/*
- * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
- * All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2010 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
- * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * 4. Products derived from this software may not be called "Sudo" nor
- * may "Sudo" appear in their names without specific prior written
- * permission from the author.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
- * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
- * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
- * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
- * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
- * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
- * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
- * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
- * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
- * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
*
* For a brief history of sudo, please see the HISTORY file included
* with this distribution.
*/
-#define _SUDO_SUDO_C
+#define _SUDO_MAIN
+
+#ifdef __TANDEM
+# include <floss.h>
+#endif
-#include "config.h"
+#include <config.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
# include <memory.h>
# endif
# include <string.h>
-#else
-# ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
-# include <strings.h>
-# endif
#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
+#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+# include <strings.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
#include <pwd.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <grp.h>
-#include <time.h>
+#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+# include <locale.h>
+#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
# define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon"
# endif
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H
+# include <project.h>
+# include <sys/task.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP
+# include <membership.h>
+#endif
#include "sudo.h"
+#include "lbuf.h"
#include "interfaces.h"
-#include "version.h"
+#include <sudo_usage.h>
+
+#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS
+# include "nonunix.h"
+#endif
-#ifndef lint
-static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.318 2002/01/15 23:43:59 millert Exp $";
-#endif /* lint */
+#if defined(HAVE_PAM) && !defined(NO_PAM_SESSION)
+# define CMND_WAIT TRUE
+#else
+# define CMND_WAIT FALSE
+#endif
/*
* Prototypes
*/
-static int init_vars __P((int));
-static int parse_args __P((void));
-static void check_sudoers __P((void));
+static void init_vars __P((char **));
+static int set_cmnd __P((int));
static void initial_setup __P((void));
static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *));
-static void usage __P((int));
-static void usage_excl __P((int));
+static void set_project __P((struct passwd *));
+static void set_runasgr __P((char *));
+static void set_runaspw __P((char *));
+static void show_version __P((void));
static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void));
-extern void list_matches __P((void));
-extern char **rebuild_env __P((int, char **));
-extern char **zero_env __P((char **));
-extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *));
-extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t));
+static void create_admin_success_flag __P((void));
+extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **, char **));
+int run_command __P((const char *path, char *argv[], char *envp[], uid_t uid, int dowait)); /* XXX should be in sudo.h */
/*
* Globals
*/
-int Argc;
-char **Argv;
-int NewArgc = 0;
-char **NewArgv = NULL;
+int Argc, NewArgc;
+char **Argv, **NewArgv;
+char *prev_user;
+int user_closefrom = -1;
struct sudo_user sudo_user;
-struct passwd *auth_pw;
-FILE *sudoers_fp = NULL;
+struct passwd *auth_pw, *list_pw;
struct interface *interfaces;
int num_interfaces;
int tgetpass_flags;
+int long_list;
+uid_t timestamp_uid;
extern int errorlineno;
+extern int parse_error;
+extern char *errorfile;
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
static struct rlimit corelimit;
-#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
+#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
+#if defined(__linux__)
+static struct rlimit nproclimit;
+#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
-#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
-char *login_style;
-#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
-void (*set_perms) __P((int, int));
+sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp;
+char *runas_user;
+char *runas_group;
+static struct sudo_nss_list *snl;
+int sudo_mode;
+/* For getopt(3) */
+extern char *optarg;
+extern int optind;
int
main(argc, argv, envp)
int argc;
- char **argv;
- char **envp;
+ char *argv[];
+ char *envp[];
{
- int validated;
- int fd;
- int cmnd_status;
- int sudo_mode;
- int pwflag;
- char **new_environ;
+ int sources = 0, validated;
+ int fd, cmnd_status, pwflag, rc = 0;
sigaction_t sa;
- extern int printmatches;
- extern char **environ;
+ struct sudo_nss *nss;
+#if defined(SUDO_DEVEL) && defined(__OpenBSD__)
+ extern char *malloc_options;
+ malloc_options = "AFGJPR";
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+#endif
+
+ Argv = argv;
+ if ((Argc = argc) < 1)
+ usage(1);
/* Must be done as the first thing... */
#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
- (void) set_auth_parameters(argc, argv);
+ (void) set_auth_parameters(Argc, Argv);
# ifdef HAVE_INITPRIVS
initprivs();
# endif
#endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
- /* Zero out the environment. */
- environ = zero_env(envp);
-
- Argv = argv;
- Argc = argc;
-
- if (geteuid() != 0) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, %s must be setuid root.\n", Argv[0]);
- exit(1);
- }
+ if (geteuid() != 0)
+ errorx(1, "must be setuid root");
/*
- * Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt
- * us at some point and avoid the logging.
+ * Signal setup:
+ * Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt
+ * us at some point and avoid the logging.
+ * Install handler to wait for children when they exit.
*/
+ zero_bytes(&sa, sizeof(sa));
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
- (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saved_sa_int);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &saved_sa_quit);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp);
+
+ /* Initialize environment functions (including replacements). */
+ env_init(FALSE);
/*
- * Setup signal handlers, turn off core dumps, and close open files.
+ * Turn off core dumps and make sure fds 0-2 are open.
*/
initial_setup();
- setpwent();
+ sudo_setpwent();
+ sudo_setgrent();
/* Parse our arguments. */
- sudo_mode = parse_args();
+ sudo_mode = parse_args(Argc, Argv);
/* Setup defaults data structures. */
init_defaults();
load_interfaces();
pwflag = 0;
- if (sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL))
user_cmnd = "shell";
- else
+ else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
+ user_cmnd = "sudoedit";
+ else {
switch (sudo_mode) {
case MODE_VERSION:
- (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version);
- if (getuid() == 0) {
- putchar('\n');
- dump_auth_methods();
- dump_defaults();
- dump_interfaces();
- dump_badenv();
- }
- exit(0);
+ show_version();
break;
case MODE_HELP:
usage(0);
break;
case MODE_VALIDATE:
+ case MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_INVALIDATE:
user_cmnd = "validate";
- pwflag = I_VERIFYPW_I;
+ pwflag = I_VERIFYPW;
break;
case MODE_KILL:
case MODE_INVALIDATE:
exit(0);
break;
case MODE_LIST:
+ case MODE_LIST|MODE_INVALIDATE:
user_cmnd = "list";
- pwflag = I_LISTPW_I;
- printmatches = 1;
+ pwflag = I_LISTPW;
+ break;
+ case MODE_CHECK:
+ case MODE_CHECK|MODE_INVALIDATE:
+ pwflag = I_LISTPW;
break;
}
+ }
/* Must have a command to run... */
if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0)
usage(1);
- cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode);
+ init_vars(envp); /* XXX - move this later? */
- check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
+#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS
+ sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_init(); /* initialise nonunix groups impl */
+#endif /* USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS */
- /* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */
- validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
+ /* Parse nsswitch.conf for sudoers order. */
+ snl = sudo_read_nss();
- /*
- * If we have POSIX saved uids and the stay_setuid flag was not set,
- * set the real, effective and saved uids to 0 and use set_perms_fallback()
- * instead of set_perms_posix().
- */
-#if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
- if (!def_flag(I_STAY_SETUID) && set_perms == set_perms_posix) {
- if (setuid(0)) {
- perror("setuid(0)");
- exit(1);
+ /* Open and parse sudoers, set global defaults */
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
+ if (nss->open(nss) == 0 && nss->parse(nss) == 0) {
+ sources++;
+ if (nss->setdefs(nss) != 0)
+ log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries");
}
- set_perms = set_perms_fallback;
}
-#endif
+ if (sources == 0)
+ log_error(0, "no valid sudoers sources found, quitting");
+
+ /* XXX - collect post-sudoers parse settings into a function */
/*
- * Look up runas user passwd struct. If we are given a uid then
- * there may be no corresponding passwd(5) entry (which is OK).
+ * Set runas passwd/group entries based on command line or sudoers.
+ * Note that if runas_group was specified without runas_user we
+ * defer setting runas_pw so the match routines know to ignore it.
*/
- if (**user_runas == '#') {
- runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1));
- if (runas_pw == NULL) {
- runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd));
- (void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd));
- runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(*user_runas + 1);
- }
- } else {
- runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas);
- if (runas_pw == NULL)
- log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", *user_runas);
- }
+ if (runas_group != NULL) {
+ set_runasgr(runas_group);
+ if (runas_user != NULL)
+ set_runaspw(runas_user);
+ } else
+ set_runaspw(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default);
+
+ if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_RUNAS))
+ log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries");
+
+ if (def_fqdn)
+ set_fqdn(); /* deferred until after sudoers is parsed */
+
+ /* Set login class if applicable. */
+ set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw);
- /* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */
+ /* Update initial shell now that runas is set. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))
+ NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell;
+
+ /* This goes after sudoers is parsed since it may have timestamp options. */
if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) {
remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL));
+ cleanup(0);
exit(0);
}
- if (validated & VALIDATE_ERROR)
- log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
- errorlineno);
-
/* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
- if (user_uid == 0 && !def_flag(I_ROOT_SUDO)) {
- (void) fputs("You are already root, you don't need to use sudo.\n",
- stderr);
+ if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
+ (void) fprintf(stderr,
+ "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n",
+ getprogname());
exit(1);
}
+ /* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */
+ if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) {
+ if (!def_closefrom_override)
+ errorx(1, "you are not permitted to use the -C option");
+ else
+ def_closefrom = user_closefrom;
+ }
+
+ cmnd_status = set_cmnd(sudo_mode);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+ if (!setlocale(LC_ALL, def_sudoers_locale)) {
+ warningx("unable to set locale to \"%s\", using \"C\"",
+ def_sudoers_locale);
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "C");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST;
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) {
+ validated = nss->lookup(nss, validated, pwflag);
+
+ if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
+ /* Handle "= auth" in netsvc.conf */
+ if (nss->ret_if_found)
+ break;
+ } else {
+ /* Handle [NOTFOUND=return] */
+ if (nss->ret_if_notfound)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (safe_cmnd == NULL)
+ safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
+ setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+#endif
+
+ /* If only a group was specified, set runas_pw based on invoking user. */
+ if (runas_pw == NULL)
+ set_runaspw(user_name);
+
+ /*
+ * Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
+ */
+ if (def_timestampowner) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ if (*def_timestampowner == '#')
+ pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
+ else
+ pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
+ if (!pw)
+ log_error(0, "timestamp owner (%s): No such user",
+ def_timestampowner);
+ timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ }
+
/* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */
- if (sudo_mode & MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS)
- def_flag(I_PRESERVE_GROUPS) = TRUE;
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS))
+ def_preserve_groups = TRUE;
/* If no command line args and "set_home" is not set, error out. */
- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_flag(I_SHELL_NOARGS))
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs)
usage(1);
- /* May need to set $HOME to target user if we are running a command. */
- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN) && (def_flag(I_ALWAYS_SET_HOME) ||
- ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL) && def_flag(I_SET_HOME))))
- sudo_mode |= MODE_RESET_HOME;
-
/* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
- if (def_flag(I_REQUIRETTY)) {
- if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+ if (def_requiretty) {
+ if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, "no tty");
log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo");
- else
+ } else
(void) close(fd);
}
+ /* Use askpass value from sudoers unless user specified their own. */
+ if (def_askpass && !user_askpass)
+ user_askpass = def_askpass;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't reset the environment for sudoedit or if the user
+ * specified the -E command line flag and they have setenv privs.
+ */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT) ||
+ (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv))
+ def_env_reset = FALSE;
+
+ /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */
+ rebuild_env(def_noexec);
+
/* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */
auth_pw = get_authpw();
- /* Require a password unless the NOPASS tag was set. */
- if (!(validated & FLAG_NOPASS))
- check_user();
+ /* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
+ if (def_authenticate)
+ check_user(validated, sudo_mode);
- /* Build up custom environment that avoids any nasty bits. */
- new_environ = rebuild_env(sudo_mode, envp);
+ /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
+ /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */
+ if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) {
+ if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) {
+ sudo_user.pw = pw;
+#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP
+ mbr_uid_to_uuid(user_uid, user_uuid);
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
+ /* Create Ubuntu-style dot file to indicate sudo was successful. */
+ create_admin_success_flag();
- if (validated & VALIDATE_OK) {
/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
- exit(1);
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, "command in current directory");
+ errorx(1, "ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
} else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0],
- user_cmnd);
- exit(1);
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, "%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
+ errorx(1, "%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
}
- log_auth(validated, 1);
- if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE)
- exit(0);
- else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) {
- list_matches();
- exit(0);
+ /* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) {
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV))
+ log_error(NO_MAIL,
+ "sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment");
+ else
+ validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
}
- /* This *must* have been set if we got a match but... */
- if (safe_cmnd == NULL) {
- log_error(MSG_ONLY,
- "internal error, safe_cmnd never got set for %s; %s",
- user_cmnd,
- "please report this error at http://courtesan.com/sudo/bugs/");
- }
+#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_IO_LOGDIR
+ /* Get next session ID so we can log it. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) && (def_log_input || def_log_output))
+ io_nextid();
+#endif
+ log_allowed(validated);
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK))
+ rc = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw);
+ else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LIST))
+ display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw);
+
+ /* Cleanup sudoers sources */
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss)
+ nss->close(nss);
+
+#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS
+ /* Finished with the groupcheck code */
+ sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_cleanup();
+#endif
- /* Reset signal handlers before we exec. */
- sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
- sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
- sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
- (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL);
+ /* Deferred exit due to sudo_ldap_close() */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, (MODE_VALIDATE|MODE_CHECK|MODE_LIST)))
+ exit(rc);
- /* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */
- if (def_ival(I_UMASK) != 0777)
- (void) umask(def_mode(I_UMASK));
+ /* Must audit before uid change. */
+ audit_success(NewArgv);
- /* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */
-#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
- (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
-#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ char *p;
- /* Become specified user or root. */
- set_perms(PERM_RUNAS, sudo_mode);
+ /* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */
+ if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL)
+ p = NewArgv[0];
+ *p = '-';
+ NewArgv[0] = p;
- /* Close the password and group files */
- endpwent();
- endgrent();
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(_AIX)
+ /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
+ read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, TRUE);
+#endif
+ }
- /* Install the new environment. */
- environ = new_environ;
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) {
+ /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */
+ if (def_env_file)
+ read_env_file(def_env_file, FALSE);
-#ifndef PROFILING
- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0)
- exit(0);
- else
- EXEC(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */
-#else
- exit(0);
-#endif /* PROFILING */
- /*
- * If we got here then the exec() failed...
- */
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: unable to exec %s: %s\n",
- Argv[0], safe_cmnd, strerror(errno));
- exit(127);
- } else if ((validated & FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
- log_auth(validated, 1);
+ /* Insert user-specified environment variables. */
+ insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
+ }
+
+ /* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */
+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL);
+
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
+ exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv, envp));
+ } else {
+ exit(run_command(safe_cmnd, NewArgv, env_get(), runas_pw->pw_uid,
+ CMND_WAIT));
+ }
+ } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, "No user or host");
+ log_denial(validated, 1);
exit(1);
- } else if (validated & VALIDATE_NOT_OK) {
- if (def_flag(I_PATH_INFO)) {
+ } else {
+ if (def_path_info) {
/*
* We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can
* *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd
* is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set
* their path to just contain a single dir.
*/
- log_auth(validated,
+ log_denial(validated,
!(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND));
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0],
- user_cmnd);
+ warningx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
+ warningx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
} else {
/* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */
- log_auth(validated, 1);
+ log_denial(validated, 1);
}
- exit(1);
- } else {
- /* should never get here */
- log_auth(validated, 1);
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, "validation failure");
exit(1);
}
exit(0); /* not reached */
* Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and
* load the ``interfaces'' array.
*/
-static int
-init_vars(sudo_mode)
- int sudo_mode;
+static void
+init_vars(envp)
+ char **envp;
{
- char *p, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- int nohostname, rval;
+ char *p, **ep, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1];
+ int nohostname;
/* Sanity check command from user. */
- if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= MAXPATHLEN) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: Pathname too long\n", Argv[0],
- NewArgv[0]);
- exit(1);
- }
+ if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX)
+ errorx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]);
#ifdef HAVE_TZSET
(void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */
/* Default value for cmnd and cwd, overridden later. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL)
user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
- (void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown");
+ (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
/*
* We avoid gethostbyname() if possible since we don't want
* "shost" is the unqualified form of the hostname.
*/
nohostname = gethostname(thost, sizeof(thost));
- if (nohostname)
+ if (nohostname) {
user_host = user_shost = "localhost";
- else {
+ } else {
+ thost[sizeof(thost) - 1] = '\0';
user_host = estrdup(thost);
- if (def_flag(I_FQDN)) {
- /* Defer call to set_fqdn() until log_error() is safe. */
- user_shost = user_host;
+ if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
+ *p = '\0';
+ user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
+ *p = '.';
} else {
- if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
- *p = '\0';
- user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
- *p = '.';
- } else {
- user_shost = user_host;
- }
+ user_shost = user_host;
}
}
- if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO))) {
- if (strncmp(p, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
- p += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
- user_tty = estrdup(p);
+ if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO)) ||
+ (p = ttyname(STDERR_FILENO))) {
+ user_tty = user_ttypath = estrdup(p);
+ if (strncmp(user_tty, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
+ user_tty += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
} else
user_tty = "unknown";
+ for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) {
+ /* XXX - don't fill in if empty string */
+ switch (**ep) {
+ case 'D':
+ if (strncmp("DISPLAY=", *ep, 8) == 0)
+ user_display = *ep + 8;
+ break;
+ case 'K':
+ if (strncmp("KRB5CCNAME=", *ep, 11) == 0)
+ user_ccname = *ep + 11;
+ break;
+ case 'P':
+ if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0)
+ user_path = *ep + 5;
+ break;
+ case 'S':
+ if (strncmp("SHELL=", *ep, 6) == 0)
+ user_shell = *ep + 6;
+ else if (!user_prompt && strncmp("SUDO_PROMPT=", *ep, 12) == 0)
+ user_prompt = *ep + 12;
+ else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0)
+ prev_user = *ep + 10;
+ else if (strncmp("SUDO_ASKPASS=", *ep, 13) == 0)
+ user_askpass = *ep + 13;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password
* if necessary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we
char pw_name[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1];
pw.pw_uid = getuid();
- (void) sprintf(pw_name, "%ld", (long) pw.pw_uid);
+ (void) snprintf(pw_name, sizeof(pw_name), "%lu",
+ (unsigned long) pw.pw_uid);
pw.pw_name = pw_name;
sudo_user.pw = &pw;
- log_error(0, "uid %ld does not exist in the passwd file!",
- (long) pw.pw_uid);
+ /*
+ * If we are in -k/-K mode, just spew to stderr. It is not unusual for
+ * users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout file which can cause sudo to
+ * be run during reboot after the YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died.
+ */
+ if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE)
+ errorx(1, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name);
+ log_error(0, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name);
}
+#ifdef HAVE_MBR_CHECK_MEMBERSHIP
+ mbr_uid_to_uuid(user_uid, user_uuid);
+#endif
if (user_shell == NULL || *user_shell == '\0')
- user_shell = sudo_user.pw->pw_shell;
+ user_shell = estrdup(sudo_user.pw->pw_shell);
/* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */
- /*
- * Must defer set_fqdn() until it is safe to call log_error()
- */
- if (def_flag(I_FQDN))
- set_fqdn();
+#ifdef HAVE_GETGROUPS
+ if ((user_ngroups = getgroups(0, NULL)) > 0) {
+ user_groups = emalloc2(user_ngroups, sizeof(GETGROUPS_T));
+ if (getgroups(user_ngroups, user_groups) < 0)
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get group vector");
+ }
+#endif
if (nohostname)
log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname");
/*
* Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root.
*/
- set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode);
+ set_perms(PERM_USER);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
- set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't get working directory!\n",
- Argv[0]);
- (void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown");
+ warningx("cannot get working directory");
+ (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
}
} else
- set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
/*
- * If we were given the '-s' option (run shell) we need to redo
+ * If we were given the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options we need to redo
* NewArgv and NewArgc.
*/
- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) {
- char **dst, **src = NewArgv;
-
- NewArgv = (char **) emalloc (sizeof(char *) * (++NewArgc + 1));
- if (user_shell && *user_shell) {
- NewArgv[0] = user_shell;
- } else {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to determine shell.", Argv[0]);
- exit(1);
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
+ NewArgv--;
+ NewArgc++;
+ NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit";
+ } else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) {
+ char **av;
+
+ /* Allocate an extra slot for execve() failure (ENOEXEC). */
+ av = (char **) emalloc2(5, sizeof(char *));
+ av++;
+
+ av[0] = user_shell; /* may be updated later */
+ if (NewArgc > 0) {
+ size_t cmnd_size = 1024;
+ char *cmnd, *src, *dst, **ap;
+
+ cmnd = dst = emalloc(cmnd_size);
+ for (ap = NewArgv; *ap != NULL; ap++) {
+ for (src = *ap; *src != '\0'; src++) {
+ /* reserve room for an escaped char + space */
+ if (cmnd_size < (dst - cmnd) + 3) {
+ char *new_cmnd;
+ cmnd_size <<= 1;
+ new_cmnd = erealloc(cmnd, cmnd_size);
+ dst = new_cmnd + (dst - cmnd);
+ cmnd = new_cmnd;
+ }
+ if (isalnum((unsigned char)*src) || *src == '_' || *src == '-') {
+ *dst++ = *src;
+ } else {
+ /* quote potential meta character */
+ *dst++ = '\\';
+ *dst++ = *src;
+ }
+ }
+ *dst++ = ' ';
+ }
+ if (cmnd != dst)
+ dst--; /* replace last space with a NUL */
+ *dst = '\0';
+ av[1] = "-c";
+ av[2] = cmnd;
+ NewArgc = 2;
}
-
- /* copy the args from Argv */
- for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst)
- ;
+ av[++NewArgc] = NULL;
+ NewArgv = av;
}
+}
- /* Set login class if applicable. */
- set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw);
+/*
+ * Fill in user_cmnd, user_args, user_base and user_stat variables
+ * and apply any command-specific defaults entries.
+ */
+static int
+set_cmnd(sudo_mode)
+ int sudo_mode;
+{
+ int rval;
+ char *path = user_path;
+
+ /* Set project if applicable. */
+ set_project(runas_pw);
/* Resolve the path and return. */
- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN)) {
- /* XXX - should call this as runas user, not root. */
- rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_path);
- if (rval != FOUND) {
- /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */
- set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode);
- rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_path);
- set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
+ rval = FOUND;
+ user_stat = emalloc(sizeof(struct stat));
+ if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) {
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) {
+ if (def_secure_path && !user_is_exempt())
+ path = def_secure_path;
+ set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
+ rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path,
+ def_ignore_dot);
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
+ if (rval != FOUND) {
+ /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */
+ set_perms(PERM_USER);
+ rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, path,
+ def_ignore_dot);
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
+ }
}
/* set user_args */
if (NewArgc > 1) {
char *to, **from;
- size_t size;
+ size_t size, n;
- /* If MODE_SHELL not set then NewArgv is contiguous so just count */
- if (!(sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) {
+ /* If we didn't realloc NewArgv it is contiguous so just count. */
+ if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) {
size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) +
strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1;
} else {
size += strlen(*from) + 1;
}
- /* alloc and copy. */
- to = user_args = (char *) emalloc(size);
- for (from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) {
- (void) strcpy(to, *from);
- to += strlen(*from);
+ /* Alloc and build up user_args. */
+ user_args = (char *) emalloc(size);
+ for (to = user_args, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) {
+ n = strlcpy(to, *from, size - (to - user_args));
+ if (n >= size - (to - user_args))
+ errorx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow");
+ to += n;
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '\0';
}
- } else
- rval = FOUND;
+ }
+ if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL)
+ user_base++;
+ else
+ user_base = user_cmnd;
+
+ if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_CMND))
+ log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries");
+
+ if (!runas_user && !runas_group)
+ set_runaspw(def_runas_default); /* may have been updated above */
return(rval);
}
/*
- * Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3).
+ * Setup the execution environment immediately prior to the call to execve()
+ * Returns TRUE on success and FALSE on failure.
*/
-static int
-parse_args()
+int
+exec_setup(rbac_enabled, ttyname, ttyfd)
+ int rbac_enabled;
+ const char *ttyname;
+ int ttyfd;
{
- int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is suod to be run in? */
- int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */
+ int rval = FALSE;
- NewArgv = Argv + 1;
- NewArgc = Argc - 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (rbac_enabled) {
+ if (selinux_setup(user_role, user_type, ttyname, ttyfd) == -1)
+ goto done;
+ }
+#endif
- if (NewArgc == 0) { /* no options and no command */
- rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL);
- return(rval);
+ /* Close the password and group files and free up memory. */
+ sudo_endpwent();
+ sudo_endgrent();
+
+ /*
+ * For sudoedit, the command runas a the user with no additional setup.
+ */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) {
+ set_perms(PERM_FULL_USER);
+ rval = TRUE;
+ goto done;
}
- def_flag(I_ENV_RESET) = TRUE;
- while (NewArgc > 0 && NewArgv[0][0] == '-') {
- if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0') {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Please use single character options\n",
- Argv[0]);
- usage(1);
+ /*
+ * Set umask based on sudoers.
+ * If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too
+ * unless umask_override is set.
+ */
+ if (def_umask != 0777) {
+ if (def_umask_override) {
+ umask(def_umask);
+ } else {
+ mode_t mask = umask(def_umask);
+ mask |= def_umask;
+ if (mask != def_umask)
+ umask(mask);
}
+ }
- switch (NewArgv[0][1]) {
- case 'p':
- /* Must have an associated prompt. */
- if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
- usage(1);
-
- user_prompt = NewArgv[1];
+ /* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */
+#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
+ (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
+#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
- /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- break;
- case 'u':
- /* Must have an associated runas user. */
- if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
- usage(1);
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN))
+ set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS);
- user_runas = &NewArgv[1];
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ /* Change to target user's homedir. */
+ if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1) {
+ warning("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
- /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- break;
-#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
- case 'a':
- /* Must have an associated authentication style. */
- if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
- usage(1);
+ /*
+ * Restore nproc resource limit if pam_limits didn't do it for us.
+ * We must do this *after* the uid change to avoid potential EAGAIN
+ * from setuid().
+ */
+#if defined(__linux__)
+ {
+ struct rlimit rl;
+ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl) == 0) {
+ if (rl.rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY && rl.rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY)
+ (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &nproclimit);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
- login_style = NewArgv[1];
+ rval = TRUE;
- /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- break;
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
- case 'c':
- /* Must have an associated login class. */
- if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
- usage(1);
+done:
+ return(rval);
+}
- login_class = NewArgv[1];
- def_flag(I_USE_LOGINCLASS) = TRUE;
+/*
+ * Run the command and wait for it to complete.
+ */
+int
+run_command(path, argv, envp, uid, dowait)
+ const char *path;
+ char *argv[];
+ char *envp[];
+ uid_t uid;
+ int dowait;
+{
+ struct command_status cstat;
+ int exitcode = 1;
- /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- break;
+#ifdef PROFILING
+ exit(0);
#endif
- case 'b':
- rval |= MODE_BACKGROUND;
- break;
- case 'v':
- rval = MODE_VALIDATE;
- if (excl && excl != 'v')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'v';
- break;
- case 'k':
- rval = MODE_INVALIDATE;
- if (excl && excl != 'k')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'k';
- break;
- case 'K':
- rval = MODE_KILL;
- if (excl && excl != 'K')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'K';
- break;
- case 'L':
- rval = MODE_LISTDEFS;
- if (excl && excl != 'L')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'L';
- break;
- case 'l':
- rval = MODE_LIST;
- if (excl && excl != 'l')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'l';
- break;
- case 'V':
- rval = MODE_VERSION;
- if (excl && excl != 'V')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'V';
- break;
- case 'h':
- rval = MODE_HELP;
- if (excl && excl != 'h')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 'h';
- break;
- case 's':
- rval |= MODE_SHELL;
- if (excl && excl != 's')
- usage_excl(1);
- excl = 's';
- break;
- case 'H':
- rval |= MODE_RESET_HOME;
- break;
- case 'P':
- rval |= MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS;
- break;
- case 'S':
- tgetpass_flags |= TGP_STDIN;
- break;
- case '-':
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- if (rval == MODE_RUN)
- rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL);
- return(rval);
- case '\0':
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: '-' requires an argument\n",
- Argv[0]);
- usage(1);
- default:
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Illegal option %s\n", Argv[0],
- NewArgv[0]);
- usage(1);
- }
- NewArgc--;
- NewArgv++;
- }
- if (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & MODE_RUN))
- usage(1);
-
- return(rval);
+ cstat.type = CMD_INVALID;
+ cstat.val = 0;
+
+ sudo_execve(path, argv, envp, uid, &cstat, dowait,
+ ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND));
+
+ switch (cstat.type) {
+ case CMD_ERRNO:
+ /* exec_setup() or execve() returned an error. */
+ warningx("unable to execute %s: %s", path, strerror(cstat.val));
+ exitcode = 127;
+ break;
+ case CMD_WSTATUS:
+ /* Command ran, exited or was killed. */
+ if (WIFEXITED(cstat.val))
+ exitcode = WEXITSTATUS(cstat.val);
+ else if (WIFSIGNALED(cstat.val))
+ exitcode = WTERMSIG(cstat.val) | 128;
+ break;
+ default:
+ warningx("unexpected child termination condition: %d", cstat.type);
+ break;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+ pam_end_session();
+#endif /* HAVE_PAM */
+#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_IO_LOGDIR
+ io_log_close();
+#endif
+ return(exitcode);
}
/*
- * Sanity check sudoers mode/owner/type.
- * Leaves a file pointer to the sudoers file open in ``fp''.
+ * Open sudoers and sanity check mode/owner/type.
+ * Returns a handle to the sudoers file or NULL on error.
*/
-static void
-check_sudoers()
+FILE *
+open_sudoers(sudoers, doedit, keepopen)
+ const char *sudoers;
+ int doedit;
+ int *keepopen;
{
struct stat statbuf;
- int rootstat, i;
- char c;
+ FILE *fp = NULL;
+ int rootstat;
/*
* Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default.
- * Only works if filesystem is readable/writable by root.
+ * Only works if file system is readable/writable by root.
*/
- if ((rootstat = lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
+ if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 &&
(statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) {
- if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: fixed mode on %s\n",
- Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS);
- statbuf.st_mode |= SUDOERS_MODE;
+ if (chmod(sudoers, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
+ warningx("fixed mode on %s", sudoers);
+ SET(statbuf.st_mode, SUDOERS_MODE);
if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) {
- if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: set group on %s\n",
- Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ if (chown(sudoers, (uid_t) -1, SUDOERS_GID) == 0) {
+ warningx("set group on %s", sudoers);
statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID;
- } else {
- (void) fprintf(stderr,"%s: Unable to set group on %s: %s\n",
- Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno));
- }
+ } else
+ warning("unable to set group on %s", sudoers);
}
- } else {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to fix mode on %s: %s\n",
- Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno));
- }
+ } else
+ warning("unable to fix mode on %s", sudoers);
}
/*
* file owner. We already did a stat as root, so use that
* data if we can't stat as sudoers file owner.
*/
- set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS, 0);
+ set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS);
- if (rootstat != 0 && lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0)
- log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf) != 0)
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't stat %s", sudoers);
else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
- log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS);
- else if (statbuf.st_size == 0)
- log_error(0, "%s is zero length", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is not a regular file", sudoers);
else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE)
- log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS,
- (statbuf.st_mode & 07777), SUDOERS_MODE);
+ log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", sudoers,
+ (unsigned int) (statbuf.st_mode & 07777),
+ (unsigned int) SUDOERS_MODE);
else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID)
- log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
- (long) statbuf.st_uid, SUDOERS_UID);
+ log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers,
+ (unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_UID);
else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID)
- log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
- (long) statbuf.st_gid, SUDOERS_GID);
+ log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers,
+ (unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_GID);
+ else if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL)
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't open %s", sudoers);
else {
- /* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */
- for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) {
- errno = 0;
- if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL ||
- fread(&c, sizeof(c), 1, sudoers_fp) != 1) {
- sudoers_fp = NULL;
- if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
- break;
- } else
- break;
- sleep(1);
+ /*
+ * Make sure we can actually read sudoers so we can present the
+ * user with a reasonable error message (unlike the lexer).
+ */
+ if (statbuf.st_size != 0 && fgetc(fp) == EOF) {
+ log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't read %s", sudoers);
+ fclose(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
}
- if (sudoers_fp == NULL)
- log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
}
- set_perms(PERM_ROOT, 0); /* change back to root */
+ if (fp != NULL) {
+ rewind(fp);
+ (void) fcntl(fileno(fp), F_SETFD, 1);
+ }
+
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* change back to root */
+ return(fp);
}
/*
static void
initial_setup()
{
- int fd, maxfd;
-#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+ int miss[3], devnull = -1;
+#if defined(__linux__) || (defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL))
struct rlimit rl;
#endif
- sigaction_t sa;
+#if defined(__linux__)
+ /*
+ * Unlimit the number of processes since Linux's setuid() will
+ * apply resource limits when changing uid and return EAGAIN if
+ * nproc would be violated by the uid switch.
+ */
+ (void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &nproclimit);
+ rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
+ if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl)) {
+ memcpy(&rl, &nproclimit, sizeof(struct rlimit));
+ rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max;
+ (void)setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl);
+ }
+#endif /* __linux__ */
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
/*
* Turn off core dumps.
*/
(void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
- rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = 0;
+ memcpy(&rl, &corelimit, sizeof(struct rlimit));
+ rl.rlim_cur = 0;
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl);
-#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
+#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
/*
- * Close any open fd's other than stdin, stdout and stderr.
+ * stdin, stdout and stderr must be open; set them to /dev/null
+ * if they are closed and close all other fds.
*/
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
- maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) - 1;
-#else
- maxfd = getdtablesize() - 1;
-#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */
-#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl) == 0) {
- if (rl.rlim_max != RLIM_INFINITY && rl.rlim_max <= maxfd)
- maxfd = rl.rlim_max - 1;
+ miss[STDIN_FILENO] = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1;
+ miss[STDOUT_FILENO] = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1;
+ miss[STDERR_FILENO] = fcntl(STDERR_FILENO, F_GETFL, 0) == -1;
+ if (miss[STDIN_FILENO] || miss[STDOUT_FILENO] || miss[STDERR_FILENO]) {
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0644)) == -1)
+ error(1, "unable to open %s", _PATH_DEVNULL);
+ if (miss[STDIN_FILENO] && dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+ error(1, "dup2");
+ if (miss[STDOUT_FILENO] && dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+ error(1, "dup2");
+ if (miss[STDERR_FILENO] && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)
+ error(1, "dup2");
+ if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ close(devnull);
}
-#endif /* RLIMIT_NOFILE */
-
- for (fd = maxfd; fd > STDERR_FILENO; fd--)
- (void) close(fd);
-
- /* Catch children as they die... */
- sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
- sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
- sa.sa_handler = reapchild;
- (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, NULL);
-
- /* Set set_perms pointer to the correct function */
-#if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
- if (sysconf(_SC_SAVED_IDS) == 1 && sysconf(_SC_VERSION) >= 199009)
- set_perms = set_perms_posix;
- else
-#endif
- set_perms = set_perms_fallback;
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
- if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: only root can use -c %s\n",
- Argv[0], login_class);
- exit(1);
- }
+ if (user_uid != 0 &&
+ strcmp(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default, "root") != 0)
+ errorx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class);
} else {
login_class = pw->pw_class;
if (!login_class || !*login_class)
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
+#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H
+static void
+set_project(pw)
+ struct passwd *pw;
+{
+ int errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
+ int errval;
+ struct project proj;
+ struct project *resultp = '\0';
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ /*
+ * Collect the default project for the user and settaskid
+ */
+ setprojent();
+ if (resultp = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &proj, buf, sizeof(buf))) {
+ errval = setproject(resultp->pj_name, pw->pw_name, TASK_NORMAL);
+ if (errval != 0) {
+ switch(errval) {
+ case SETPROJ_ERR_TASK:
+ if (errno == EAGAIN)
+ log_error(errflags, "resource control limit has been reached");
+ else if (errno == ESRCH)
+ log_error(errflags, "user \"%s\" is not a member of "
+ "project \"%s\"", pw->pw_name, resultp->pj_name);
+ else if (errno == EACCES)
+ log_error(errflags, "the invoking task is final");
+ else
+ log_error(errflags, "could not join project \"%s\"",
+ resultp->pj_name);
+ break;
+ case SETPROJ_ERR_POOL:
+ if (errno == EACCES)
+ log_error(errflags, "no resource pool accepting "
+ "default bindings exists for project \"%s\"",
+ resultp->pj_name);
+ else if (errno == ESRCH)
+ log_error(errflags, "specified resource pool does "
+ "not exist for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name);
+ else
+ log_error(errflags, "could not bind to default "
+ "resource pool for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (errval <= 0) {
+ log_error(errflags, "setproject failed for project \"%s\"",
+ resultp->pj_name);
+ } else {
+ log_error(errflags, "warning, resource control assignment "
+ "failed for project \"%s\"", resultp->pj_name);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_error(errflags, "getdefaultproj() error: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+ endprojent();
+}
+#else
+static void
+set_project(pw)
+ struct passwd *pw;
+{
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_PROJECT_H */
+
/*
* Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost.
*/
void
set_fqdn()
{
+#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+ struct addrinfo *res0, hint;
+#else
struct hostent *hp;
+#endif
char *p;
+#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+ zero_bytes(&hint, sizeof(hint));
+ hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+ hint.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
+ if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) {
+#else
if (!(hp = gethostbyname(user_host))) {
+#endif
log_error(MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT,
- "unable to lookup %s via gethostbyname()", user_host);
+ "unable to resolve host %s", user_host);
} else {
if (user_shost != user_host)
- free(user_shost);
- free(user_host);
+ efree(user_shost);
+ efree(user_host);
+#ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+ user_host = estrdup(res0->ai_canonname);
+ freeaddrinfo(res0);
+#else
user_host = estrdup(hp->h_name);
+#endif
}
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
*p = '\0';
}
}
+/*
+ * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as.
+ * By default, this is "root". Updates runas_pw as a side effect.
+ */
+static void
+set_runaspw(user)
+ char *user;
+{
+ if (*user == '#') {
+ if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1))) == NULL)
+ runas_pw = sudo_fakepwnam(user, runas_gr ? runas_gr->gr_gid : 0);
+ } else {
+ if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
+ audit_failure(NewArgv, "unknown user: %s", user);
+ log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown user: %s", user);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get group entry for the group we are going to run commands as.
+ * Updates runas_pw as a side effect.
+ */
+static void
+set_runasgr(group)
+ char *group;
+{
+ if (*group == '#') {
+ if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrgid(atoi(group + 1))) == NULL)
+ runas_gr = sudo_fakegrnam(group);
+ } else {
+ if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrnam(group)) == NULL)
+ log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown group: %s", group);
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as.
- * By default, this is the user invoking sudo...
+ * By default, this is the user invoking sudo. In the most common
+ * case, this matches sudo_user.pw or runas_pw.
*/
static struct passwd *
get_authpw()
{
struct passwd *pw;
- if (def_ival(I_ROOTPW)) {
+ if (def_rootpw) {
if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
- log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!");
- } else if (def_ival(I_RUNASPW)) {
- if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_str(I_RUNAS_DEFAULT))) == NULL)
- log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
- def_str(I_RUNAS_DEFAULT));
- } else if (def_ival(I_TARGETPW)) {
- if (**user_runas == '#') {
- if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1))) == NULL)
- log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
- user_runas);
- } else {
- if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas)) == NULL)
- log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
- user_runas);
- }
+ log_error(0, "unknown uid: 0");
+ } else if (def_runaspw) {
+ if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL)
+ log_error(0, "unknown user: %s", def_runas_default);
+ } else if (def_targetpw) {
+ if (runas_pw->pw_name == NULL)
+ log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown uid: %lu",
+ (unsigned long) runas_pw->pw_uid);
+ pw = runas_pw;
} else
pw = sudo_user.pw;
}
/*
- * Tell which options are mutually exclusive and exit.
+ * Cleanup hook for error()/errorx()
*/
+void
+cleanup(gotsignal)
+ int gotsignal;
+{
+ struct sudo_nss *nss;
+
+ if (!gotsignal) {
+ if (snl != NULL) {
+ tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss)
+ nss->close(nss);
+ }
+#ifdef USING_NONUNIX_GROUPS
+ sudo_nonunix_groupcheck_cleanup();
+#endif
+ sudo_endpwent();
+ sudo_endgrent();
+#ifdef _PATH_SUDO_IO_LOGDIR
+ io_log_close();
+#endif
+ }
+ term_restore(STDIN_FILENO, 0);
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ selinux_restore_tty();
+#endif
+}
+
static void
-usage_excl(exit_val)
- int exit_val;
+show_version()
{
- (void) fprintf(stderr,
- "Only one of the -h, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used\n");
- usage(exit_val);
+ (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", PACKAGE_VERSION);
+ if (getuid() == 0) {
+ putchar('\n');
+ (void) printf("Configure args: %s\n", CONFIGURE_ARGS);
+ (void) printf("Sudoers path: %s\n", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP
+# ifdef _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF
+ (void) printf("nsswitch path: %s\n", _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF);
+# endif
+ (void) printf("ldap.conf path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_CONF);
+ (void) printf("ldap.secret path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_SECRET);
+#endif
+ dump_auth_methods();
+ dump_defaults();
+ dump_interfaces();
+ }
+ exit(0);
}
-/*
- * Give usage message and exit.
- */
+#ifdef USE_ADMIN_FLAG
static void
-usage(exit_val)
- int exit_val;
+create_admin_success_flag()
{
+ struct stat statbuf;
+ char flagfile[PATH_MAX];
+ int fd, n;
+
+ /* Check whether the user is in the admin group. */
+ if (!user_in_group(sudo_user.pw, "admin"))
+ return;
+
+ /* Build path to flag file. */
+ n = snprintf(flagfile, sizeof(flagfile), "%s/.sudo_as_admin_successful",
+ user_dir);
+ if (n <= 0 || n >= sizeof(flagfile))
+ return;
+
+ /* Create admin flag file if it doesn't already exist. */
+ set_perms(PERM_USER);
+ if (stat(flagfile, &statbuf) == 0) {
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
+ return;
+ }
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: sudo -V | -h | -L | -l | -v | -k | -K | %s",
- "[-H] [-P] [-S] [-b] [-p prompt]\n [-u username/#uid] ");
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "[-c class] ");
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "[-a auth_type] ");
-#endif
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "-s | <command>\n");
- exit(exit_val);
+ fd = open(flagfile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0644);
+ close(fd);
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
+}
+#else /* !USE_ADMIN_FLAG */
+static void
+create_admin_success_flag()
+{
+ /* STUB */
}
+#endif /* USE_ADMIN_FLAG */
projects / debian / sudo / blobdiff