/*
- * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2008 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
# include <floss.h>
#endif
-#include "config.h"
+#include <config.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
-#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
-# include <err.h>
-#else
-# include "emul/err.h"
-#endif /* HAVE_ERR_H */
#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <grp.h>
-#include <time.h>
+#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+# include <locale.h>
+#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
# define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon"
# endif
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H
+# include <project.h>
+# include <sys/task.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+# include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#endif
#include "sudo.h"
+#include "sudo_usage.h"
+#include "lbuf.h"
#include "interfaces.h"
#include "version.h"
#ifndef lint
-static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.370 2004/08/24 18:01:13 millert Exp $";
+__unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.500 2008/11/18 15:57:09 millert Exp $";
#endif /* lint */
/*
* Prototypes
*/
-static int init_vars __P((int));
+static void init_vars __P((int, char **));
+static int set_cmnd __P((int));
static int parse_args __P((int, char **));
-static void check_sudoers __P((void));
static void initial_setup __P((void));
static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *));
-static void usage __P((int));
-static void usage_excl __P((int));
+static void set_project __P((struct passwd *));
+static void set_runasgr __P((char *));
+static void set_runaspw __P((char *));
+static void show_version __P((void));
+static void usage __P((int))
+ __attribute__((__noreturn__));
+static void usage_excl __P((int))
+ __attribute__((__noreturn__));
static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void));
-extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **));
-extern void list_matches __P((void));
-extern char **rebuild_env __P((char **, int, int));
-extern char **zero_env __P((char **));
-extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *));
-extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t));
-extern struct passwd *sudo_pwdup __P((const struct passwd *));
+extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **, char **));
+extern void rebuild_env __P((int, int));
+void validate_env_vars __P((struct list_member *));
+void insert_env_vars __P((struct list_member *));
/*
* Globals
int Argc, NewArgc;
char **Argv, **NewArgv;
char *prev_user;
+static int user_closefrom = -1;
struct sudo_user sudo_user;
-struct passwd *auth_pw;
-FILE *sudoers_fp;
+struct passwd *auth_pw, *list_pw;
struct interface *interfaces;
int num_interfaces;
int tgetpass_flags;
+int long_list;
uid_t timestamp_uid;
extern int errorlineno;
+extern int parse_error;
+extern char *errorfile;
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
static struct rlimit corelimit;
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
char *login_style;
#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
-sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp, saved_sa_chld;
-void (*set_perms) __P((int));
+sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp;
+static char *runas_user;
+static char *runas_group;
+static struct sudo_nss_list *snl;
+/* For getopt(3) */
+extern char *optarg;
+extern int optind;
int
main(argc, argv, envp)
char **argv;
char **envp;
{
- int validated;
- int fd;
- int cmnd_status;
- int sudo_mode;
- int pwflag;
- char **new_environ;
+ int sources = 0, validated;
+ int fd, cmnd_status, sudo_mode, pwflag, rc = 0;
sigaction_t sa;
- extern int printmatches;
- extern char **environ;
+ struct sudo_nss *nss;
+#if defined(SUDO_DEVEL) && defined(__OpenBSD__)
+ extern char *malloc_options;
+ malloc_options = "AFGJPR";
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+#endif
Argv = argv;
if ((Argc = argc) < 1)
# endif
#endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
- /* Zero out the environment. */
- environ = zero_env(envp);
-
if (geteuid() != 0)
- errx(1, "must be setuid root");
+ errorx(1, "must be setuid root");
/*
* Signal setup:
* us at some point and avoid the logging.
* Install handler to wait for children when they exit.
*/
+ zero_bytes(&sa, sizeof(sa));
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saved_sa_int);
(void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &saved_sa_quit);
(void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp);
- sa.sa_handler = reapchild;
- (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, &saved_sa_chld);
/*
- * Turn off core dumps, close open files and setup set_perms().
+ * Turn off core dumps and make sure fds 0-2 are open.
*/
initial_setup();
- setpwent();
+ sudo_setpwent();
+ sudo_setgrent();
/* Parse our arguments. */
sudo_mode = parse_args(Argc, Argv);
else
switch (sudo_mode) {
case MODE_VERSION:
- (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version);
- if (getuid() == 0) {
- putchar('\n');
- dump_auth_methods();
- dump_defaults();
- dump_interfaces();
- }
- exit(0);
+ show_version();
break;
case MODE_HELP:
usage(0);
case MODE_LIST:
user_cmnd = "list";
pwflag = I_LISTPW;
- printmatches = 1;
+ break;
+ case MODE_CHECK:
+ pwflag = I_LISTPW;
break;
}
if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0)
usage(1);
- cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode);
+ init_vars(sudo_mode, envp); /* XXX - move this later? */
-#ifdef HAVE_LDAP
- validated = sudo_ldap_check(pwflag);
+ /* Parse nsswitch.conf for sudoers order. */
+ snl = sudo_read_nss();
- /* Skip reading /etc/sudoers if LDAP told us to */
- if (def_ignore_local_sudoers); /* skips */
- else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && !printmatches); /* skips */
- else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && printmatches)
- {
- check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
-
- /* User is found in LDAP and we want a list of all sudo commands the
- * user can do, so consult sudoers but throw away result.
- */
- sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
+ /* Open and parse sudoers, set global defaults */
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
+ if (nss->open(nss) == 0 && nss->parse(nss) == 0) {
+ sources++;
+ nss->setdefs(nss);
+ }
}
- else
-#endif
- {
- check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
+ if (sources == 0)
+ log_error(0, "no valid sudoers sources found, quitting");
- /* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */
- validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
- }
+ /* XXX - collect post-sudoers parse settings into a function */
/*
- * If we are using set_perms_posix() and the stay_setuid flag was not set,
- * set the real, effective and saved uids to 0 and use set_perms_nosuid()
- * instead of set_perms_posix().
+ * Set runas passwd/group entries based on command line or sudoers.
+ * Note that if runas_group was specified without runas_user we
+ * defer setting runas_pw so the match routines know to ignore it.
*/
-#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && !defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && \
- !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
- if (!def_stay_setuid && set_perms == set_perms_posix) {
- if (setuid(0)) {
- perror("setuid(0)");
- exit(1);
- }
- set_perms = set_perms_nosuid;
+ if (runas_group != NULL) {
+ set_runasgr(runas_group);
+ if (runas_user != NULL)
+ set_runaspw(runas_user);
+ } else
+ set_runaspw(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default);
+
+ if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_RUNAS))
+ log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries");
+
+ /* Set login class if applicable. */
+ set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw);
+
+ /* Update initial shell now that runas is set. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))
+ NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell;
+
+ /* This goes after sudoers is parsed since it may have timestamp options. */
+ if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) {
+ remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL));
+ cleanup(0);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
+ if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
+ (void) fprintf(stderr,
+ "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n",
+ getprogname());
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */
+ if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) {
+ if (!def_closefrom_override)
+ errorx(1, "you are not permitted to use the -C option");
+ else
+ def_closefrom = user_closefrom;
+ }
+
+ cmnd_status = set_cmnd(sudo_mode);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+ if (!setlocale(LC_ALL, def_sudoers_locale)) {
+ warningx("unable to set locale to \"%s\", using \"C\"",
+ def_sudoers_locale);
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "C");
}
#endif
+ validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST;
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
+ validated = nss->lookup(nss, validated, pwflag);
+
+ /* Handle [NOTFOUND=return] */
+ if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && nss->ret_notfound)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (safe_cmnd == NULL)
+ safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+#endif
+
+ /* If only a group was specified, set runas_pw based on invoking user. */
+ if (runas_pw == NULL)
+ set_runaspw(user_name);
+
/*
* Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
*/
struct passwd *pw;
if (*def_timestampowner == '#')
- pw = getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
+ pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
else
- pw = getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
+ pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
if (!pw)
log_error(0, "timestamp owner (%s): No such user",
def_timestampowner);
timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
}
- /* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */
- if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) {
- remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL));
- exit(0);
- }
-
- if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR))
- log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
- errorlineno);
-
- /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
- if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr,
- "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n",
- getprogname());
- exit(1);
- }
-
/* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS))
def_preserve_groups = TRUE;
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs)
usage(1);
- /* May need to set $HOME to target user if we are running a command. */
- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && (def_always_set_home ||
- (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL) && def_set_home)))
- SET(sudo_mode, MODE_RESET_HOME);
-
/* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
if (def_requiretty) {
if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
(void) close(fd);
}
+ /* Use askpass value from sudoers unless user specified their own. */
+ if (def_askpass && !user_askpass)
+ user_askpass = def_askpass;
+
+ /* User may have overridden environment resetting via the -E flag. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv)
+ def_env_reset = FALSE;
+
+ /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */
+ rebuild_env(sudo_mode, def_noexec);
+
/* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */
auth_pw = get_authpw();
/* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
- if (!ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOPASS))
- check_user(ISSET(validated, FLAG_CHECK_USER));
+ if (def_authenticate)
+ check_user(validated, !ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE));
/* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
- if (user_uid == 0 && prev_user != NULL && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
+ /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
+ if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
+ if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
struct passwd *pw;
- if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) {
- free(sudo_user.pw);
+ if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL)
sudo_user.pw = pw;
- }
+ }
}
- /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits if we have a cmnd. */
- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN))
- new_environ = rebuild_env(envp, sudo_mode, ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOEXEC));
- else
- new_environ = envp;
-
if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
- if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
- warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
- exit(1);
- } else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
- warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
- exit(1);
+ if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
+ errorx(1, "ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
+ else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
+ errorx(1, "%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
+
+ /* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) {
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV))
+ log_error(NO_MAIL,
+ "sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment");
+ else
+ validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
}
- log_auth(validated, 1);
- if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE)
- exit(0);
- else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) {
- list_matches();
-#ifdef HAVE_LDAP
- sudo_ldap_list_matches();
-#endif
- exit(0);
- }
+ log_allowed(validated);
+ if (sudo_mode == MODE_CHECK)
+ rc = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw);
+ else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST)
+ display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw);
- /* This *must* have been set if we got a match but... */
- if (safe_cmnd == NULL) {
- log_error(MSG_ONLY,
- "internal error, safe_cmnd never got set for %s; %s",
- user_cmnd,
- "please report this error at http://courtesan.com/sudo/bugs/");
- }
+ /* Cleanup sudoers sources */
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss)
+ nss->close(nss);
+
+ /* Deferred exit due to sudo_ldap_close() */
+ if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE || sudo_mode == MODE_CHECK ||
+ sudo_mode == MODE_LIST)
+ exit(rc);
- /* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */
- if (def_umask != 0777)
- (void) umask(def_umask);
+ /*
+ * Override user's umask if configured to do so.
+ * If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too.
+ */
+ if (def_umask != 0777) {
+ mode_t mask = umask(def_umask);
+ mask |= def_umask;
+ if (mask != def_umask)
+ umask(mask);
+ }
/* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN))
set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS);
- /* Close the password and group files */
- endpwent();
- endgrent();
-
- /* Install the real environment. */
- environ = new_environ;
-
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
char *p;
/* Change to target user's homedir. */
if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1)
- warn("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir);
+ warning("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir);
+
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(_AIX)
+ /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
+ read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, TRUE);
+#endif
}
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
- exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv));
+ exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv, envp));
+
+ /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
+ if (def_env_file)
+ read_env_file(def_env_file, FALSE);
+
+ /* Insert user-specified environment variables. */
+ insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
/* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */
(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL);
(void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL);
(void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &saved_sa_chld, NULL);
+
+ /* Close the password and group files and free up memory. */
+ sudo_endpwent();
+ sudo_endgrent();
+
+ closefrom(def_closefrom + 1);
#ifndef PROFILING
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0)
exit(0);
- else
- EXECV(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */
+ else {
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (is_selinux_enabled() > 0 && user_role != NULL)
+ selinux_exec(user_role, user_type, NewArgv,
+ ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL));
+#endif
+ execv(safe_cmnd, NewArgv);
+ }
#else
exit(0);
#endif /* PROFILING */
/*
- * If we got here then the exec() failed...
+ * If we got here then execve() failed...
*/
- warn("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd);
+ if (errno == ENOEXEC) {
+ NewArgv--; /* at least one extra slot... */
+ NewArgv[0] = "sh";
+ NewArgv[1] = safe_cmnd;
+ execv(_PATH_BSHELL, NewArgv);
+ } warning("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd);
exit(127);
- } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
- log_auth(validated, 1);
+ } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
+ log_denial(validated, 1);
exit(1);
- } else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_NOT_OK)) {
+ } else {
if (def_path_info) {
/*
* We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can
* is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set
* their path to just contain a single dir.
*/
- log_auth(validated,
+ log_denial(validated,
!(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND));
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
- warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
+ warningx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
- warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
+ warningx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
} else {
/* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */
- log_auth(validated, 1);
+ log_denial(validated, 1);
}
exit(1);
- } else {
- /* should never get here */
- log_auth(validated, 1);
- exit(1);
}
exit(0); /* not reached */
}
* Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and
* load the ``interfaces'' array.
*/
-static int
-init_vars(sudo_mode)
+static void
+init_vars(sudo_mode, envp)
int sudo_mode;
+ char **envp;
{
- char *p, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- int nohostname, rval;
+ char *p, **ep, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
+ int nohostname;
/* Sanity check command from user. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX)
- errx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]);
+ errorx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]);
#ifdef HAVE_TZSET
(void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */
if (nohostname)
user_host = user_shost = "localhost";
else {
+ thost[sizeof(thost) - 1] = '\0';
user_host = estrdup(thost);
if (def_fqdn) {
/* Defer call to set_fqdn() until log_error() is safe. */
}
if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO))) {
- if (strncmp(p, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
- p += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
- user_tty = estrdup(p);
+ user_tty = user_ttypath = estrdup(p);
+ if (strncmp(user_tty, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
+ user_tty += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
} else
user_tty = "unknown";
+ for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) {
+ /* XXX - don't fill in if empty string */
+ switch (**ep) {
+ case 'D':
+ if (strncmp("DISPLAY=", *ep, 8) == 0)
+ user_display = *ep + 8;
+ break;
+ case 'K':
+ if (strncmp("KRB5CCNAME=", *ep, 11) == 0)
+ user_ccname = *ep + 11;
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0)
+ user_path = *ep + 5;
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ if (strncmp("SHELL=", *ep, 6) == 0)
+ user_shell = *ep + 6;
+ else if (!user_prompt && strncmp("SUDO_PROMPT=", *ep, 12) == 0)
+ user_prompt = *ep + 12;
+ else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0)
+ prev_user = *ep + 10;
+ else if (strncmp("SUDO_ASKPASS=", *ep, 13) == 0)
+ user_askpass = *ep + 13;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password
* if necessary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we
* be run during reboot after the YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died.
*/
if (sudo_mode & (MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_KILL))
- errx(1, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name);
- log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name);
+ errorx(1, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name);
+ log_error(0, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name);
}
if (user_shell == NULL || *user_shell == '\0')
- user_shell = sudo_user.pw->pw_shell;
+ user_shell = estrdup(sudo_user.pw->pw_shell);
/* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */
+#ifdef HAVE_GETGROUPS
+ if ((user_ngroups = getgroups(0, NULL)) > 0) {
+ user_groups = emalloc2(user_ngroups, sizeof(GETGROUPS_T));
+ if (getgroups(user_ngroups, user_groups) < 0)
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get group vector");
+ } else
+ user_ngroups = 0;
+#endif
+
if (def_fqdn)
set_fqdn(); /* may call log_error() */
if (nohostname)
log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname");
- set_runaspw(*user_runas); /* may call log_error() */
- if (*user_runas[0] == '#' && runas_pw->pw_name && runas_pw->pw_name[0])
- *user_runas = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_name);
-
/*
* Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root.
*/
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
- warnx("cannot get working directory");
+ warningx("cannot get working directory");
(void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
}
} else
* If we were given the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options we need to redo
* NewArgv and NewArgc.
*/
- if ((sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) {
- char **dst, **src = NewArgv;
-
- NewArgv = (char **) emalloc2((++NewArgc + 1), sizeof(char *));
- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
- NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit";
- else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))
- NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell;
- else if (user_shell && *user_shell)
- NewArgv[0] = user_shell;
- else
- errx(1, "unable to determine shell");
-
- /* copy the args from NewArgv */
- for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst)
- ;
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
+ NewArgv--;
+ NewArgc++;
+ NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit";
+ } else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) {
+ char **av;
+
+ /* Allocate an extra slot for execve() failure (ENOEXEC). */
+ av = (char **) emalloc2(5, sizeof(char *));
+ av++;
+
+ av[0] = user_shell; /* may be updated later */
+ if (NewArgc > 0) {
+ size_t size;
+ char *cmnd, *src, *dst, *end;
+ size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc - 1] - NewArgv[0]) +
+ strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc - 1]) + 1;
+ cmnd = emalloc(size);
+ src = NewArgv[0];
+ dst = cmnd;
+ for (end = src + size - 1; src < end; src++, dst++)
+ *dst = *src == 0 ? ' ' : *src;
+ *dst = '\0';
+ av[1] = "-c";
+ av[2] = cmnd;
+ NewArgc = 2;
+ }
+ av[++NewArgc] = NULL;
+ NewArgv = av;
}
+}
- /* Set login class if applicable. */
- set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw);
+/*
+ * Fill in user_cmnd, user_args, user_base and user_stat variables
+ * and apply any command-specific defaults entries.
+ */
+static int
+set_cmnd(sudo_mode)
+ int sudo_mode;
+{
+ int rval;
+
+ /* Set project if applicable. */
+ set_project(runas_pw);
/* Resolve the path and return. */
rval = FOUND;
user_stat = emalloc(sizeof(struct stat));
- if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) {
- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) {
- /* XXX - default_runas may be modified during parsing of sudoers */
+ if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) {
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) {
set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path);
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
size_t size, n;
/* If we didn't realloc NewArgv it is contiguous so just count. */
- if (!(sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) {
+ if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) {
size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) +
strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1;
} else {
for (to = user_args, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) {
n = strlcpy(to, *from, size - (to - user_args));
if (n >= size - (to - user_args))
- errx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow");
+ errorx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow");
to += n;
*to++ = ' ';
}
else
user_base = user_cmnd;
+ if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_CMND))
+ log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries");
+
return(rval);
}
/*
- * Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3).
+ * Command line argument parsing.
+ * Sets NewArgc and NewArgv which corresponds to the argc/argv we'll use
+ * for the command to be run (if we are running one).
*/
static int
parse_args(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
- int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is sudo to be run in? */
- int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */
-
- NewArgv = argv + 1;
- NewArgc = argc - 1;
+ int mode = 0; /* what mode is sudo to be run in? */
+ int flags = 0; /* mode flags */
+ int ch;
/* First, check to see if we were invoked as "sudoedit". */
- if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) {
- rval = MODE_EDIT;
- excl = 'e';
- } else
- rval = MODE_RUN;
-
- if (NewArgc == 0 && rval == MODE_RUN) { /* no options and no command */
- SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
- return(rval);
- }
-
- while (NewArgc > 0 && NewArgv[0][0] == '-') {
- if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0')
- warnx("please use single character options");
-
- switch (NewArgv[0][1]) {
- case 'p':
- /* Must have an associated prompt. */
- if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
- usage(1);
-
- user_prompt = NewArgv[1];
+ if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0)
+ mode = MODE_EDIT;
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- break;
- case 'u':
- /* Must have an associated runas user. */
- if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
- usage(1);
+ /* Returns true if the last option string was "--" */
+#define got_end_of_args (optind > 1 && argv[optind - 1][0] == '-' && \
+ argv[optind - 1][1] == '-' && argv[optind - 1][2] == '\0')
- user_runas = &NewArgv[1];
+ /* Returns true if next option is an environment variable */
+#define is_envar (optind < argc && argv[optind][0] != '/' && \
+ strchr(argv[optind], '=') != NULL)
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- break;
+ for (;;) {
+ /*
+ * We disable arg permutation for GNU getopt().
+ * Some trickiness is required to allow environment variables
+ * to be interspersed with command line options.
+ */
+ if ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "+Aa:bC:c:Eeg:HhiKkLlnPp:r:Sst:U:u:Vv")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'A':
+ SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_ASKPASS);
+ break;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
- case 'a':
- /* Must have an associated authentication style. */
- if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
- usage(1);
-
- login_style = NewArgv[1];
-
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- break;
+ case 'a':
+ login_style = optarg;
+ break;
#endif
+ case 'b':
+ SET(flags, MODE_BACKGROUND);
+ break;
+ case 'C':
+ if ((user_closefrom = atoi(optarg)) < 3) {
+ warningx("the argument to -C must be at least 3");
+ usage(1);
+ }
+ break;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
- case 'c':
- /* Must have an associated login class. */
- if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
+ case 'c':
+ login_class = optarg;
+ def_use_loginclass = TRUE;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case 'E':
+ SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV);
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ if (mode && mode != MODE_EDIT)
+ usage_excl(1);
+ mode = MODE_EDIT;
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ runas_group = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'H':
+ SET(flags, MODE_RESET_HOME);
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ if (mode && mode != MODE_HELP)
+ usage_excl(1);
+ mode = MODE_HELP;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ SET(flags, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL);
+ def_env_reset = TRUE;
+ break;
+ case 'k':
+ if (mode && mode != MODE_INVALIDATE)
+ usage_excl(1);
+ mode = MODE_INVALIDATE;
+ break;
+ case 'K':
+ if (mode && mode != MODE_KILL)
+ usage_excl(1);
+ mode = MODE_KILL;
+ break;
+ case 'L':
+ if (mode && mode != MODE_LISTDEFS)
+ usage_excl(1);
+ mode = MODE_LISTDEFS;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ if (mode) {
+ if (mode == MODE_LIST)
+ long_list = 1;
+ else
+ usage_excl(1);
+ }
+ mode = MODE_LIST;
+ break;
+ case 'n':
+ SET(flags, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE);
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS);
+ break;
+ case 'p':
+ user_prompt = optarg;
+ def_passprompt_override = TRUE;
+ break;
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ case 'r':
+ user_role = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ user_type = optarg;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case 'S':
+ SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN);
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ SET(flags, MODE_SHELL);
+ break;
+ case 'U':
+ if ((list_pw = sudo_getpwnam(optarg)) == NULL)
+ errorx(1, "unknown user: %s", optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ runas_user = optarg;
+ break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (mode && mode != MODE_VALIDATE)
+ usage_excl(1);
+ mode = MODE_VALIDATE;
+ break;
+ case 'V':
+ if (mode && mode != MODE_VERSION)
+ usage_excl(1);
+ mode = MODE_VERSION;
+ break;
+ default:
usage(1);
+ }
+ } else if (!got_end_of_args && is_envar) {
+ struct list_member *ev;
- login_class = NewArgv[1];
- def_use_loginclass = TRUE;
+ /* Store environment variable. */
+ ev = emalloc(sizeof(*ev));
+ ev->value = argv[optind];
+ ev->next = sudo_user.env_vars;
+ sudo_user.env_vars = ev;
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- break;
-#endif
- case 'b':
- SET(rval, MODE_BACKGROUND);
- break;
- case 'e':
- rval = MODE_EDIT;
- if (excl && excl != 'e')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'e';
- break;
- case 'v':
- rval = MODE_VALIDATE;
- if (excl && excl != 'v')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'v';
- break;
- case 'i':
- SET(rval, (MODE_LOGIN_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
- def_env_reset = TRUE;
- if (excl && excl != 'i')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'i';
- break;
- case 'k':
- rval = MODE_INVALIDATE;
- if (excl && excl != 'k')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'k';
- break;
- case 'K':
- rval = MODE_KILL;
- if (excl && excl != 'K')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'K';
- break;
- case 'L':
- rval = MODE_LISTDEFS;
- if (excl && excl != 'L')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'L';
- break;
- case 'l':
- rval = MODE_LIST;
- if (excl && excl != 'l')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'l';
- break;
- case 'V':
- rval = MODE_VERSION;
- if (excl && excl != 'V')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'V';
- break;
- case 'h':
- rval = MODE_HELP;
- if (excl && excl != 'h')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'h';
- break;
- case 's':
- SET(rval, MODE_SHELL);
- if (excl && excl != 's')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 's';
- break;
- case 'H':
- SET(rval, MODE_RESET_HOME);
- break;
- case 'P':
- SET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS);
- break;
- case 'S':
- SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN);
- break;
- case '-':
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- if (rval == MODE_RUN)
- SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
- return(rval);
- case '\0':
- warnx("'-' requires an argument");
- usage(1);
- default:
- warnx("illegal option `%s'", NewArgv[0]);
- usage(1);
+ /* Crank optind and resume getopt. */
+ optind++;
+ } else {
+ /* Not an option or an environment variable -- we're done. */
+ break;
}
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
}
- if ((NewArgc == 0 && (rval & MODE_EDIT)) ||
- (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT))))
+ NewArgc = argc - optind;
+ NewArgv = argv + optind;
+
+ if (!mode)
+ mode = MODE_RUN;
+
+ if (NewArgc > 0 && mode == MODE_LIST)
+ mode = MODE_CHECK;
+
+ if (ISSET(flags, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ if (ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL)) {
+ warningx("you may not specify both the `-i' and `-s' options");
+ usage(1);
+ }
+ if (ISSET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) {
+ warningx("you may not specify both the `-i' and `-E' options");
+ usage(1);
+ }
+ SET(flags, MODE_SHELL);
+ }
+ if (mode == MODE_EDIT &&
+ (ISSET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) || sudo_user.env_vars != NULL)) {
+ if (ISSET(mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV))
+ warningx("the `-E' option is not valid in edit mode");
+ if (sudo_user.env_vars != NULL)
+ warningx("you may not specify environment variables in edit mode");
usage(1);
+ }
+ if ((runas_user != NULL || runas_group != NULL) &&
+ !ISSET(mode, MODE_EDIT | MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) {
+ usage(1);
+ }
+ if (list_pw != NULL && mode != MODE_LIST && mode != MODE_CHECK) {
+ warningx("the `-U' option may only be used with the `-l' option");
+ usage(1);
+ }
+ if (ISSET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN) && ISSET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_ASKPASS)) {
+ warningx("the `-A' and `-S' options may not be used together");
+ usage(1);
+ }
+ if ((NewArgc == 0 && mode == MODE_EDIT) ||
+ (NewArgc > 0 && !ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)))
+ usage(1);
+ if (NewArgc == 0 && mode == MODE_RUN && !ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL))
+ SET(flags, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
- return(rval);
+ return(mode | flags);
}
/*
- * Sanity check sudoers mode/owner/type.
- * Leaves a file pointer to the sudoers file open in ``fp''.
+ * Open sudoers and sanity check mode/owner/type.
+ * Returns a handle to the sudoers file or NULL on error.
*/
-static void
-check_sudoers()
+FILE *
+open_sudoers(sudoers, keepopen)
+ const char *sudoers;
+ int *keepopen;
{
struct stat statbuf;
- int rootstat, i;
- char c;
+ FILE *fp = NULL;
+ int rootstat;
/*
* Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default.
* Only works if file system is readable/writable by root.
*/
- if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
+ if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 &&
(statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) {
- if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
- warnx("fixed mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ if (chmod(sudoers, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
+ warningx("fixed mode on %s", sudoers);
SET(statbuf.st_mode, SUDOERS_MODE);
if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) {
- if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) {
- warnx("set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ if (chown(sudoers, (uid_t) -1, SUDOERS_GID) == 0) {
+ warningx("set group on %s", sudoers);
statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID;
} else
- warn("unable to set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ warning("unable to set group on %s", sudoers);
}
} else
- warn("unable to fix mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ warning("unable to fix mode on %s", sudoers);
}
/*
*/
set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS);
- if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0)
- log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf) != 0)
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't stat %s", sudoers);
else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
- log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS);
- else if (statbuf.st_size == 0)
- log_error(0, "%s is zero length", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is not a regular file", sudoers);
else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE)
- log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS,
- (statbuf.st_mode & 07777), SUDOERS_MODE);
+ log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", sudoers,
+ (unsigned int) (statbuf.st_mode & 07777),
+ (unsigned int) SUDOERS_MODE);
else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID)
- log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS,
- (unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, SUDOERS_UID);
+ log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers,
+ (unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_UID);
else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID)
- log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS,
- (unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, SUDOERS_GID);
- else {
- /* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */
- for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) {
- errno = 0;
- if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL ||
- fread(&c, sizeof(c), 1, sudoers_fp) != 1) {
- sudoers_fp = NULL;
- if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
- break;
- } else
- break;
- sleep(1);
- }
- if (sudoers_fp == NULL)
- log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers,
+ (unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_GID);
+ else if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL)
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", sudoers);
+ else if (statbuf.st_size != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure we can actually read sudoers so we can present the
+ * user with a reasonable error message.
+ */
+ if (fgetc(fp) == EOF)
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't read %s", sudoers);
+ rewind(fp);
}
+ (void) fcntl(fileno(fp), F_SETFD, 1);
set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* change back to root */
+ return(fp);
}
/*
static void
initial_setup()
{
-#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
+ int miss[3], devnull = -1;
+#if defined(__linux__) || (defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL))
struct rlimit rl;
+#endif
+#if defined(__linux__)
+ /*
+ * Unlimit the number of processes since Linux's setuid() will
+ * apply resource limits when changing uid and return EAGAIN if
+ * nproc would be violated by the uid switch.
+ */
+ rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl)) {
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl) == 0) {
+ rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max;
+ (void)setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
/*
* Turn off core dumps.
*/
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl);
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
/*
- * Make set_perms point to the correct function.
- * If we are using setresuid() or setreuid() we only need to set this
- * once. If we are using POSIX saved uids we will switch to
- * set_perms_nosuid after sudoers has been parsed if the "stay_suid"
- * option is not set.
+ * stdin, stdout and stderr must be open; set them to /dev/null
+ * if they are closed and close all other fds.
*/
-#if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
- set_perms = set_perms_suid;
-#else
-# if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
- if (sysconf(_SC_SAVED_IDS) == 1 && sysconf(_SC_VERSION) >= 199009)
- set_perms = set_perms_posix;
- else
-# endif
- set_perms = set_perms_nosuid;
-#endif /* HAVE_SETRESUID || HAVE_SETREUID */
+ miss[STDIN_FILENO] = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1;
+ miss[STDOUT_FILENO] = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1;
+ miss[STDERR_FILENO] = fcntl(STDERR_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1;
+ if (miss[STDIN_FILENO] || miss[STDOUT_FILENO] || miss[STDERR_FILENO]) {
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0644)) != -1) {
+ if (miss[STDIN_FILENO])
+ (void) dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO);
+ if (miss[STDOUT_FILENO])
+ (void) dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO);
+ if (miss[STDERR_FILENO])
+ (void) dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO);
+ if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(devnull);
+ }
+ }
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
- if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0)
- errx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class);
+ if (user_uid != 0 &&
+ strcmp(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default, "root") != 0)
+ errorx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class);
} else {
login_class = pw->pw_class;
if (!login_class || !*login_class)
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
+#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H
+static void
+set_project(pw)
+ struct passwd *pw;
+{
+ int errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
+ int errval;
+ struct project proj;
+ struct project *resultp = '\0';
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ /*
+ * Collect the default project for the user and settaskid
+ */
+ setprojent();
+ if (resultp = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &proj, buf, sizeof(buf))) {
+ errval = setproject(resultp->pj_name, pw->pw_name, TASK_NORMAL);
+ if (errval != 0) {
+ switch(errval) {
+ case SETPROJ_ERR_TASK:
+ if (errno == EAGAIN)
+ log_error(errflags, "resource control limit has been reached");
+ else if (errno == ESRCH)
+ log_error(errflags, "user \"%s\" is not a member of "
+ "project \"%s\"", pw->pw_name, resultp->pj_name);
+ else if (errno == EACCES)
+ log_error(errflags, "the invoking task is final");
+ else
+ log_error(errflags, "could not join project \"%s\"",
+ resultp->pj_name);
+ break;
+ case SETPROJ_ERR_POOL:
+ if (errno == EACCES)
+ log_error(errflags, "no resource pool accepting "
+ "default bindings exists for project \"%s\"",
+ resultp->pj_name);
+ else if (errno == ESRCH)
+ log_error(errflags, "specified resource pool does "
+ "not exist for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name);
+ else
+ log_error(errflags, "could not bind to default "
+ "resource pool for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (errval <= 0) {
+ log_error(errflags, "setproject failed for project \"%s\"",
+ resultp->pj_name);
+ } else {
+ log_error(errflags, "warning, resource control assignment "
+ "failed for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_error(errflags, "getdefaultproj() error: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ endprojent();
+}
+#else
+static void
+set_project(pw)
+ struct passwd *pw;
+{
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_PROJECT_H */
+
/*
* Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost.
*/
void
set_fqdn()
{
+#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+ struct addrinfo *res0, hint;
+#else
struct hostent *hp;
+#endif
char *p;
+#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+ zero_bytes(&hint, sizeof(hint));
+ hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+ hint.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
+ if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) {
+#else
if (!(hp = gethostbyname(user_host))) {
+#endif
log_error(MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT,
- "unable to lookup %s via gethostbyname()", user_host);
+ "unable to resolve host %s", user_host);
} else {
if (user_shost != user_host)
- free(user_shost);
- free(user_host);
+ efree(user_shost);
+ efree(user_host);
+#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+ user_host = estrdup(res0->ai_canonname);
+ freeaddrinfo(res0);
+#else
user_host = estrdup(hp->h_name);
+#endif
}
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
*p = '\0';
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as.
* By default, this is "root". Updates runas_pw as a side effect.
*/
-int
+static void
set_runaspw(user)
char *user;
{
- if (runas_pw != NULL) {
- if (user_runas != &def_runas_default)
- return(TRUE); /* don't override -u option */
- free(runas_pw);
- }
if (*user == '#') {
- runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1));
- if (runas_pw == NULL) {
- runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd));
- (void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd));
- runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(user + 1);
- }
+ if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1))) == NULL)
+ runas_pw = sudo_fakepwnam(user, runas_gr ? runas_gr->gr_gid : 0);
} else {
- runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user);
- if (runas_pw == NULL)
- log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", user);
+ if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
+ log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown user: %s", user);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get group entry for the group we are going to run commands as.
+ * Updates runas_pw as a side effect.
+ */
+static void
+set_runasgr(group)
+ char *group;
+{
+ if (*group == '#') {
+ if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrgid(atoi(group + 1))) == NULL)
+ runas_gr = sudo_fakegrnam(group);
+ } else {
+ if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrnam(group)) == NULL)
+ log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown group: %s", group);
}
- return(TRUE);
}
/*
struct passwd *pw;
if (def_rootpw) {
- if (runas_pw->pw_uid == 0)
- pw = runas_pw;
- else if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
- log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!");
+ if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
+ log_error(0, "unknown uid: 0");
} else if (def_runaspw) {
- if (strcmp(def_runas_default, *user_runas) == 0)
- pw = runas_pw;
- else if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL)
- log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
- def_runas_default);
+ if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL)
+ log_error(0, "unknown user: %s", def_runas_default);
} else if (def_targetpw) {
if (runas_pw->pw_name == NULL)
- log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %lu!",
- runas_pw->pw_uid);
+ log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown uid: %lu",
+ (unsigned long) runas_pw->pw_uid);
pw = runas_pw;
} else
pw = sudo_user.pw;
return(pw);
}
+/*
+ * Cleanup hook for error()/errorx()
+ */
+void
+cleanup(gotsignal)
+ int gotsignal;
+{
+ struct sudo_nss *nss;
+
+ if (!gotsignal) {
+ if (snl != NULL) {
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss)
+ nss->close(nss);
+ }
+ sudo_endpwent();
+ sudo_endgrent();
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+show_version()
+{
+ (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version);
+ if (getuid() == 0) {
+ putchar('\n');
+ (void) printf("Sudoers path: %s\n", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP
+# ifdef _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF
+ (void) printf("nsswitch path: %s\n", _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF);
+# endif
+ (void) printf("ldap.conf path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_CONF);
+ (void) printf("ldap.secret path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_SECRET);
+#endif
+ dump_auth_methods();
+ dump_defaults();
+ dump_interfaces();
+ }
+ exit(0);
+}
+
/*
* Tell which options are mutually exclusive and exit.
*/
usage_excl(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
- warnx("Only one of the -e, -h, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used");
+ warningx("Only one of the -e, -h, -i, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be specified");
usage(exit_val);
}
/*
* Give usage message and exit.
+ * The actual usage strings are in sudo_usage.h for configure substitution.
*/
static void
usage(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
- char **p;
- int linelen, linemax, ulen;
- static char *uvec[] = {
- " [-HPSb]",
-#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
- " [-a auth_type]",
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
- " [-c class|-]",
-#endif
- " [-p prompt]",
- " [-u username|#uid]",
- " { -e file [...] | -i | -s | <command> }",
- NULL
- };
+ struct lbuf lbuf;
+ char *uvec[5];
+ int i, ulen;
/*
- * For sudoedit, replace the last entry in the usage vector.
- * For sudo, print the secondary usage.
+ * Use usage vectors appropriate to the progname.
*/
if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) {
- /* Replace the last entry in the usage vector. */
- for (p = uvec; p[1] != NULL; p++)
- continue;
- *p = " file [...]";
+ uvec[0] = SUDO_USAGE4 + 3;
+ uvec[1] = NULL;
} else {
- fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -K | -L | -V | -h | -k | -l | -v\n",
- getprogname());
+ uvec[0] = SUDO_USAGE1;
+ uvec[1] = SUDO_USAGE2;
+ uvec[2] = SUDO_USAGE3;
+ uvec[3] = SUDO_USAGE4;
+ uvec[4] = NULL;
}
/*
- * Print the main usage and wrap lines as needed.
- * Assumes an 80-character wide terminal, which is kind of bogus...
+ * Print usage and wrap lines as needed, depending on the
+ * tty width.
*/
- ulen = (int)strlen(getprogname()) + 7;
- linemax = 80;
- linelen = linemax - ulen;
- printf("usage: %s", getprogname());
- for (p = uvec; *p != NULL; p++) {
- if (linelen == linemax || (linelen -= strlen(*p)) >= 0) {
- fputs(*p, stdout);
- } else {
- p--;
- linelen = linemax;
- printf("\n%*s", ulen, "");
- }
+ ulen = (int)strlen(getprogname()) + 8;
+ lbuf_init(&lbuf, NULL, ulen, 0);
+ for (i = 0; uvec[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ lbuf_append(&lbuf, "usage: ", getprogname(), uvec[i], NULL);
+ lbuf_print(&lbuf);
}
- putchar('\n');
+ lbuf_destroy(&lbuf);
exit(exit_val);
}
projects / debian / sudo / blobdiff