-.\" Copyright (c) 1994-1996,1998-2003 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1994-1996, 1998-2005, 2007-2009
+.\" Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
.\"
.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
.\" Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
.\" Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
.\"
-.\" $Sudo: sudo.pod,v 1.73 2004/09/08 18:34:38 millert Exp $
-.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man v1.37, Pod::Parser v1.14
+.\" $Sudo: sudo.man.in,v 1.56 2009/06/29 13:36:42 millert Exp $
+.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.16 (Pod::Simple 3.05)
.\"
.\" Standard preamble:
.\" ========================================================================
..
.\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will
.\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left
-.\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. | will give a
-.\" real vertical bar. \*(C+ will give a nicer C++. Capital omega is used to
-.\" do unbreakable dashes and therefore won't be available. \*(C` and \*(C'
-.\" expand to `' in nroff, nothing in troff, for use with C<>.
-.tr \(*W-|\(bv\*(Tr
+.\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. \*(C+ will
+.\" give a nicer C++. Capital omega is used to do unbreakable dashes and
+.\" therefore won't be available. \*(C` and \*(C' expand to `' in nroff,
+.\" nothing in troff, for use with C<>.
+.tr \(*W-
.ds C+ C\v'-.1v'\h'-1p'\s-2+\h'-1p'+\s0\v'.1v'\h'-1p'
.ie n \{\
. ds -- \(*W-
. ds R" ''
'br\}
.\"
+.\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform.
+.ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq
+.el .ds Aq '
+.\"
.\" If the F register is turned on, we'll generate index entries on stderr for
.\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.Sh), items (.Ip), and index
.\" entries marked with X<> in POD. Of course, you'll have to process the
.\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion.
-.if \nF \{\
+.ie \nF \{\
. de IX
. tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2"
..
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. rr F
.\}
-.\"
-.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
-.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
-.hy 0
-.if n .na
+.el \{\
+. de IX
+..
+.\}
.\"
.\" Accent mark definitions (@(#)ms.acc 1.5 88/02/08 SMI; from UCB 4.2).
.\" Fear. Run. Save yourself. No user-serviceable parts.
.\" ========================================================================
.\"
.IX Title "SUDO @mansectsu@"
-.TH SUDO @mansectsu@ "June 20, 2005" "1.6.8p9" "MAINTENANCE COMMANDS"
+.TH SUDO @mansectsu@ "June 15, 2009" "1.7.2p1" "MAINTENANCE COMMANDS"
+.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
+.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
+.if n .ad l
+.nh
.SH "NAME"
sudo, sudoedit \- execute a command as another user
.SH "SYNOPSIS"
.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
-\&\fBsudo\fR \fB\-K\fR | \fB\-L\fR | \fB\-V\fR | \fB\-h\fR | \fB\-k\fR | \fB\-l\fR | \fB\-v\fR
-.PP
-\&\fBsudo\fR [\fB\-HPSb\fR] [\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR] [\fB\-c\fR\ \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR]
-[\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR] [\fB\-u\fR\ \fIusername\fR|\fI#uid\fR]
-{\fB\-e\fR\ file\ [...]\ |\ \fB\-i\fR\ |\ \fB\-s\fR\ |\ \fIcommand\fR}
-.PP
-\&\fBsudoedit\fR [\fB\-S\fR] [\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
-[\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR] [\fB\-u\fR\ \fIusername\fR|\fI#uid\fR]
-file [...]
+\&\fBsudo\fR \fB\-h\fR | \fB\-K\fR | \fB\-k\fR | \fB\-L\fR | \fB\-V\fR
+.PP
+\&\fBsudo\fR \fB\-v\fR [\fB\-AknS\fR]
+@BAMAN@[\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
+[\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR]
+.PP
+\&\fBsudo\fR \fB\-l[l]\fR [\fB\-AknS\fR]
+@BAMAN@[\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
+[\fB\-g\fR\ \fIgroupname\fR|\fI#gid\fR] [\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR]
+[\fB\-U\fR\ \fIusername\fR] [\fB\-u\fR\ \fIusername\fR|\fI#uid\fR] [\fIcommand\fR]
+.PP
+\&\fBsudo\fR [\fB\-AbEHnPS\fR]
+@BAMAN@[\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
+[\fB\-C\fR\ \fIfd\fR]
+@LCMAN@[\fB\-c\fR\ \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR]
+[\fB\-g\fR\ \fIgroupname\fR|\fI#gid\fR] [\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR]
+@SEMAN@[\fB\-r\fR\ \fIrole\fR] [\fB\-t\fR\ \fItype\fR]
+[\fB\-u\fR\ \fIusername\fR|\fI#uid\fR]
+[\fB\s-1VAR\s0\fR=\fIvalue\fR] [\fB\-i\fR\ |\ \fB\-s\fR] [\fIcommand\fR]
+.PP
+\&\fBsudoedit\fR [\fB\-AnS\fR]
+@BAMAN@[\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
+[\fB\-C\fR\ \fIfd\fR]
+@LCMAN@[\fB\-c\fR\ \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR]
+[\fB\-g\fR\ \fIgroupname\fR|\fI#gid\fR] [\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR]
+[\fB\-u\fR\ \fIusername\fR|\fI#uid\fR] file ...
.SH "DESCRIPTION"
.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
\&\fBsudo\fR allows a permitted user to execute a \fIcommand\fR as the
is implied.
.PP
\&\fBsudo\fR determines who is an authorized user by consulting the file
-\&\fI@sysconfdir@/sudoers\fR. By giving \fBsudo\fR the \fB\-v\fR flag a user
-can update the time stamp without running a \fIcommand.\fR The password
-prompt itself will not time out in Debian's version (unless overridden via
-\&\fIsudoers\fR).
+\&\fI@sysconfdir@/sudoers\fR. By running \fBsudo\fR with the \fB\-v\fR option,
+a user can update the time stamp without running a \fIcommand\fR. The
+password prompt itself will also time out if the user's password
+is not entered within \f(CW\*(C`@password_timeout@\*(C'\fR minutes (unless overridden
+via \fIsudoers\fR).
.PP
If a user who is not listed in the \fIsudoers\fR file tries to run a
command via \fBsudo\fR, mail is sent to the proper authorities, as
defined at configure time or in the \fIsudoers\fR file (defaults to
\&\f(CW\*(C`@mailto@\*(C'\fR). Note that the mail will not be sent if an unauthorized
-user tries to run sudo with the \fB\-l\fR or \fB\-v\fR flags. This allows
+user tries to run sudo with the \fB\-l\fR or \fB\-v\fR option. This allows
users to determine for themselves whether or not they are allowed
to use \fBsudo\fR.
.PP
is set, \fBsudo\fR will use this value to determine who the actual
user is. This can be used by a user to log commands through sudo
even when a root shell has been invoked. It also allows the \fB\-e\fR
-flag to remain useful even when being run via a sudo-run script or
+option to remain useful even when being run via a sudo-run script or
program. Note however, that the sudoers lookup is still done for
root, not the user specified by \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_USER\*(C'\fR.
.PP
.SH "OPTIONS"
.IX Header "OPTIONS"
\&\fBsudo\fR accepts the following command line options:
-.IP "\-H" 4
-.IX Item "-H"
-The \fB\-H\fR (\fI\s-1HOME\s0\fR) option sets the \f(CW\*(C`HOME\*(C'\fR environment variable
-to the homedir of the target user (root by default) as specified
-in passwd(@mansectform@). By default, \fBsudo\fR does not modify \f(CW\*(C`HOME\*(C'\fR
-(see \fIset_home\fR and \fIalways_set_home\fR in sudoers(@mansectform@)).
-.IP "\-K" 4
-.IX Item "-K"
-The \fB\-K\fR (sure \fIkill\fR) option is like \fB\-k\fR except that it removes
-the user's timestamp entirely. Like \fB\-k\fR, this option does not
-require a password.
-.IP "\-L" 4
-.IX Item "-L"
-The \fB\-L\fR (\fIlist\fR defaults) option will list out the parameters
-that may be set in a \fIDefaults\fR line along with a short description
-for each. This option is useful in conjunction with \fIgrep\fR\|(1).
-.IP "\-P" 4
-.IX Item "-P"
-The \fB\-P\fR (\fIpreserve group vector\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to
-preserve the invoking user's group vector unaltered. By default,
-\&\fBsudo\fR will initialize the group vector to the list of groups the
-target user is in. The real and effective group IDs, however, are
-still set to match the target user.
-.IP "\-S" 4
-.IX Item "-S"
-The \fB\-S\fR (\fIstdin\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to read the password from
-the standard input instead of the terminal device.
-.IP "\-V" 4
-.IX Item "-V"
-The \fB\-V\fR (\fIversion\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to print the version
-number and exit. If the invoking user is already root the \fB\-V\fR
-option will print out a list of the defaults \fBsudo\fR was compiled
-with as well as the machine's local network addresses.
-.IP "\-a" 4
-.IX Item "-a"
-The \fB\-a\fR (\fIauthentication type\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to use the
-specified authentication type when validating the user, as allowed
-by /etc/login.conf. The system administrator may specify a list
-of sudo-specific authentication methods by adding an \*(L"auth\-sudo\*(R"
-entry in /etc/login.conf. This option is only available on systems
-that support \s-1BSD\s0 authentication where \fBsudo\fR has been configured
-with the \-\-with\-bsdauth option.
-.IP "\-b" 4
+.IP "\-A" 12
+.IX Item "-A"
+Normally, if \fBsudo\fR requires a password, it will read it from the
+current terminal. If the \fB\-A\fR (\fIaskpass\fR) option is specified,
+a (possibly graphical) helper program is executed to read the
+user's password and output the password to the standard output. If
+the \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_ASKPASS\*(C'\fR environment variable is set, it specifies the
+path to the helper program. Otherwise, the value specified by the
+\&\fIaskpass\fR option in \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@) is used.
+@BAMAN@.IP "\-a \fItype\fR" 12
+@BAMAN@.IX Item "-a type"
+@BAMAN@The \fB\-a\fR (\fIauthentication type\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to use the
+@BAMAN@specified authentication type when validating the user, as allowed
+@BAMAN@by \fI/etc/login.conf\fR. The system administrator may specify a list
+@BAMAN@of sudo-specific authentication methods by adding an \*(L"auth-sudo\*(R"
+@BAMAN@entry in \fI/etc/login.conf\fR. This option is only available on systems
+@BAMAN@that support \s-1BSD\s0 authentication.
+.IP "\-b" 12
.IX Item "-b"
The \fB\-b\fR (\fIbackground\fR) option tells \fBsudo\fR to run the given
command in the background. Note that if you use the \fB\-b\fR
option you cannot use shell job control to manipulate the process.
-.IP "\-c" 4
-.IX Item "-c"
-The \fB\-c\fR (\fIclass\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to run the specified command
-with resources limited by the specified login class. The \fIclass\fR
-argument can be either a class name as defined in /etc/login.conf,
-or a single '\-' character. Specifying a \fIclass\fR of \f(CW\*(C`\-\*(C'\fR indicates
-that the command should be run restricted by the default login
-capabilities for the user the command is run as. If the \fIclass\fR
-argument specifies an existing user class, the command must be run
-as root, or the \fBsudo\fR command must be run from a shell that is already
-root. This option is only available on systems with \s-1BSD\s0 login classes
-where \fBsudo\fR has been configured with the \-\-with\-logincap option.
-.IP "\-e" 4
+.IP "\-C \fIfd\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-C fd"
+Normally, \fBsudo\fR will close all open file descriptors other than
+standard input, standard output and standard error. The \fB\-C\fR
+(\fIclose from\fR) option allows the user to specify a starting point
+above the standard error (file descriptor three). Values less than
+three are not permitted. This option is only available if the
+administrator has enabled the \fIclosefrom_override\fR option in
+\&\fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@).
+@LCMAN@.IP "\-c \fIclass\fR" 12
+@LCMAN@.IX Item "-c class"
+@LCMAN@The \fB\-c\fR (\fIclass\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to run the specified command
+@LCMAN@with resources limited by the specified login class. The \fIclass\fR
+@LCMAN@argument can be either a class name as defined in \fI/etc/login.conf\fR,
+@LCMAN@or a single '\-' character. Specifying a \fIclass\fR of \f(CW\*(C`\-\*(C'\fR indicates
+@LCMAN@that the command should be run restricted by the default login
+@LCMAN@capabilities for the user the command is run as. If the \fIclass\fR
+@LCMAN@argument specifies an existing user class, the command must be run
+@LCMAN@as root, or the \fBsudo\fR command must be run from a shell that is already
+@LCMAN@root. This option is only available on systems with \s-1BSD\s0 login classes.
+.IP "\-E" 12
+.IX Item "-E"
+The \fB\-E\fR (\fIpreserve\fR \fIenvironment\fR) option will override the
+\&\fIenv_reset\fR option in \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@)). It is only
+available when either the matching command has the \f(CW\*(C`SETENV\*(C'\fR tag
+or the \fIsetenv\fR option is set in \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@).
+.IP "\-e" 12
.IX Item "-e"
The \fB\-e\fR (\fIedit\fR) option indicates that, instead of running
a command, the user wishes to edit one or more files. In lieu
of a command, the string \*(L"sudoedit\*(R" is used when consulting
the \fIsudoers\fR file. If the user is authorized by \fIsudoers\fR
the following steps are taken:
-.RS 4
-.IP "1." 8
+.RS 12
+.IP "1." 4
Temporary copies are made of the files to be edited with the owner
set to the invoking user.
-.IP "2." 8
-The editor specified by the \f(CW\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`EDITOR\*(C'\fR environment
-variables is run to edit the temporary files. If neither \f(CW\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'\fR
-nor \f(CW\*(C`EDITOR\*(C'\fR are set, the program listed in the \fIeditor\fR \fIsudoers\fR
-variable is used.
-.IP "3." 8
+.IP "2." 4
+The editor specified by the \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`EDITOR\*(C'\fR
+environment variables is run to edit the temporary files. If none
+of \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`EDITOR\*(C'\fR are set, the first program
+listed in the \fIeditor\fR \fIsudoers\fR variable is used.
+.IP "3." 4
If they have been modified, the temporary files are copied back to
their original location and the temporary versions are removed.
.RE
-.RS 4
+.RS 12
.Sp
If the specified file does not exist, it will be created. Note
that unlike most commands run by \fBsudo\fR, the editor is run with
user will receive a warning and the edited copy will remain in a
temporary file.
.RE
-.IP "\-h" 4
+.IP "\-g \fIgroup\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-g group"
+Normally, \fBsudo\fR sets the primary group to the one specified by
+the passwd database for the user the command is being run as (by
+default, root). The \fB\-g\fR (\fIgroup\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to run
+the specified command with the primary group set to \fIgroup\fR. To
+specify a \fIgid\fR instead of a \fIgroup name\fR, use \fI#gid\fR. When
+running commands as a \fIgid\fR, many shells require that the '#' be
+escaped with a backslash ('\e'). If no \fB\-u\fR option is specified,
+the command will be run as the invoking user (not root). In either
+case, the primary group will be set to \fIgroup\fR.
+.IP "\-H" 12
+.IX Item "-H"
+The \fB\-H\fR (\fI\s-1HOME\s0\fR) option sets the \f(CW\*(C`HOME\*(C'\fR environment variable
+to the homedir of the target user (root by default) as specified
+in \fIpasswd\fR\|(@mansectform@). By default, \fBsudo\fR does not modify \f(CW\*(C`HOME\*(C'\fR
+(see \fIset_home\fR and \fIalways_set_home\fR in \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@)).
+.IP "\-h" 12
.IX Item "-h"
The \fB\-h\fR (\fIhelp\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to print a usage message and exit.
-.IP "\-i" 4
-.IX Item "-i"
+.IP "\-i [command]" 12
+.IX Item "-i [command]"
The \fB\-i\fR (\fIsimulate initial login\fR) option runs the shell specified
-in the passwd(@mansectform@) entry of the user that the command is
-being run as. The command name argument given to the shell begins
-with a \f(CW\*(C`\-\*(C'\fR to tell the shell to run as a login shell. \fBsudo\fR
-attempts to change to that user's home directory before running the
-shell. It also initializes the environment, leaving \fI\s-1TERM\s0\fR
-unchanged, setting \fI\s-1HOME\s0\fR, \fI\s-1SHELL\s0\fR, \fI\s-1USER\s0\fR, \fI\s-1LOGNAME\s0\fR, and
-\&\fI\s-1PATH\s0\fR, and unsetting all other environment variables. Note that
-because the shell to use is determined before the \fIsudoers\fR file
-is parsed, a \fIrunas_default\fR setting in \fIsudoers\fR will specify
-the user to run the shell as but will not affect which shell is
-actually run.
-.IP "\-k" 4
+in the \fIpasswd\fR\|(@mansectform@) entry of the target user as a login shell. This
+means that login-specific resource files such as \f(CW\*(C`.profile\*(C'\fR or
+\&\f(CW\*(C`.login\*(C'\fR will be read by the shell. If a command is specified,
+it is passed to the shell for execution. Otherwise, an interactive
+shell is executed. \fBsudo\fR attempts to change to that user's home
+directory before running the shell. It also initializes the
+environment, leaving \fI\s-1DISPLAY\s0\fR and \fI\s-1TERM\s0\fR unchanged, setting
+\&\fI\s-1HOME\s0\fR, \fI\s-1SHELL\s0\fR, \fI\s-1USER\s0\fR, \fI\s-1LOGNAME\s0\fR, and \fI\s-1PATH\s0\fR, as well as
+the contents of \fI/etc/environment\fR on Linux and \s-1AIX\s0 systems.
+All other environment variables are removed.
+.IP "\-K" 12
+.IX Item "-K"
+The \fB\-K\fR (sure \fIkill\fR) option is like \fB\-k\fR except that it removes
+the user's timestamp entirely and may not be used in conjunction
+with a command or other option. This option does not require a
+password.
+.IP "\-k" 12
.IX Item "-k"
-The \fB\-k\fR (\fIkill\fR) option to \fBsudo\fR invalidates the user's timestamp
-by setting the time on it to the epoch. The next time \fBsudo\fR is
-run a password will be required. This option does not require a password
-and was added to allow a user to revoke \fBsudo\fR permissions from a .logout
-file.
-.IP "\-l" 4
-.IX Item "-l"
-The \fB\-l\fR (\fIlist\fR) option will list out the allowed (and
-forbidden) commands for the user on the current host.
-.IP "\-p" 4
-.IX Item "-p"
+When used by itself, the \fB\-k\fR (\fIkill\fR) option to \fBsudo\fR invalidates
+the user's timestamp by setting the time on it to the Epoch. The
+next time \fBsudo\fR is run a password will be required. This option
+does not require a password and was added to allow a user to revoke
+\&\fBsudo\fR permissions from a .logout file.
+.Sp
+When used in conjunction with a command or an option that may require
+a password, the \fB\-k\fR option will cause \fBsudo\fR to ignore the user's
+timestamp file. As a result, \fBsudo\fR will prompt for a password
+(if one is required by \fIsudoers\fR) and will not update the user's
+timestamp file.
+.IP "\-L" 12
+.IX Item "-L"
+The \fB\-L\fR (\fIlist\fR defaults) option will list out the parameters
+that may be set in a \fIDefaults\fR line along with a short description
+for each. This option is useful in conjunction with \fIgrep\fR\|(1).
+.IP "\-l[l] [\fIcommand\fR]" 12
+.IX Item "-l[l] [command]"
+If no \fIcommand\fR is specified, the \fB\-l\fR (\fIlist\fR) option will list
+the allowed (and forbidden) commands for the invoking user (or the
+user specified by the \fB\-U\fR option) on the current host. If a
+\&\fIcommand\fR is specified and is permitted by \fIsudoers\fR, the
+fully-qualified path to the command is displayed along with any
+command line arguments. If \fIcommand\fR is specified but not allowed,
+\&\fBsudo\fR will exit with a status value of 1. If the \fB\-l\fR option is
+specified with an \fBl\fR argument (i.e. \fB\-ll\fR), or if \fB\-l\fR
+is specified multiple times, a longer list format is used.
+.IP "\-n" 12
+.IX Item "-n"
+The \fB\-n\fR (\fInon-interactive\fR) option prevents \fBsudo\fR from prompting
+the user for a password. If a password is required for the command
+to run, \fBsudo\fR will display an error messages and exit.
+.IP "\-P" 12
+.IX Item "-P"
+The \fB\-P\fR (\fIpreserve\fR \fIgroup vector\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to
+preserve the invoking user's group vector unaltered. By default,
+\&\fBsudo\fR will initialize the group vector to the list of groups the
+target user is in. The real and effective group IDs, however, are
+still set to match the target user.
+.IP "\-p \fIprompt\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-p prompt"
The \fB\-p\fR (\fIprompt\fR) option allows you to override the default
password prompt and use a custom one. The following percent (`\f(CW\*(C`%\*(C'\fR')
escapes are supported:
-.RS 4
-.ie n .IP "%u" 8
-.el .IP "\f(CW%u\fR" 8
-.IX Item "%u"
-expanded to the invoking user's login name
-.ie n .IP "%U" 8
-.el .IP "\f(CW%U\fR" 8
-.IX Item "%U"
-expanded to the login name of the user the command will
-be run as (defaults to root)
-.ie n .IP "%h" 8
-.el .IP "\f(CW%h\fR" 8
-.IX Item "%h"
-expanded to the local hostname without the domain name
-.ie n .IP "%H" 8
-.el .IP "\f(CW%H\fR" 8
+.RS 12
+.ie n .IP "%H" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW%H\fR" 4
.IX Item "%H"
expanded to the local hostname including the domain name
(on if the machine's hostname is fully qualified or the \fIfqdn\fR
-sudoers option is set)
-.ie n .IP "\*(C`%%\*(C'" 8
-.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`%%\*(C'\fR" 8
+\&\fIsudoers\fR option is set)
+.ie n .IP "%h" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW%h\fR" 4
+.IX Item "%h"
+expanded to the local hostname without the domain name
+.ie n .IP "%p" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW%p\fR" 4
+.IX Item "%p"
+expanded to the user whose password is being asked for (respects the
+\&\fIrootpw\fR, \fItargetpw\fR and \fIrunaspw\fR flags in \fIsudoers\fR)
+.ie n .IP "%U" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW%U\fR" 4
+.IX Item "%U"
+expanded to the login name of the user the command will
+be run as (defaults to root)
+.ie n .IP "%u" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW%u\fR" 4
+.IX Item "%u"
+expanded to the invoking user's login name
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`%%\*(C'" 4
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`%%\*(C'\fR" 4
.IX Item "%%"
two consecutive \f(CW\*(C`%\*(C'\fR characters are collapsed into a single \f(CW\*(C`%\*(C'\fR character
.RE
-.RS 4
+.RS 12
+.Sp
+The prompt specified by the \fB\-p\fR option will override the system
+password prompt on systems that support \s-1PAM\s0 unless the
+\&\fIpassprompt_override\fR flag is disabled in \fIsudoers\fR.
.RE
-.IP "\-s" 4
-.IX Item "-s"
+@SEMAN@.IP "\-r \fIrole\fR" 12
+@SEMAN@.IX Item "-r role"
+@SEMAN@The \fB\-r\fR (\fIrole\fR) option causes the new (SELinux) security context to
+@SEMAN@have the role specified by \fIrole\fR.
+.IP "\-S" 12
+.IX Item "-S"
+The \fB\-S\fR (\fIstdin\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to read the password from
+the standard input instead of the terminal device.
+.IP "\-s [command]" 12
+.IX Item "-s [command]"
The \fB\-s\fR (\fIshell\fR) option runs the shell specified by the \fI\s-1SHELL\s0\fR
-environment variable if it is set or the shell as specified
-in passwd(@mansectform@).
-.IP "\-u" 4
-.IX Item "-u"
-The \fB\-u\fR (\fIuser\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to run the specified command
-as a user other than \fIroot\fR. To specify a \fIuid\fR instead of a
-\&\fIusername\fR, use \fI#uid\fR. Note that if the \fItargetpw\fR Defaults
-option is set (see sudoers(@mansectform@)) it is not possible
-to run commands with a uid not listed in the password database.
-.IP "\-v" 4
+environment variable if it is set or the shell as specified in
+\&\fIpasswd\fR\|(@mansectform@). If a command is specified, it is passed to the shell
+for execution. Otherwise, an interactive shell is executed.
+@SEMAN@.IP "\-t \fItype\fR" 12
+@SEMAN@.IX Item "-t type"
+@SEMAN@The \fB\-t\fR (\fItype\fR) option causes the new (SELinux) security context to
+@SEMAN@have the type specified by \fItype\fR. If no type is specified, the default
+@SEMAN@type is derived from the specified role.
+.IP "\-U \fIuser\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-U user"
+The \fB\-U\fR (\fIother user\fR) option is used in conjunction with the \fB\-l\fR
+option to specify the user whose privileges should be listed. Only
+root or a user with \fBsudo\fR \f(CW\*(C`ALL\*(C'\fR on the current host may use this
+option.
+.IP "\-u \fIuser\fR" 12
+.IX Item "-u user"
+The \fB\-u\fR (\fIuser\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to run the specified
+command as a user other than \fIroot\fR. To specify a \fIuid\fR instead
+of a \fIuser name\fR, use \fI#uid\fR. When running commands as a \fIuid\fR,
+many shells require that the '#' be escaped with a backslash ('\e').
+Note that if the \fItargetpw\fR Defaults option is set (see \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@))
+it is not possible to run commands with a uid not listed in the
+password database.
+.IP "\-V" 12
+.IX Item "-V"
+The \fB\-V\fR (\fIversion\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to print the version
+number and exit. If the invoking user is already root the \fB\-V\fR
+option will print out a list of the defaults \fBsudo\fR was compiled
+with as well as the machine's local network addresses.
+.IP "\-v" 12
.IX Item "-v"
If given the \fB\-v\fR (\fIvalidate\fR) option, \fBsudo\fR will update the
user's timestamp, prompting for the user's password if necessary.
This extends the \fBsudo\fR timeout for another \f(CW\*(C`@timeout@\*(C'\fR minutes
(or whatever the timeout is set to in \fIsudoers\fR) but does not run
a command.
-.IP "\-\-" 4
-The \fB\-\-\fR flag indicates that \fBsudo\fR should stop processing command
-line arguments. It is most useful in conjunction with the \fB\-s\fR flag.
+.IP "\-\-" 12
+The \fB\-\-\fR option indicates that \fBsudo\fR should stop processing command
+line arguments. It is most useful in conjunction with the \fB\-s\fR option.
+.PP
+Environment variables to be set for the command may also be passed
+on the command line in the form of \fB\s-1VAR\s0\fR=\fIvalue\fR, e.g.
+\&\fB\s-1LD_LIBRARY_PATH\s0\fR=\fI/usr/local/pkg/lib\fR. Variables passed on the
+command line are subject to the same restrictions as normal environment
+variables with one important exception. If the \fIsetenv\fR option
+is set in \fIsudoers\fR, the command to be run has the \f(CW\*(C`SETENV\*(C'\fR tag
+set or the command matched is \f(CW\*(C`ALL\*(C'\fR, the user may set variables
+that would overwise be forbidden. See \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@) for more information.
.SH "RETURN VALUES"
.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
-Upon successful execution of a program, the return value from \fBsudo\fR
-will simply be the return value of the program that was executed.
+Upon successful execution of a program, the exit status from \fBsudo\fR
+will simply be the exit status of the program that was executed.
.PP
Otherwise, \fBsudo\fR quits with an exit value of 1 if there is a
configuration/permission problem or if \fBsudo\fR cannot execute the
unreachable.
.SH "SECURITY NOTES"
.IX Header "SECURITY NOTES"
-\&\fBsudo\fR tries to be safe when executing external commands. Variables
-that control how dynamic loading and binding is done can be used
-to subvert the program that \fBsudo\fR runs. To combat this the
-\&\f(CW\*(C`LD_*\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`_RLD_*\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`SHLIB_PATH\*(C'\fR (\s-1HP\-UX\s0 only), and \f(CW\*(C`LIBPATH\*(C'\fR (\s-1AIX\s0
-only) environment variables are removed from the environment passed
-on to all commands executed. \fBsudo\fR will also remove the \f(CW\*(C`IFS\*(C'\fR,
-\&\f(CW\*(C`CDPATH\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`ENV\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`BASH_ENV\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`KRB_CONF\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`KRBCONFDIR\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`KRBTKFILE\*(C'\fR,
-\&\f(CW\*(C`KRB5_CONFIG\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`LOCALDOMAIN\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`RES_OPTIONS\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`HOSTALIASES\*(C'\fR,
-\&\f(CW\*(C`NLSPATH\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`PATH_LOCALE\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`TERMINFO\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`TERMINFO_DIRS\*(C'\fR and
-\&\f(CW\*(C`TERMPATH\*(C'\fR variables as they too can pose a threat. If the
-\&\f(CW\*(C`TERMCAP\*(C'\fR variable is set and is a pathname, it too is ignored.
-Additionally, if the \f(CW\*(C`LC_*\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`LANGUAGE\*(C'\fR variables contain the
-\&\f(CW\*(C`/\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`%\*(C'\fR characters, they are ignored. Environment variables
-with a value beginning with \f(CW\*(C`()\*(C'\fR are also removed as they could
-be interpreted as \fBbash\fR functions. If \fBsudo\fR has been
-compiled with SecurID support, the \f(CW\*(C`VAR_ACE\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`USR_ACE\*(C'\fR and
-\&\f(CW\*(C`DLC_ACE\*(C'\fR variables are cleared as well. The list of environment
-variables that \fBsudo\fR clears is contained in the output of
-\&\f(CW\*(C`sudo \-V\*(C'\fR when run as root.
+\&\fBsudo\fR tries to be safe when executing external commands.
+.PP
+There are two distinct ways to deal with environment variables.
+By default, the \fIenv_reset\fR \fIsudoers\fR option is enabled.
+This causes commands to be executed with a minimal environment
+containing \f(CW\*(C`TERM\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`HOME\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`SHELL\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`LOGNAME\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`USER\*(C'\fR
+and \f(CW\*(C`USERNAME\*(C'\fR in addition to variables from the invoking process
+permitted by the \fIenv_check\fR and \fIenv_keep\fR \fIsudoers\fR options.
+There is effectively a whitelist for environment variables.
+.PP
+If, however, the \fIenv_reset\fR option is disabled in \fIsudoers\fR, any
+variables not explicitly denied by the \fIenv_check\fR and \fIenv_delete\fR
+options are inherited from the invoking process. In this case,
+\&\fIenv_check\fR and \fIenv_delete\fR behave like a blacklist. Since it
+is not possible to blacklist all potentially dangerous environment
+variables, use of the default \fIenv_reset\fR behavior is encouraged.
+.PP
+In all cases, environment variables with a value beginning with
+\&\f(CW\*(C`()\*(C'\fR are removed as they could be interpreted as \fBbash\fR functions.
+The list of environment variables that \fBsudo\fR allows or denies is
+contained in the output of \f(CW\*(C`sudo \-V\*(C'\fR when run as root.
+.PP
+Note that the dynamic linker on most operating systems will remove
+variables that can control dynamic linking from the environment of
+setuid executables, including \fBsudo\fR. Depending on the operating
+system this may include \f(CW\*(C`_RLD*\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`DYLD_*\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`LD_*\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`LDR_*\*(C'\fR,
+\&\f(CW\*(C`LIBPATH\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`SHLIB_PATH\*(C'\fR, and others. These type of variables are
+removed from the environment before \fBsudo\fR even begins execution
+and, as such, it is not possible for \fBsudo\fR to preserve them.
.PP
To prevent command spoofing, \fBsudo\fR checks \*(L".\*(R" and "" (both denoting
current directory) last when searching for a command in the user's
\&\s-1PATH\s0 (if one or both are in the \s-1PATH\s0). Note, however, that the
-actual \f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR environment variable is \fInot\fR modified and is passed
-unchanged to the program that \fBsudo\fR executes.
-.PP
-For security reasons, if your \s-1OS\s0 supports shared libraries and does
-not disable user-defined library search paths for setuid programs
-(most do), you should either use a linker option that disables this
-behavior or link \fBsudo\fR statically.
+\&\f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR environment variable is further modified in Debian because of
+the use of the \fI\s-1SECURE_PATH\s0\fR build option.
.PP
\&\fBsudo\fR will check the ownership of its timestamp directory
(\fI@timedir@\fR by default) and ignore the directory's contents if
-it is not owned by root and only writable by root. On systems that
-allow non-root users to give away files via \fIchown\fR\|(2), if the timestamp
-directory is located in a directory writable by anyone (e.g.: \fI/tmp\fR),
-it is possible for a user to create the timestamp directory before
-\&\fBsudo\fR is run. However, because \fBsudo\fR checks the ownership and
-mode of the directory and its contents, the only damage that can
-be done is to \*(L"hide\*(R" files by putting them in the timestamp dir.
-This is unlikely to happen since once the timestamp dir is owned
-by root and inaccessible by any other user the user placing files
-there would be unable to get them back out. To get around this
-issue you can use a directory that is not world-writable for the
-timestamps (\fI/var/adm/sudo\fR for instance) or create \fI@timedir@\fR
-with the appropriate owner (root) and permissions (0700) in the
-system startup files.
+it is not owned by root or if it is writable by a user other than
+root. On systems that allow non-root users to give away files via
+\&\fIchown\fR\|(2), if the timestamp directory is located in a directory
+writable by anyone (e.g., \fI/tmp\fR), it is possible for a user to
+create the timestamp directory before \fBsudo\fR is run. However,
+because \fBsudo\fR checks the ownership and mode of the directory and
+its contents, the only damage that can be done is to \*(L"hide\*(R" files
+by putting them in the timestamp dir. This is unlikely to happen
+since once the timestamp dir is owned by root and inaccessible by
+any other user, the user placing files there would be unable to get
+them back out. To get around this issue you can use a directory
+that is not world-writable for the timestamps (\fI/var/adm/sudo\fR for
+instance) or create \fI@timedir@\fR with the appropriate owner (root)
+and permissions (0700) in the system startup files.
.PP
\&\fBsudo\fR will not honor timestamps set far in the future.
Timestamps with a date greater than current_time + 2 * \f(CW\*(C`TIMEOUT\*(C'\fR
keep a user from creating his/her own timestamp with a bogus
date on systems that allow users to give away files.
.PP
-Please note that \fBsudo\fR will only log the command it explicitly
-runs. If a user runs a command such as \f(CW\*(C`sudo su\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`sudo sh\*(C'\fR,
-subsequent commands run from that shell will \fInot\fR be logged, nor
-will \fBsudo\fR's access control affect them. The same is true for
-commands that offer shell escapes (including most editors). Because
-of this, care must be taken when giving users access to commands
-via \fBsudo\fR to verify that the command does not inadvertently give
-the user an effective root shell.
+Please note that \fBsudo\fR will normally only log the command it
+explicitly runs. If a user runs a command such as \f(CW\*(C`sudo su\*(C'\fR or
+\&\f(CW\*(C`sudo sh\*(C'\fR, subsequent commands run from that shell will \fInot\fR be
+logged, nor will \fBsudo\fR's access control affect them. The same
+is true for commands that offer shell escapes (including most
+editors). Because of this, care must be taken when giving users
+access to commands via \fBsudo\fR to verify that the command does not
+inadvertently give the user an effective root shell. For more
+information, please see the \f(CW\*(C`PREVENTING SHELL ESCAPES\*(C'\fR section in
+\&\fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@).
.SH "ENVIRONMENT"
.IX Header "ENVIRONMENT"
\&\fBsudo\fR utilizes the following environment variables:
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`EDITOR\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`EDITOR\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "EDITOR"
+Default editor to use in \fB\-e\fR (sudoedit) mode if neither \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'\fR
+nor \f(CW\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'\fR is set
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`HOME\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`HOME\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "HOME"
+In \fB\-s\fR or \fB\-H\fR mode (or if sudo was configured with the
+\&\-\-enable\-shell\-sets\-home option), set to homedir of the target user
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`PATH\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "PATH"
+Set to a sane value if the \fIsecure_path\fR sudoers option is set.
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SHELL\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SHELL\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SHELL"
+Used to determine shell to run with \f(CW\*(C`\-s\*(C'\fR option
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_ASKPASS\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_ASKPASS\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_ASKPASS"
+Specifies the path to a helper program used to read the password
+if no terminal is available or if the \f(CW\*(C`\-A\*(C'\fR option is specified.
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_COMMAND\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_COMMAND\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_COMMAND"
+Set to the command run by sudo
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_EDITOR"
+Default editor to use in \fB\-e\fR (sudoedit) mode
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_GID\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_GID\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_GID"
+Set to the group \s-1ID\s0 of the user who invoked sudo
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_PROMPT\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_PROMPT\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_PROMPT"
+Used as the default password prompt
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_PS1\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_PS1\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_PS1"
+If set, \f(CW\*(C`PS1\*(C'\fR will be set to its value for the program being run
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_UID\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_UID\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_UID"
+Set to the user \s-1ID\s0 of the user who invoked sudo
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`SUDO_USER\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`SUDO_USER\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "SUDO_USER"
+Set to the login of the user who invoked sudo
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`USER\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`USER\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "USER"
+Set to the target user (root unless the \fB\-u\fR option is specified)
+.ie n .IP "\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'" 16
+.el .IP "\f(CW\*(C`VISUAL\*(C'\fR" 16
+.IX Item "VISUAL"
+Default editor to use in \fB\-e\fR (sudoedit) mode if \f(CW\*(C`SUDO_EDITOR\*(C'\fR
+is not set
+.SH "FILES"
+.IX Header "FILES"
+.ie n .IP "\fI@sysconfdir@/sudoers\fR" 24
+.el .IP "\fI@sysconfdir@/sudoers\fR" 24
+.IX Item "@sysconfdir@/sudoers"
+List of who can run what
+.ie n .IP "\fI@timedir@\fR" 24
+.el .IP "\fI@timedir@\fR" 24
+.IX Item "@timedir@"
+Directory containing timestamps
+.IP "\fI/etc/environment\fR" 24
+.IX Item "/etc/environment"
+Initial environment for \fB\-i\fR mode on Linux and \s-1AIX\s0
+.SH "EXAMPLES"
+.IX Header "EXAMPLES"
+Note: the following examples assume suitable \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@) entries.
.PP
-.Vb 2
-\& EDITOR Default editor to use in -e (sudoedit) mode if
-\& VISUAL is not set
-.Ve
-.PP
-.Vb 3
-\& HOME In -s or -H mode (or if sudo was configured with
-\& the --enable-shell-sets-home option), set to
-\& homedir of the target user
-.Ve
-.PP
-.Vb 2
-\& PATH Set to a sane value if sudo was configured with
-\& the --with-secure-path option
-.Ve
-.PP
-.Vb 1
-\& SHELL Used to determine shell to run with -s option
-.Ve
-.PP
-.Vb 1
-\& SUDO_PROMPT Used as the default password prompt
-.Ve
-.PP
-.Vb 1
-\& SUDO_COMMAND Set to the command run by sudo
-.Ve
-.PP
-.Vb 1
-\& SUDO_USER Set to the login of the user who invoked sudo
-.Ve
-.PP
-.Vb 1
-\& SUDO_UID Set to the uid of the user who invoked sudo
-.Ve
-.PP
-.Vb 1
-\& SUDO_GID Set to the gid of the user who invoked sudo
-.Ve
+To get a file listing of an unreadable directory:
.PP
.Vb 1
-\& SUDO_PS1 If set, PS1 will be set to its value
+\& $ sudo ls /usr/local/protected
.Ve
.PP
-.Vb 2
-\& USER Set to the target user (root unless the -u option
-\& is specified)
-.Ve
+To list the home directory of user yaz on a machine where the
+file system holding ~yaz is not exported as root:
.PP
.Vb 1
-\& VISUAL Default editor to use in -e (sudoedit) mode
+\& $ sudo \-u yaz ls ~yaz
.Ve
-.SH "FILES"
-.IX Header "FILES"
-.Vb 2
-\& @sysconfdir@/sudoers List of who can run what
-\& @timedir@ Directory containing timestamps
-.Ve
-.SH "EXAMPLES"
-.IX Header "EXAMPLES"
-Note: the following examples assume suitable sudoers(@mansectform@) entries.
.PP
-To get a file listing of an unreadable directory:
+To edit the \fIindex.html\fR file as user www:
.PP
.Vb 1
-\& $ sudo ls /usr/local/protected
+\& $ sudo \-u www vi ~www/htdocs/index.html
.Ve
.PP
-To list the home directory of user yazza on a machine where the
-file system holding ~yazza is not exported as root:
+To view system logs only accessible to root and users in the adm group:
.PP
.Vb 1
-\& $ sudo -u yazza ls ~yazza
+\& $ sudo \-g adm view /var/log/syslog
.Ve
.PP
-To edit the \fIindex.html\fR file as user www:
+To run an editor as jim with a different primary group:
.PP
.Vb 1
-\& $ sudo -u www vi ~www/htdocs/index.html
+\& $ sudo \-u jim \-g audio vi ~jim/sound.txt
.Ve
.PP
To shutdown a machine:
.PP
.Vb 1
-\& $ sudo shutdown -r +15 "quick reboot"
+\& $ sudo shutdown \-r +15 "quick reboot"
.Ve
.PP
To make a usage listing of the directories in the /home
to make the \f(CW\*(C`cd\*(C'\fR and file redirection work.
.PP
.Vb 1
-\& $ sudo sh -c "cd /home ; du -s * | sort -rn > USAGE"
+\& $ sudo sh \-c "cd /home ; du \-s * | sort \-rn > USAGE"
.Ve
.SH "SEE ALSO"
.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
-\&\fIgrep\fR\|(1), \fIsu\fR\|(1), \fIstat\fR\|(2), \fIlogin_cap\fR\|(3), sudoers(@mansectform@),
-passwd(@mansectform@), visudo(@mansectsu@)
+\&\fIgrep\fR\|(1), \fIsu\fR\|(1), \fIstat\fR\|(2),
+@LCMAN@\&\fIlogin_cap\fR\|(3),
+\&\fIpasswd\fR\|(@mansectform@), \fIsudoers\fR\|(5), \fIvisudo\fR\|(@mansectsu@)
+.PP
+The file /usr/share/doc/sudo/OPTIONS describes the options used for building
+the Debian version of sudo, some of which change default behaviors documented
+elsewhere in this document.
.SH "AUTHORS"
.IX Header "AUTHORS"
Many people have worked on \fBsudo\fR over the years; this
version consists of code written primarily by:
.PP
-.Vb 2
-\& Todd Miller
-\& Chris Jepeway
+.Vb 1
+\& Todd C. Miller
.Ve
.PP
See the \s-1HISTORY\s0 file in the \fBsudo\fR distribution or visit
Also, many programs (such as editors) allow the user to run commands
via shell escapes, thus avoiding \fBsudo\fR's checks. However, on
most systems it is possible to prevent shell escapes with \fBsudo\fR's
-\&\fInoexec\fR functionality. See the sudoers(@mansectform@) manual
+\&\fInoexec\fR functionality. See the \fIsudoers\fR\|(@mansectform@) manual
for details.
.PP
-It is not meaningful to run the \f(CW\*(C`cd\*(C'\fR command directly via sudo, e.g.
+It is not meaningful to run the \f(CW\*(C`cd\*(C'\fR command directly via sudo, e.g.,
.PP
.Vb 1
\& $ sudo cd /usr/local/protected
.Ve
.PP
-since when whe command exits the parent process (your shell) will
+since when the command exits the parent process (your shell) will
still be the same. Please see the \s-1EXAMPLES\s0 section for more information.
.PP
If users have sudo \f(CW\*(C`ALL\*(C'\fR there is nothing to prevent them from
at http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/bugs/
.SH "SUPPORT"
.IX Header "SUPPORT"
-Commercial support is available for \fBsudo\fR, see
-http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/support.html for details.
-.PP
Limited free support is available via the sudo-users mailing list,
see http://www.sudo.ws/mailman/listinfo/sudo\-users to subscribe or
search the archives.
.SH "DISCLAIMER"
.IX Header "DISCLAIMER"
-\&\fBSudo\fR is provided ``\s-1AS\s0 \s-1IS\s0'' and any express or implied warranties,
+\&\fBsudo\fR is provided ``\s-1AS\s0 \s-1IS\s0'' and any express or implied warranties,
including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose are disclaimed. See the \s-1LICENSE\s0
file distributed with \fBsudo\fR or http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/license.html
projects / debian / sudo / blobdiff