X-Git-Url: https://git.gag.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=sudo.c;h=0f8e2deb79e832139b5b113a535d969b71438647;hb=32783418bbb334eb102ab8dffcf899f9ada3d56f;hp=71560410436da97a8b8994aff6e8d00ae27776ad;hpb=dbfba8e03d0fd62b5bd97a7ae9c8712221106b17;p=debian%2Fsudo diff --git a/sudo.c b/sudo.c index 7156041..0f8e2de 100644 --- a/sudo.c +++ b/sudo.c @@ -1,43 +1,33 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2002 Todd C. Miller - * All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2007 Todd C. Miller * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * - * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products - * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. - * - * 4. Products derived from this software may not be called "Sudo" nor - * may "Sudo" appear in their names without specific prior written - * permission from the author. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, - * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY - * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL - * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, - * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, - * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; - * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, - * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR - * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF - * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects + * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force + * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. * * For a brief history of sudo, please see the HISTORY file included * with this distribution. */ -#define _SUDO_SUDO_C +#define _SUDO_MAIN + +#ifdef __TANDEM +# include +#endif -#include "config.h" +#include #include #include @@ -69,12 +59,22 @@ #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H # include #endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */ +#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H +# include +#else +# include "emul/err.h" +#endif /* HAVE_ERR_H */ #include #include #include #include #include -#include +#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE +# include +#endif #include #include #if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS) @@ -92,56 +92,70 @@ # define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon" # endif #endif +#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H +# include +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX +# include +#endif #include "sudo.h" #include "interfaces.h" #include "version.h" #ifndef lint -static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.318 2002/01/15 23:43:59 millert Exp $"; +__unused __unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.369.2.39 2008/04/10 17:56:05 millert Exp $"; #endif /* lint */ /* * Prototypes */ -static int init_vars __P((int)); -static int parse_args __P((void)); +static int init_vars __P((int, char **)); +static int parse_args __P((int, char **)); static void check_sudoers __P((void)); static void initial_setup __P((void)); static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *)); -static void usage __P((int)); +static void set_project __P((struct passwd *)); +static void usage __P((int)) + __attribute__((__noreturn__)); +static void usage_excl __P((int)) + __attribute__((__noreturn__)); static void usage_excl __P((int)); static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void)); +extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **, char **)); extern void list_matches __P((void)); -extern char **rebuild_env __P((int, char **)); -extern char **zero_env __P((char **)); +extern char **rebuild_env __P((char **, int, int)); +extern void validate_env_vars __P((struct list_member *)); +extern char **insert_env_vars __P((char **, struct list_member *)); extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *)); extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t)); +extern struct passwd *sudo_pwdup __P((const struct passwd *)); /* * Globals */ -int Argc; -char **Argv; -int NewArgc = 0; -char **NewArgv = NULL; +int Argc, NewArgc; +char **Argv, **NewArgv; +char *prev_user; struct sudo_user sudo_user; struct passwd *auth_pw; -FILE *sudoers_fp = NULL; +FILE *sudoers_fp; struct interface *interfaces; int num_interfaces; int tgetpass_flags; +uid_t timestamp_uid; extern int errorlineno; #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) static struct rlimit corelimit; -#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */ +#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H login_cap_t *lc; #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */ #ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H char *login_style; #endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */ -void (*set_perms) __P((int, int)); +sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp, saved_sa_chld; int @@ -155,49 +169,52 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) int cmnd_status; int sudo_mode; int pwflag; - char **new_environ; sigaction_t sa; extern int printmatches; extern char **environ; +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE + setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); +#endif + + Argv = argv; + if ((Argc = argc) < 1) + usage(1); + /* Must be done as the first thing... */ #if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS) - (void) set_auth_parameters(argc, argv); + (void) set_auth_parameters(Argc, Argv); # ifdef HAVE_INITPRIVS initprivs(); # endif #endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */ - /* Zero out the environment. */ - environ = zero_env(envp); - - Argv = argv; - Argc = argc; - - if (geteuid() != 0) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, %s must be setuid root.\n", Argv[0]); - exit(1); - } + if (geteuid() != 0) + errx(1, "must be setuid root"); /* - * Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt - * us at some point and avoid the logging. + * Signal setup: + * Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt + * us at some point and avoid the logging. + * Install handler to wait for children when they exit. */ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN; - (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL); - (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL); - (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saved_sa_int); + (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &saved_sa_quit); + (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp); + sa.sa_handler = reapchild; + (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, &saved_sa_chld); /* - * Setup signal handlers, turn off core dumps, and close open files. + * Turn off core dumps and close open files. */ initial_setup(); setpwent(); /* Parse our arguments. */ - sudo_mode = parse_args(); + sudo_mode = parse_args(Argc, Argv); /* Setup defaults data structures. */ init_defaults(); @@ -206,18 +223,20 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) load_interfaces(); pwflag = 0; - if (sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL) + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) user_cmnd = "shell"; + else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) + user_cmnd = "sudoedit"; else switch (sudo_mode) { case MODE_VERSION: (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version); if (getuid() == 0) { putchar('\n'); + (void) printf("Sudoers path: %s\n", _PATH_SUDOERS); dump_auth_methods(); dump_defaults(); dump_interfaces(); - dump_badenv(); } exit(0); break; @@ -226,7 +245,7 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) break; case MODE_VALIDATE: user_cmnd = "validate"; - pwflag = I_VERIFYPW_I; + pwflag = I_VERIFYPW; break; case MODE_KILL: case MODE_INVALIDATE: @@ -239,7 +258,7 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) break; case MODE_LIST: user_cmnd = "list"; - pwflag = I_LISTPW_I; + pwflag = I_LISTPW; printmatches = 1; break; } @@ -248,43 +267,45 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0) usage(1); - cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode); + cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode, environ); + +#ifdef HAVE_LDAP + validated = sudo_ldap_check(pwflag); + + /* Skip reading /etc/sudoers if LDAP told us to */ + if (!def_ignore_local_sudoers) { + int v; + + check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */ + /* Local sudoers file overrides LDAP if we have a match. */ + v = sudoers_lookup(pwflag); + if (validated == VALIDATE_ERROR || ISSET(v, VALIDATE_OK)) + validated = v; + } +#else check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */ /* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */ validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag); - - /* - * If we have POSIX saved uids and the stay_setuid flag was not set, - * set the real, effective and saved uids to 0 and use set_perms_fallback() - * instead of set_perms_posix(). - */ -#if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION) - if (!def_flag(I_STAY_SETUID) && set_perms == set_perms_posix) { - if (setuid(0)) { - perror("setuid(0)"); - exit(1); - } - set_perms = set_perms_fallback; - } #endif + if (safe_cmnd == NULL) + safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd); /* - * Look up runas user passwd struct. If we are given a uid then - * there may be no corresponding passwd(5) entry (which is OK). + * Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified. */ - if (**user_runas == '#') { - runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1)); - if (runas_pw == NULL) { - runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd)); - (void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd)); - runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(*user_runas + 1); - } - } else { - runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas); - if (runas_pw == NULL) - log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", *user_runas); + if (def_timestampowner) { + struct passwd *pw; + + if (*def_timestampowner == '#') + pw = getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1)); + else + pw = getpwnam(def_timestampowner); + if (!pw) + log_error(0, "timestamp owner (%s): No such user", + def_timestampowner); + timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid; } /* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */ @@ -293,121 +314,161 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) exit(0); } - if (validated & VALIDATE_ERROR) + if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR)) log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS, errorlineno); /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */ - if (user_uid == 0 && !def_flag(I_ROOT_SUDO)) { - (void) fputs("You are already root, you don't need to use sudo.\n", - stderr); + if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) { + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n", + getprogname()); exit(1); } /* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */ - if (sudo_mode & MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS) - def_flag(I_PRESERVE_GROUPS) = TRUE; + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS)) + def_preserve_groups = TRUE; /* If no command line args and "set_home" is not set, error out. */ - if ((sudo_mode & MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_flag(I_SHELL_NOARGS)) + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs) usage(1); - /* May need to set $HOME to target user if we are running a command. */ - if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN) && (def_flag(I_ALWAYS_SET_HOME) || - ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL) && def_flag(I_SET_HOME)))) - sudo_mode |= MODE_RESET_HOME; - /* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */ - if (def_flag(I_REQUIRETTY)) { + if (def_requiretty) { if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1) log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo"); else (void) close(fd); } + /* User may have overriden environment resetting via the -E flag. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && ISSET(validated, FLAG_SETENV)) + def_env_reset = FALSE; + + /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */ + environ = rebuild_env(environ, sudo_mode, ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOEXEC)); + /* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */ auth_pw = get_authpw(); - /* Require a password unless the NOPASS tag was set. */ - if (!(validated & FLAG_NOPASS)) - check_user(); + /* Require a password if sudoers says so. */ + if (!ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOPASS)) + check_user(validated); - /* Build up custom environment that avoids any nasty bits. */ - new_environ = rebuild_env(sudo_mode, envp); + /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */ + if (user_uid == 0 && prev_user != NULL && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) { + struct passwd *pw; - if (validated & VALIDATE_OK) { + if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) { + efree(sudo_user.pw); + sudo_user.pw = pw; + } + } + + if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) { /* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */ if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); + warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); exit(1); } else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0], - user_cmnd); + warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd); exit(1); } + /* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !ISSET(validated, FLAG_SETENV)) { + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) + log_error(NO_MAIL, + "sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment"); + else + validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars); + } + log_auth(validated, 1); if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE) exit(0); else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) { list_matches(); +#ifdef HAVE_LDAP + sudo_ldap_list_matches(); +#endif exit(0); } - /* This *must* have been set if we got a match but... */ - if (safe_cmnd == NULL) { - log_error(MSG_ONLY, - "internal error, safe_cmnd never got set for %s; %s", - user_cmnd, - "please report this error at http://courtesan.com/sudo/bugs/"); - } - - /* Reset signal handlers before we exec. */ - sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); - sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; - sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL; - (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL); - (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL); - (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL); - /* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */ - if (def_ival(I_UMASK) != 0777) - (void) umask(def_mode(I_UMASK)); + if (def_umask != 0777) + (void) umask(def_umask); /* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */ #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit); -#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */ +#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */ - /* Become specified user or root. */ - set_perms(PERM_RUNAS, sudo_mode); + /* Become specified user or root if executing a command. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) + set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS); /* Close the password and group files */ endpwent(); endgrent(); - /* Install the new environment. */ - environ = new_environ; + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { + char *p; + + /* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */ + if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL) + p = NewArgv[0]; + *p = '-'; + NewArgv[0] = p; + + /* Change to target user's homedir. */ + if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1) + warn("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir); + } + + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) + exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv, envp)); + + /* Insert user-specified environment variables. */ + environ = insert_env_vars(environ, sudo_user.env_vars); + + /* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */ + (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &saved_sa_chld, NULL); #ifndef PROFILING - if ((sudo_mode & MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0) + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0) exit(0); - else - EXEC(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */ + else { +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + if (is_selinux_enabled() > 0 && user_role != NULL) + selinux_exec(user_role, user_type, NewArgv, environ, + ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)); +#endif + execve(safe_cmnd, NewArgv, environ); + } #else exit(0); #endif /* PROFILING */ /* * If we got here then the exec() failed... */ - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: unable to exec %s: %s\n", - Argv[0], safe_cmnd, strerror(errno)); + if (errno == ENOEXEC) { + NewArgv--; /* at least one extra slot... */ + NewArgv[0] = "sh"; + NewArgv[1] = safe_cmnd; + execve(_PATH_BSHELL, NewArgv, environ); + } + warn("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd); exit(127); - } else if ((validated & FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) { + } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) { log_auth(validated, 1); exit(1); - } else if (validated & VALIDATE_NOT_OK) { - if (def_flag(I_PATH_INFO)) { + } else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_NOT_OK)) { + if (def_path_info) { /* * We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can * *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd @@ -418,10 +479,9 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) log_auth(validated, !(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)); if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0], - user_cmnd); + warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd); else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); + warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); } else { /* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */ log_auth(validated, 1); @@ -440,18 +500,16 @@ main(argc, argv, envp) * load the ``interfaces'' array. */ static int -init_vars(sudo_mode) +init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) int sudo_mode; + char **envp; { - char *p, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + char *p, **ep, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; int nohostname, rval; /* Sanity check command from user. */ - if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= MAXPATHLEN) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: Pathname too long\n", Argv[0], - NewArgv[0]); - exit(1); - } + if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX) + errx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]); #ifdef HAVE_TZSET (void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */ @@ -460,7 +518,7 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode) /* Default value for cmnd and cwd, overridden later. */ if (user_cmnd == NULL) user_cmnd = NewArgv[0]; - (void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown"); + (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd)); /* * We avoid gethostbyname() if possible since we don't want @@ -468,32 +526,45 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode) * "host" is the (possibly fully-qualified) hostname and * "shost" is the unqualified form of the hostname. */ + sudo_user.host_fqdn_queried = FALSE; nohostname = gethostname(thost, sizeof(thost)); if (nohostname) user_host = user_shost = "localhost"; else { user_host = estrdup(thost); - if (def_flag(I_FQDN)) { + if (def_fqdn) { /* Defer call to set_fqdn() until log_error() is safe. */ user_shost = user_host; } else { - if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) { - *p = '\0'; - user_shost = estrdup(user_host); - *p = '.'; - } else { - user_shost = user_host; - } + user_shost = user_host; } } if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO))) { - if (strncmp(p, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0) - p += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1; - user_tty = estrdup(p); + user_tty = user_ttypath = estrdup(p); + if (strncmp(user_tty, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0) + user_tty += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1; } else user_tty = "unknown"; + for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) { + switch (**ep) { + case 'P': + if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0) + user_path = *ep + 5; + break; + case 'S': + if (strncmp("SHELL=", *ep, 6) == 0) + user_shell = *ep + 6; + else if (!user_prompt && strncmp("SUDO_PROMPT=", *ep, 12) == 0) + user_prompt = *ep + 12; + else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0) + prev_user = *ep + 10; + break; + + } + } + /* * Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password * if necessary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we @@ -505,82 +576,111 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode) char pw_name[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1]; pw.pw_uid = getuid(); - (void) sprintf(pw_name, "%ld", (long) pw.pw_uid); + (void) snprintf(pw_name, sizeof(pw_name), "%lu", + (unsigned long) pw.pw_uid); pw.pw_name = pw_name; sudo_user.pw = &pw; - log_error(0, "uid %ld does not exist in the passwd file!", - (long) pw.pw_uid); + /* + * If we are in -k/-K mode, just spew to stderr. It is not unusual for + * users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout file which can cause sudo to + * be run during reboot after the YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died. + */ + if (sudo_mode & (MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_KILL)) + errx(1, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name); + log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name); } if (user_shell == NULL || *user_shell == '\0') user_shell = sudo_user.pw->pw_shell; /* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */ - /* - * Must defer set_fqdn() until it is safe to call log_error() - */ - if (def_flag(I_FQDN)) - set_fqdn(); +#ifdef HAVE_GETGROUPS + if ((user_ngroups = getgroups(0, NULL)) > 0) { + user_groups = emalloc2(user_ngroups, sizeof(GETGROUPS_T)); + if (getgroups(user_ngroups, user_groups) < 0) + log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get group vector"); + } else + user_ngroups = 0; +#endif + + if (def_fqdn) + set_fqdn(); /* may call log_error() */ if (nohostname) log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname"); + set_runaspw(*user_runas); /* may call log_error() */ + if (*user_runas[0] == '#' && runas_pw->pw_name && runas_pw->pw_name[0]) + *user_runas = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_name); + /* * Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root. */ - set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode); + set_perms(PERM_USER); if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) { - set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode); + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't get working directory!\n", - Argv[0]); - (void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown"); + warnx("cannot get working directory"); + (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd)); } } else - set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode); + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* - * If we were given the '-s' option (run shell) we need to redo + * If we were given the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options we need to redo * NewArgv and NewArgc. */ - if ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) { + if ((sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) { char **dst, **src = NewArgv; - NewArgv = (char **) emalloc (sizeof(char *) * (++NewArgc + 1)); - if (user_shell && *user_shell) { + /* Allocate an extra slot for execve() failure (ENOEXEC). */ + NewArgv = (char **) emalloc2((++NewArgc + 2), sizeof(char *)); + NewArgv++; + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) + NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit"; + else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) + NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell; + else if (user_shell && *user_shell) NewArgv[0] = user_shell; - } else { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to determine shell.", Argv[0]); - exit(1); - } + else + errx(1, "unable to determine shell"); - /* copy the args from Argv */ + /* copy the args from NewArgv */ for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst) - ; + continue; } /* Set login class if applicable. */ set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw); + /* Set project if applicable. */ + set_project(runas_pw); + /* Resolve the path and return. */ - if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN)) { - /* XXX - should call this as runas user, not root. */ - rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_path); - if (rval != FOUND) { - /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */ - set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode); - rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_path); - set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode); + rval = FOUND; + user_stat = emalloc(sizeof(struct stat)); + if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) { + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) { + /* XXX - default_runas may be modified during parsing of sudoers */ + set_perms(PERM_RUNAS); + rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path); + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); + if (rval != FOUND) { + /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */ + set_perms(PERM_USER); + rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path); + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); + } } /* set user_args */ if (NewArgc > 1) { char *to, **from; - size_t size; + size_t size, n; - /* If MODE_SHELL not set then NewArgv is contiguous so just count */ - if (!(sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) { + /* If we didn't realloc NewArgv it is contiguous so just count. */ + if (!(sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) { size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) + strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1; } else { @@ -588,17 +688,22 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode) size += strlen(*from) + 1; } - /* alloc and copy. */ - to = user_args = (char *) emalloc(size); - for (from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) { - (void) strcpy(to, *from); - to += strlen(*from); + /* Alloc and build up user_args. */ + user_args = (char *) emalloc(size); + for (to = user_args, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) { + n = strlcpy(to, *from, size - (to - user_args)); + if (n >= size - (to - user_args)) + errx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow"); + to += n; *to++ = ' '; } *--to = '\0'; } - } else - rval = FOUND; + } + if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL) + user_base++; + else + user_base = user_cmnd; return(rval); } @@ -607,158 +712,221 @@ init_vars(sudo_mode) * Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3). */ static int -parse_args() +parse_args(argc, argv) + int argc; + char **argv; { - int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is suod to be run in? */ + int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is sudo to be run in? */ int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */ - NewArgv = Argv + 1; - NewArgc = Argc - 1; + NewArgv = argv + 1; + NewArgc = argc - 1; - if (NewArgc == 0) { /* no options and no command */ - rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL); - return(rval); - } + /* First, check to see if we were invoked as "sudoedit". */ + if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) { + rval = MODE_EDIT; + excl = 'e'; + } else + rval = MODE_RUN; - def_flag(I_ENV_RESET) = TRUE; - while (NewArgc > 0 && NewArgv[0][0] == '-') { - if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0') { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Please use single character options\n", - Argv[0]); - usage(1); - } + while (NewArgc > 0) { + if (NewArgv[0][0] == '-') { + if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0') { + warnx("please use single character options"); + usage(1); + } - switch (NewArgv[0][1]) { - case 'p': - /* Must have an associated prompt. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); + switch (NewArgv[0][1]) { + case 'p': + /* Must have an associated prompt. */ + if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) + usage(1); - user_prompt = NewArgv[1]; + user_prompt = NewArgv[1]; + def_passprompt_override = TRUE; - /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */ - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; - case 'u': - /* Must have an associated runas user. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); + NewArgc--; + NewArgv++; + break; + case 'u': + /* Must have an associated runas user. */ + if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) + usage(1); - user_runas = &NewArgv[1]; + user_runas = &NewArgv[1]; - /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */ - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; + NewArgc--; + NewArgv++; + break; #ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H - case 'a': - /* Must have an associated authentication style. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); + case 'a': + /* Must have an associated authentication style. */ + if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) + usage(1); - login_style = NewArgv[1]; + login_style = NewArgv[1]; - /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */ - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; + NewArgc--; + NewArgv++; + break; #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H - case 'c': - /* Must have an associated login class. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); + case 'c': + /* Must have an associated login class. */ + if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) + usage(1); - login_class = NewArgv[1]; - def_flag(I_USE_LOGINCLASS) = TRUE; + login_class = NewArgv[1]; + def_use_loginclass = TRUE; - /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */ - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; + NewArgc--; + NewArgv++; + break; #endif - case 'b': - rval |= MODE_BACKGROUND; - break; - case 'v': - rval = MODE_VALIDATE; - if (excl && excl != 'v') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'v'; - break; - case 'k': - rval = MODE_INVALIDATE; - if (excl && excl != 'k') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'k'; - break; - case 'K': - rval = MODE_KILL; - if (excl && excl != 'K') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'K'; - break; - case 'L': - rval = MODE_LISTDEFS; - if (excl && excl != 'L') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'L'; - break; - case 'l': - rval = MODE_LIST; - if (excl && excl != 'l') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'l'; - break; - case 'V': - rval = MODE_VERSION; - if (excl && excl != 'V') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'V'; - break; - case 'h': - rval = MODE_HELP; - if (excl && excl != 'h') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'h'; - break; - case 's': - rval |= MODE_SHELL; - if (excl && excl != 's') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 's'; - break; - case 'H': - rval |= MODE_RESET_HOME; - break; - case 'P': - rval |= MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS; - break; - case 'S': - tgetpass_flags |= TGP_STDIN; - break; - case '-': - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - if (rval == MODE_RUN) - rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL); - return(rval); - case '\0': - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: '-' requires an argument\n", - Argv[0]); - usage(1); - default: - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Illegal option %s\n", Argv[0], - NewArgv[0]); - usage(1); + case 'b': + SET(rval, MODE_BACKGROUND); + break; + case 'e': + rval = MODE_EDIT; + if (excl && excl != 'e') + usage_excl(1); + excl = 'e'; + break; + case 'v': + rval = MODE_VALIDATE; + if (excl && excl != 'v') + usage_excl(1); + excl = 'v'; + break; + case 'i': + SET(rval, (MODE_LOGIN_SHELL | MODE_SHELL)); + def_env_reset = TRUE; + if (excl && excl != 'i') + usage_excl(1); + excl = 'i'; + break; + case 'k': + rval = MODE_INVALIDATE; + if (excl && excl != 'k') + usage_excl(1); + excl = 'k'; + break; + case 'K': + rval = MODE_KILL; + if (excl && excl != 'K') + usage_excl(1); + excl = 'K'; + break; + case 'L': + rval = MODE_LISTDEFS; + if (excl && excl != 'L') + usage_excl(1); + excl = 'L'; + break; + case 'l': + rval = MODE_LIST; + if (excl && excl != 'l') + usage_excl(1); + excl = 'l'; + break; + case 'V': + rval = MODE_VERSION; + if (excl && excl != 'V') + usage_excl(1); + excl = 'V'; + break; + case 'h': + rval = MODE_HELP; + if (excl && excl != 'h') + usage_excl(1); + excl = 'h'; + break; + case 's': + SET(rval, MODE_SHELL); + if (excl && excl != 's') + usage_excl(1); + excl = 's'; + break; + case 'H': + SET(rval, MODE_RESET_HOME); + break; + case 'P': + SET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS); + break; + case 'S': + SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN); + break; + case 'E': + SET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV); + break; +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + case 'r': + /* Must have an associated SELinux role. */ + if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) + usage(1); + + user_role = NewArgv[1]; + + NewArgc--; + NewArgv++; + break; + case 't': + /* Must have an associated SELinux type. */ + if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) + usage(1); + + user_type = NewArgv[1]; + + NewArgc--; + NewArgv++; + break; +#endif + case '-': + NewArgc--; + NewArgv++; + goto args_done; + case '\0': + warnx("'-' requires an argument"); + usage(1); + default: + warnx("illegal option `%s'", NewArgv[0]); + usage(1); + } + } else if (NewArgv[0][0] != '/' && strchr(NewArgv[0], '=') != NULL) { + /* Could be an environment variable. */ + struct list_member *ev; + ev = emalloc(sizeof(*ev)); + ev->value = NewArgv[0]; + ev->next = sudo_user.env_vars; + sudo_user.env_vars = ev; + } else { + /* Not an arg */ + break; } NewArgc--; NewArgv++; } +args_done: + + if (ISSET(rval, MODE_EDIT) && + (ISSET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) || sudo_user.env_vars != NULL)) { + if (ISSET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) + warnx("the `-E' option is not valid in edit mode"); + if (sudo_user.env_vars != NULL) + warnx("you may not specify environment variables in edit mode"); + usage(1); + } - if (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & MODE_RUN)) + if (user_runas != NULL && !ISSET(rval, (MODE_EDIT|MODE_RUN))) { + if (excl != '\0') + warnx("the `-u' and '-%c' options may not be used together", excl); usage(1); + } + if ((NewArgc == 0 && (rval & MODE_EDIT)) || + (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)))) + usage(1); + if (NewArgc == 0 && rval == MODE_RUN) + SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL)); return(rval); } @@ -772,34 +940,27 @@ check_sudoers() { struct stat statbuf; int rootstat, i; - char c; /* * Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default. - * Only works if filesystem is readable/writable by root. + * Only works if file system is readable/writable by root. */ - if ((rootstat = lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 && + if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 && SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 && (statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) { if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: fixed mode on %s\n", - Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS); - statbuf.st_mode |= SUDOERS_MODE; + warnx("fixed mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + SET(statbuf.st_mode, SUDOERS_MODE); if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) { if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: set group on %s\n", - Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS); + warnx("set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID; - } else { - (void) fprintf(stderr,"%s: Unable to set group on %s: %s\n", - Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno)); - } + } else + warn("unable to set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); } - } else { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to fix mode on %s: %s\n", - Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno)); - } + } else + warn("unable to fix mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); } /* @@ -807,9 +968,9 @@ check_sudoers() * file owner. We already did a stat as root, so use that * data if we can't stat as sudoers file owner. */ - set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS, 0); + set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS); - if (rootstat != 0 && lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0) + if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0) log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS); @@ -817,19 +978,22 @@ check_sudoers() log_error(0, "%s is zero length", _PATH_SUDOERS); else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE) log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS, - (statbuf.st_mode & 07777), SUDOERS_MODE); + (unsigned int) (statbuf.st_mode & 07777), + (unsigned int) SUDOERS_MODE); else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID) - log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS, - (long) statbuf.st_uid, SUDOERS_UID); + log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS, + (unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_UID); else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) - log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS, - (long) statbuf.st_gid, SUDOERS_GID); + log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS, + (unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_GID); else { /* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */ for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) { errno = 0; if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL || - fread(&c, sizeof(c), 1, sudoers_fp) != 1) { + fgetc(sudoers_fp) == EOF) { + if (sudoers_fp != NULL) + fclose(sudoers_fp); sudoers_fp = NULL; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) break; @@ -841,62 +1005,62 @@ check_sudoers() log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); } - set_perms(PERM_ROOT, 0); /* change back to root */ + set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* change back to root */ } /* * Close all open files (except std*) and turn off core dumps. - * Also sets the set_perms() pointer to the correct function. */ static void initial_setup() { - int fd, maxfd; -#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT + int miss[3], devnull = -1; +#if defined(__linux__) || (defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)) struct rlimit rl; #endif - sigaction_t sa; +#if defined(__linux__) + /* + * Unlimit the number of processes since Linux's setuid() will + * apply resource limits when changing uid and return EAGAIN if + * nproc would be violated by the uid switch. + */ + rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl)) { + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl) == 0) { + rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max; + (void)setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl); + } + } +#endif /* __linux__ */ #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) /* * Turn off core dumps. */ (void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit); - rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = 0; + memcpy(&rl, &corelimit, sizeof(struct rlimit)); + rl.rlim_cur = 0; (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl); -#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */ +#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */ /* - * Close any open fd's other than stdin, stdout and stderr. + * stdin, stdout and stderr must be open; set them to /dev/null + * if they are closed and close all other fds. */ -#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF - maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) - 1; -#else - maxfd = getdtablesize() - 1; -#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */ -#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE - if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl) == 0) { - if (rl.rlim_max != RLIM_INFINITY && rl.rlim_max <= maxfd) - maxfd = rl.rlim_max - 1; + miss[STDIN_FILENO] = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1; + miss[STDOUT_FILENO] = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1; + miss[STDERR_FILENO] = fcntl(STDERR_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1; + if (miss[STDIN_FILENO] || miss[STDOUT_FILENO] || miss[STDERR_FILENO]) { + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0644)) != -1) { + if (miss[STDIN_FILENO]) + (void) dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO); + if (miss[STDOUT_FILENO]) + (void) dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO); + if (miss[STDERR_FILENO]) + (void) dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO); + } } -#endif /* RLIMIT_NOFILE */ - - for (fd = maxfd; fd > STDERR_FILENO; fd--) - (void) close(fd); - - /* Catch children as they die... */ - sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); - sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; - sa.sa_handler = reapchild; - (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, NULL); - - /* Set set_perms pointer to the correct function */ -#if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION) - if (sysconf(_SC_SAVED_IDS) == 1 && sysconf(_SC_VERSION) >= 199009) - set_perms = set_perms_posix; - else -#endif - set_perms = set_perms_fallback; + closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H @@ -917,11 +1081,8 @@ set_loginclass(pw) errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT; if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) { - if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: only root can use -c %s\n", - Argv[0], login_class); - exit(1); - } + if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0) + errx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class); } else { login_class = pw->pw_class; if (!login_class || !*login_class) @@ -944,23 +1105,105 @@ set_loginclass(pw) } #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */ +#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H +static void +set_project(pw) + struct passwd *pw; +{ + int errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT; + int errval; + struct project proj; + struct project *resultp = '\0'; + char buf[1024]; + + /* + * Collect the default project for the user and settaskid + */ + setprojent(); + if (resultp = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &proj, buf, sizeof(buf))) { + errval = setproject(resultp->pj_name, pw->pw_name, TASK_NORMAL); + if (errval != 0) { + switch(errval) { + case SETPROJ_ERR_TASK: + if (errno == EAGAIN) + log_error(errflags, "resource control limit has been reached"); + else if (errno == ESRCH) + log_error(errflags, "user \"%s\" is not a member of " + "project \"%s\"", pw->pw_name, resultp->pj_name); + else if (errno == EACCES) + log_error(errflags, "the invoking task is final"); + else + log_error(errflags, "could not join project \"%s\"", + resultp->pj_name); + break; + case SETPROJ_ERR_POOL: + if (errno == EACCES) + log_error(errflags, "no resource pool accepting " + "default bindings exists for project \"%s\"", + resultp->pj_name); + else if (errno == ESRCH) + log_error(errflags, "specified resource pool does " + "not exist for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name); + else + log_error(errflags, "could not bind to default " + "resource pool for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name); + break; + default: + if (errval <= 0) { + log_error(errflags, "setproject failed for project \"%s\"", + resultp->pj_name); + } else { + log_error(errflags, "warning, resource control assignment " + "failed for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name); + } + } + } + } else { + log_error(errflags, "getdefaultproj() error: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + endprojent(); +} +#else +static void +set_project(pw) + struct passwd *pw; +{ +} +#endif /* HAVE_PROJECT_H */ + /* * Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost. */ void set_fqdn() { +#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO + struct addrinfo *res0, hint; +#else struct hostent *hp; +#endif char *p; +#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO + memset(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint)); + hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + hint.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) { +#else if (!(hp = gethostbyname(user_host))) { +#endif log_error(MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT, - "unable to lookup %s via gethostbyname()", user_host); + "unable to resolve host %s", user_host); } else { if (user_shost != user_host) - free(user_shost); - free(user_host); + efree(user_shost); + efree(user_host); +#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO + user_host = estrdup(res0->ai_canonname); + freeaddrinfo(res0); +#else user_host = estrdup(hp->h_name); +#endif } if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) { *p = '\0'; @@ -969,34 +1212,63 @@ set_fqdn() } else { user_shost = user_host; } + sudo_user.host_fqdn_queried = TRUE; +} + +/* + * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as. + * By default, this is "root". Updates runas_pw as a side effect. + */ +int +set_runaspw(user) + char *user; +{ + if (runas_pw != NULL) { + if (user_runas != &def_runas_default) + return(TRUE); /* don't override -u option */ + efree(runas_pw); + } + if (*user == '#') { + runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1)); + if (runas_pw == NULL) { + runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd)); + (void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd)); + runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(user + 1); + } + } else { + runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user); + if (runas_pw == NULL) + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", user); + } + return(TRUE); } /* * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as. - * By default, this is the user invoking sudo... + * By default, this is the user invoking sudo. In the most common + * case, this matches sudo_user.pw or runas_pw. */ static struct passwd * get_authpw() { struct passwd *pw; - if (def_ival(I_ROOTPW)) { - if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL) + if (def_rootpw) { + if (runas_pw->pw_uid == 0) + pw = runas_pw; + else if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL) log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!"); - } else if (def_ival(I_RUNASPW)) { - if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_str(I_RUNAS_DEFAULT))) == NULL) + } else if (def_runaspw) { + if (strcmp(def_runas_default, *user_runas) == 0) + pw = runas_pw; + else if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL) log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!", - def_str(I_RUNAS_DEFAULT)); - } else if (def_ival(I_TARGETPW)) { - if (**user_runas == '#') { - if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1))) == NULL) - log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", - user_runas); - } else { - if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas)) == NULL) - log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!", - user_runas); - } + def_runas_default); + } else if (def_targetpw) { + if (runas_pw->pw_name == NULL) + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %lu!", + (unsigned long) runas_pw->pw_uid); + pw = runas_pw; } else pw = sudo_user.pw; @@ -1010,8 +1282,7 @@ static void usage_excl(exit_val) int exit_val; { - (void) fprintf(stderr, - "Only one of the -h, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used\n"); + warnx("Only one of the -e, -h, i, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used"); usage(exit_val); } @@ -1022,15 +1293,87 @@ static void usage(exit_val) int exit_val; { - - (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: sudo -V | -h | -L | -l | -v | -k | -K | %s", - "[-H] [-P] [-S] [-b] [-p prompt]\n [-u username/#uid] "); + char **p, **uvec[4]; + int i, linelen, linemax, ulen, plen; + static char *uvec1[] = { + " -h |", + " -K |", + " -k |", + " -L |", + " -l |", + " -V |", + " -v", + NULL + }; + static char *uvec2[] = { + " [-bEHPS]", +#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H + " [-a auth_type]", +#endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H - (void) fprintf(stderr, "[-c class] "); + " [-c class|-]", +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + " [-r role]", #endif + " [-p prompt]", +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + " [-t type]", +#endif + " [-u username|#uid]", + " [VAR=value]", + " {-i | -s | }", + NULL + }; + static char *uvec3[] = { + " -e", + " [-S]", #ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H - (void) fprintf(stderr, "[-a auth_type] "); + " [-a auth_type]", +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H + " [-c class|-]", #endif - (void) fprintf(stderr, "-s | \n"); + " [-p prompt]", + " [-u username|#uid]", + " file ...", + NULL + }; + + /* + * Use usage vectors appropriate to the progname. + */ + if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) { + uvec[0] = uvec3 + 1; + uvec[1] = NULL; + } else { + uvec[0] = uvec1; + uvec[1] = uvec2; + uvec[2] = uvec3; + uvec[3] = NULL; + } + + /* + * Print usage and wrap lines as needed. + * Assumes an 80-character wide terminal, which is kind of bogus... + */ + ulen = (int)strlen(getprogname()) + 7; + linemax = 80; + for (i = 0; uvec[i] != NULL; i++) { + printf("usage: %s", getprogname()); + linelen = linemax - ulen; + for (p = uvec[i]; *p != NULL; p++) { + plen = (int)strlen(*p); + if (linelen >= plen || linelen == linemax - ulen) { + fputs(*p, stdout); + linelen -= plen; + } else { + p--; + linelen = linemax - ulen; + printf("\n%*s", ulen, ""); + } + } + putchar('\n'); + } exit(exit_val); }