (*group == '#') { + if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrgid(atoi(group + 1))) == NULL) + runas_gr = sudo_fakegrnam(group); } else { - runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user); - if (runas_pw == NULL) - log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", user); + if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrnam(group)) == NULL) + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown group: %s", group); } - return(TRUE); } /* @@ -1211,19 +1298,14 @@ get_authpw() struct passwd *pw; if (def_rootpw) { - if (runas_pw->pw_uid == 0) - pw = runas_pw; - else if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL) - log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!"); + if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL) + log_error(0, "unknown uid: 0"); } else if (def_runaspw) { - if (strcmp(def_runas_default, *user_runas) == 0) - pw = runas_pw; - else if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL) - log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!", - def_runas_default); + if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL) + log_error(0, "unknown user: %s", def_runas_default); } else if (def_targetpw) { if (runas_pw->pw_name == NULL) - log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %lu!", + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown uid: %lu", (unsigned long) runas_pw->pw_uid); pw = runas_pw; } else @@ -1233,98 +1315,89 @@ get_authpw() } /* - * Tell which options are mutually exclusive and exit. + * Cleanup hook for error()/errorx() */ -static void -usage_excl(exit_val) - int exit_val; +void +cleanup(gotsignal) + int gotsignal; { - warnx("Only one of the -e, -h, i, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used"); - usage(exit_val); -} + struct sudo_nss *nss; -/* - * Give usage message and exit. - */ -static void -usage(exit_val) - int exit_val; -{ - char **p, **uvec[4]; - int i, linelen, linemax, ulen, plen; - static char *uvec1[] = { - " -h |", - " -K |", - " -k |", - " -L |", - " -l |", - " -V |", - " -v", - NULL - }; - static char *uvec2[] = { - " [-bEHPS]", -#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H - " [-a auth_type]", -#endif -#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H - " [-c class|-]", + if (!gotsignal) { + if (snl != NULL) { + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) + nss->close(nss); + } +#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS + sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_cleanup(); #endif - " [-p prompt]", - " [-u username|#uid]", - " [VAR=value]", - " {-i | -s | }", - NULL - }; - static char *uvec3[] = { - " -e", - " [-S]", -#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H - " [-a auth_type]", + sudo_endpwent(); + sudo_endgrent(); +#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_IO_LOGDIR + io_log_close(); #endif -#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H - " [-c class|-]", + } + term_restore(STDIN_FILENO, 0); +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + selinux_restore_tty(); #endif - " [-p prompt]", - " [-u username|#uid]", - " file ...", - NULL - }; +} - /* - * Use usage vectors appropriate to the progname. - */ - if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) { - uvec[0] = uvec3 + 1; - uvec[1] = NULL; - } else { - uvec[0] = uvec1; - uvec[1] = uvec2; - uvec[2] = uvec3; - uvec[3] = NULL; +static void +show_version() +{ + (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", PACKAGE_VERSION); + if (getuid() == 0) { + putchar('\n'); + (void) printf("Configure args: %s\n", CONFIGURE_ARGS); + (void) printf("Sudoers path: %s\n", _PATH_SUDOERS); +#ifdef HAVE_LDAP +# ifdef _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF + (void) printf("nsswitch path: %s\n", _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF); +# endif + (void) printf("ldap.conf path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_CONF); + (void) printf("ldap.secret path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_SECRET); +#endif + dump_auth_methods(); + dump_defaults(); + dump_interfaces(); } + exit(0); +} - /* - * Print usage and wrap lines as needed. - * Assumes an 80-character wide terminal, which is kind of bogus... - */ - ulen = (int)strlen(getprogname()) + 7; - linemax = 80; - for (i = 0; uvec[i] != NULL; i++) { - printf("usage: %s", getprogname()); - linelen = linemax - ulen; - for (p = uvec[i]; *p != NULL; p++) { - plen = (int)strlen(*p); - if (linelen >= plen || linelen == linemax - ulen) { - fputs(*p, stdout); - linelen -= plen; - } else { - p--; - linelen = linemax - ulen; - printf("\n%*s", ulen, ""); - } - } - putchar('\n'); +#ifdef USE_ADMIN_FLAG +static void +create_admin_success_flag() +{ + struct stat statbuf; + char flagfile[PATH_MAX]; + int fd, n; + + /* Check whether the user is in the admin group. */ + if (!user_in_group(sudo_user.pw, "admin")) + return; + + /* Build path to flag file. */ + n = snprintf(flagfile, sizeof(flagfile), "%s/.sudo_as_admin_successful", + user_dir); + if (n <= 0 || n >= sizeof(flagfile)) + return; + + /* Create admin flag file if it doesn't already exist. */ + set_perms(PERM_USER); + if (stat(flagfile, &statbuf) == 0) { + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); + return; } - exit(exit_val); + + fd = open(flagfile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0644); + close(fd); + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); +} +#else /* !USE_ADMIN_FLAG */ +static void +create_admin_success_flag() +{ + /* STUB */ } +#endif /* USE_ADMIN_FLAG */