/*
- * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
- * All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
- * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * 4. Products derived from this software may not be called "Sudo" nor
- * may "Sudo" appear in their names without specific prior written
- * permission from the author.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
- * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
- * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
- * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
- * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
- * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
- * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
- * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
- * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
- * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
*
* For a brief history of sudo, please see the HISTORY file included
* with this distribution.
*/
-#define _SUDO_SUDO_C
+#define _SUDO_MAIN
+
+#ifdef __TANDEM
+# include <floss.h>
+#endif
#include "config.h"
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
+# include <err.h>
+#else
+# include "emul/err.h"
+#endif /* HAVE_ERR_H */
#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include "version.h"
#ifndef lint
-static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.318 2002/01/15 23:43:59 millert Exp $";
+static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.370 2004/08/24 18:01:13 millert Exp $";
#endif /* lint */
/*
* Prototypes
*/
static int init_vars __P((int));
-static int parse_args __P((void));
+static int parse_args __P((int, char **));
static void check_sudoers __P((void));
static void initial_setup __P((void));
static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *));
static void usage __P((int));
static void usage_excl __P((int));
static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void));
+extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **));
extern void list_matches __P((void));
-extern char **rebuild_env __P((int, char **));
+extern char **rebuild_env __P((char **, int, int));
extern char **zero_env __P((char **));
extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *));
extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t));
+extern struct passwd *sudo_pwdup __P((const struct passwd *));
/*
* Globals
*/
-int Argc;
-char **Argv;
-int NewArgc = 0;
-char **NewArgv = NULL;
+int Argc, NewArgc;
+char **Argv, **NewArgv;
+char *prev_user;
struct sudo_user sudo_user;
struct passwd *auth_pw;
-FILE *sudoers_fp = NULL;
+FILE *sudoers_fp;
struct interface *interfaces;
int num_interfaces;
int tgetpass_flags;
+uid_t timestamp_uid;
extern int errorlineno;
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
static struct rlimit corelimit;
-#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
+#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
char *login_style;
#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
-void (*set_perms) __P((int, int));
+sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp, saved_sa_chld;
+void (*set_perms) __P((int));
int
extern int printmatches;
extern char **environ;
+ Argv = argv;
+ if ((Argc = argc) < 1)
+ usage(1);
+
/* Must be done as the first thing... */
#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
- (void) set_auth_parameters(argc, argv);
+ (void) set_auth_parameters(Argc, Argv);
# ifdef HAVE_INITPRIVS
initprivs();
# endif
/* Zero out the environment. */
environ = zero_env(envp);
- Argv = argv;
- Argc = argc;
-
- if (geteuid() != 0) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, %s must be setuid root.\n", Argv[0]);
- exit(1);
- }
+ if (geteuid() != 0)
+ errx(1, "must be setuid root");
/*
- * Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt
- * us at some point and avoid the logging.
+ * Signal setup:
+ * Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt
+ * us at some point and avoid the logging.
+ * Install handler to wait for children when they exit.
*/
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
- (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saved_sa_int);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &saved_sa_quit);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp);
+ sa.sa_handler = reapchild;
+ (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, &saved_sa_chld);
/*
- * Setup signal handlers, turn off core dumps, and close open files.
+ * Turn off core dumps, close open files and setup set_perms().
*/
initial_setup();
setpwent();
/* Parse our arguments. */
- sudo_mode = parse_args();
+ sudo_mode = parse_args(Argc, Argv);
/* Setup defaults data structures. */
init_defaults();
load_interfaces();
pwflag = 0;
- if (sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL))
user_cmnd = "shell";
+ else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
+ user_cmnd = "sudoedit";
else
switch (sudo_mode) {
case MODE_VERSION:
dump_auth_methods();
dump_defaults();
dump_interfaces();
- dump_badenv();
}
exit(0);
break;
break;
case MODE_VALIDATE:
user_cmnd = "validate";
- pwflag = I_VERIFYPW_I;
+ pwflag = I_VERIFYPW;
break;
case MODE_KILL:
case MODE_INVALIDATE:
break;
case MODE_LIST:
user_cmnd = "list";
- pwflag = I_LISTPW_I;
+ pwflag = I_LISTPW;
printmatches = 1;
break;
}
cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode);
- check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP
+ validated = sudo_ldap_check(pwflag);
+
+ /* Skip reading /etc/sudoers if LDAP told us to */
+ if (def_ignore_local_sudoers); /* skips */
+ else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && !printmatches); /* skips */
+ else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && printmatches)
+ {
+ check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
- /* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */
- validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
+ /* User is found in LDAP and we want a list of all sudo commands the
+ * user can do, so consult sudoers but throw away result.
+ */
+ sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ {
+ check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
+
+ /* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */
+ validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
+ }
/*
- * If we have POSIX saved uids and the stay_setuid flag was not set,
- * set the real, effective and saved uids to 0 and use set_perms_fallback()
+ * If we are using set_perms_posix() and the stay_setuid flag was not set,
+ * set the real, effective and saved uids to 0 and use set_perms_nosuid()
* instead of set_perms_posix().
*/
-#if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
- if (!def_flag(I_STAY_SETUID) && set_perms == set_perms_posix) {
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && !defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && \
+ !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
+ if (!def_stay_setuid && set_perms == set_perms_posix) {
if (setuid(0)) {
perror("setuid(0)");
exit(1);
}
- set_perms = set_perms_fallback;
+ set_perms = set_perms_nosuid;
}
#endif
/*
- * Look up runas user passwd struct. If we are given a uid then
- * there may be no corresponding passwd(5) entry (which is OK).
+ * Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
*/
- if (**user_runas == '#') {
- runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1));
- if (runas_pw == NULL) {
- runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd));
- (void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd));
- runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(*user_runas + 1);
- }
- } else {
- runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas);
- if (runas_pw == NULL)
- log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", *user_runas);
+ if (def_timestampowner) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ if (*def_timestampowner == '#')
+ pw = getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
+ else
+ pw = getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
+ if (!pw)
+ log_error(0, "timestamp owner (%s): No such user",
+ def_timestampowner);
+ timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
}
/* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */
exit(0);
}
- if (validated & VALIDATE_ERROR)
+ if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR))
log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
errorlineno);
/* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
- if (user_uid == 0 && !def_flag(I_ROOT_SUDO)) {
- (void) fputs("You are already root, you don't need to use sudo.\n",
- stderr);
+ if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
+ (void) fprintf(stderr,
+ "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n",
+ getprogname());
exit(1);
}
/* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */
- if (sudo_mode & MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS)
- def_flag(I_PRESERVE_GROUPS) = TRUE;
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS))
+ def_preserve_groups = TRUE;
/* If no command line args and "set_home" is not set, error out. */
- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_flag(I_SHELL_NOARGS))
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs)
usage(1);
/* May need to set $HOME to target user if we are running a command. */
- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN) && (def_flag(I_ALWAYS_SET_HOME) ||
- ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL) && def_flag(I_SET_HOME))))
- sudo_mode |= MODE_RESET_HOME;
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && (def_always_set_home ||
+ (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL) && def_set_home)))
+ SET(sudo_mode, MODE_RESET_HOME);
/* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
- if (def_flag(I_REQUIRETTY)) {
+ if (def_requiretty) {
if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo");
else
/* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */
auth_pw = get_authpw();
- /* Require a password unless the NOPASS tag was set. */
- if (!(validated & FLAG_NOPASS))
- check_user();
+ /* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
+ if (!ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOPASS))
+ check_user(ISSET(validated, FLAG_CHECK_USER));
- /* Build up custom environment that avoids any nasty bits. */
- new_environ = rebuild_env(sudo_mode, envp);
+ /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
+ if (user_uid == 0 && prev_user != NULL && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
+ struct passwd *pw;
- if (validated & VALIDATE_OK) {
+ if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) {
+ free(sudo_user.pw);
+ sudo_user.pw = pw;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits if we have a cmnd. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN))
+ new_environ = rebuild_env(envp, sudo_mode, ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOEXEC));
+ else
+ new_environ = envp;
+
+ if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
+ warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
exit(1);
} else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0],
- user_cmnd);
+ warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
exit(1);
}
exit(0);
else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) {
list_matches();
+#ifdef HAVE_LDAP
+ sudo_ldap_list_matches();
+#endif
exit(0);
}
"please report this error at http://courtesan.com/sudo/bugs/");
}
- /* Reset signal handlers before we exec. */
- sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
- sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
- sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
- (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, NULL);
- (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL);
-
/* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */
- if (def_ival(I_UMASK) != 0777)
- (void) umask(def_mode(I_UMASK));
+ if (def_umask != 0777)
+ (void) umask(def_umask);
/* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
-#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
+#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
- /* Become specified user or root. */
- set_perms(PERM_RUNAS, sudo_mode);
+ /* Become specified user or root if executing a command. */
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN))
+ set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS);
/* Close the password and group files */
endpwent();
endgrent();
- /* Install the new environment. */
+ /* Install the real environment. */
environ = new_environ;
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ char *p;
+
+ /* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */
+ if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL)
+ p = NewArgv[0];
+ *p = '-';
+ NewArgv[0] = p;
+
+ /* Change to target user's homedir. */
+ if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1)
+ warn("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir);
+ }
+
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
+ exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv));
+
+ /* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */
+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &saved_sa_chld, NULL);
+
#ifndef PROFILING
- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0)
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0)
exit(0);
else
- EXEC(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */
+ EXECV(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */
#else
exit(0);
#endif /* PROFILING */
/*
* If we got here then the exec() failed...
*/
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: unable to exec %s: %s\n",
- Argv[0], safe_cmnd, strerror(errno));
+ warn("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd);
exit(127);
- } else if ((validated & FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
+ } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
log_auth(validated, 1);
exit(1);
- } else if (validated & VALIDATE_NOT_OK) {
- if (def_flag(I_PATH_INFO)) {
+ } else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_NOT_OK)) {
+ if (def_path_info) {
/*
* We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can
* *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd
log_auth(validated,
!(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND));
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: command not found\n", Argv[0],
- user_cmnd);
+ warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.\n", Argv[0], user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
+ warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
} else {
/* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */
log_auth(validated, 1);
int nohostname, rval;
/* Sanity check command from user. */
- if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= MAXPATHLEN) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: Pathname too long\n", Argv[0],
- NewArgv[0]);
- exit(1);
- }
+ if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX)
+ errx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]);
#ifdef HAVE_TZSET
(void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */
/* Default value for cmnd and cwd, overridden later. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL)
user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
- (void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown");
+ (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
/*
* We avoid gethostbyname() if possible since we don't want
user_host = user_shost = "localhost";
else {
user_host = estrdup(thost);
- if (def_flag(I_FQDN)) {
+ if (def_fqdn) {
/* Defer call to set_fqdn() until log_error() is safe. */
user_shost = user_host;
} else {
char pw_name[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1];
pw.pw_uid = getuid();
- (void) sprintf(pw_name, "%ld", (long) pw.pw_uid);
+ (void) snprintf(pw_name, sizeof(pw_name), "%lu",
+ (unsigned long) pw.pw_uid);
pw.pw_name = pw_name;
sudo_user.pw = &pw;
- log_error(0, "uid %ld does not exist in the passwd file!",
- (long) pw.pw_uid);
+ /*
+ * If we are in -k/-K mode, just spew to stderr. It is not unusual for
+ * users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout file which can cause sudo to
+ * be run during reboot after the YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died.
+ */
+ if (sudo_mode & (MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_KILL))
+ errx(1, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name);
+ log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name);
}
if (user_shell == NULL || *user_shell == '\0')
user_shell = sudo_user.pw->pw_shell;
/* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */
- /*
- * Must defer set_fqdn() until it is safe to call log_error()
- */
- if (def_flag(I_FQDN))
- set_fqdn();
+ if (def_fqdn)
+ set_fqdn(); /* may call log_error() */
if (nohostname)
log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname");
+ set_runaspw(*user_runas); /* may call log_error() */
+ if (*user_runas[0] == '#' && runas_pw->pw_name && runas_pw->pw_name[0])
+ *user_runas = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_name);
+
/*
* Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root.
*/
- set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode);
+ set_perms(PERM_USER);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
- set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Can't get working directory!\n",
- Argv[0]);
- (void) strcpy(user_cwd, "unknown");
+ warnx("cannot get working directory");
+ (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
}
} else
- set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
/*
- * If we were given the '-s' option (run shell) we need to redo
+ * If we were given the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options we need to redo
* NewArgv and NewArgc.
*/
- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) {
+ if ((sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) {
char **dst, **src = NewArgv;
- NewArgv = (char **) emalloc (sizeof(char *) * (++NewArgc + 1));
- if (user_shell && *user_shell) {
+ NewArgv = (char **) emalloc2((++NewArgc + 1), sizeof(char *));
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
+ NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit";
+ else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))
+ NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell;
+ else if (user_shell && *user_shell)
NewArgv[0] = user_shell;
- } else {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to determine shell.", Argv[0]);
- exit(1);
- }
+ else
+ errx(1, "unable to determine shell");
- /* copy the args from Argv */
+ /* copy the args from NewArgv */
for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst)
;
}
set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw);
/* Resolve the path and return. */
- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_RUN)) {
- /* XXX - should call this as runas user, not root. */
- rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_path);
- if (rval != FOUND) {
- /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */
- set_perms(PERM_USER, sudo_mode);
- rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_path);
- set_perms(PERM_ROOT, sudo_mode);
+ rval = FOUND;
+ user_stat = emalloc(sizeof(struct stat));
+ if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) {
+ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) {
+ /* XXX - default_runas may be modified during parsing of sudoers */
+ set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
+ rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path);
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
+ if (rval != FOUND) {
+ /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */
+ set_perms(PERM_USER);
+ rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path);
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
+ }
}
/* set user_args */
if (NewArgc > 1) {
char *to, **from;
- size_t size;
+ size_t size, n;
- /* If MODE_SHELL not set then NewArgv is contiguous so just count */
- if (!(sudo_mode & MODE_SHELL)) {
+ /* If we didn't realloc NewArgv it is contiguous so just count. */
+ if (!(sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) {
size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) +
strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1;
} else {
size += strlen(*from) + 1;
}
- /* alloc and copy. */
- to = user_args = (char *) emalloc(size);
- for (from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) {
- (void) strcpy(to, *from);
- to += strlen(*from);
+ /* Alloc and build up user_args. */
+ user_args = (char *) emalloc(size);
+ for (to = user_args, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) {
+ n = strlcpy(to, *from, size - (to - user_args));
+ if (n >= size - (to - user_args))
+ errx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow");
+ to += n;
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '\0';
}
- } else
- rval = FOUND;
+ }
+ if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL)
+ user_base++;
+ else
+ user_base = user_cmnd;
return(rval);
}
* Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3).
*/
static int
-parse_args()
+parse_args(argc, argv)
+ int argc;
+ char **argv;
{
- int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is suod to be run in? */
+ int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is sudo to be run in? */
int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */
- NewArgv = Argv + 1;
- NewArgc = Argc - 1;
+ NewArgv = argv + 1;
+ NewArgc = argc - 1;
- if (NewArgc == 0) { /* no options and no command */
- rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL);
+ /* First, check to see if we were invoked as "sudoedit". */
+ if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) {
+ rval = MODE_EDIT;
+ excl = 'e';
+ } else
+ rval = MODE_RUN;
+
+ if (NewArgc == 0 && rval == MODE_RUN) { /* no options and no command */
+ SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
return(rval);
}
while (NewArgc > 0 && NewArgv[0][0] == '-') {
- if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0') {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Please use single character options\n",
- Argv[0]);
- usage(1);
- }
+ if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0')
+ warnx("please use single character options");
switch (NewArgv[0][1]) {
case 'p':
user_prompt = NewArgv[1];
- /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
user_runas = &NewArgv[1];
- /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
login_style = NewArgv[1];
- /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
usage(1);
login_class = NewArgv[1];
- def_flag(I_USE_LOGINCLASS) = TRUE;
+ def_use_loginclass = TRUE;
- /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
#endif
case 'b':
- rval |= MODE_BACKGROUND;
+ SET(rval, MODE_BACKGROUND);
+ break;
+ case 'e':
+ rval = MODE_EDIT;
+ if (excl && excl != 'e')
+ usage_excl(1);
+ excl = 'e';
break;
case 'v':
rval = MODE_VALIDATE;
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'v';
break;
+ case 'i':
+ SET(rval, (MODE_LOGIN_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
+ def_env_reset = TRUE;
+ if (excl && excl != 'i')
+ usage_excl(1);
+ excl = 'i';
+ break;
case 'k':
rval = MODE_INVALIDATE;
if (excl && excl != 'k')
excl = 'h';
break;
case 's':
- rval |= MODE_SHELL;
+ SET(rval, MODE_SHELL);
if (excl && excl != 's')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 's';
break;
case 'H':
- rval |= MODE_RESET_HOME;
+ SET(rval, MODE_RESET_HOME);
break;
case 'P':
- rval |= MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS;
+ SET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS);
break;
case 'S':
- tgetpass_flags |= TGP_STDIN;
+ SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN);
break;
case '-':
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
if (rval == MODE_RUN)
- rval |= (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL);
+ SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
return(rval);
case '\0':
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: '-' requires an argument\n",
- Argv[0]);
+ warnx("'-' requires an argument");
usage(1);
default:
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Illegal option %s\n", Argv[0],
- NewArgv[0]);
+ warnx("illegal option `%s'", NewArgv[0]);
usage(1);
}
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
}
- if (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & MODE_RUN))
+ if ((NewArgc == 0 && (rval & MODE_EDIT)) ||
+ (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT))))
usage(1);
return(rval);
/*
* Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default.
- * Only works if filesystem is readable/writable by root.
+ * Only works if file system is readable/writable by root.
*/
- if ((rootstat = lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
+ if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 &&
(statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) {
if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: fixed mode on %s\n",
- Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS);
- statbuf.st_mode |= SUDOERS_MODE;
+ warnx("fixed mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ SET(statbuf.st_mode, SUDOERS_MODE);
if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) {
if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: set group on %s\n",
- Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS);
+ warnx("set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID;
- } else {
- (void) fprintf(stderr,"%s: Unable to set group on %s: %s\n",
- Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno));
- }
+ } else
+ warn("unable to set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
}
- } else {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: Unable to fix mode on %s: %s\n",
- Argv[0], _PATH_SUDOERS, strerror(errno));
- }
+ } else
+ warn("unable to fix mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
}
/*
* file owner. We already did a stat as root, so use that
* data if we can't stat as sudoers file owner.
*/
- set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS, 0);
+ set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS);
- if (rootstat != 0 && lstat(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0)
+ if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0)
log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS);
log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS,
(statbuf.st_mode & 07777), SUDOERS_MODE);
else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID)
- log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
- (long) statbuf.st_uid, SUDOERS_UID);
+ log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS,
+ (unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, SUDOERS_UID);
else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID)
- log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %ld, should be %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
- (long) statbuf.st_gid, SUDOERS_GID);
+ log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS,
+ (unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, SUDOERS_GID);
else {
/* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */
for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) {
log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
}
- set_perms(PERM_ROOT, 0); /* change back to root */
+ set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* change back to root */
}
/*
static void
initial_setup()
{
- int fd, maxfd;
-#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
struct rlimit rl;
-#endif
- sigaction_t sa;
-#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
/*
* Turn off core dumps.
*/
(void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
- rl.rlim_cur = rl.rlim_max = 0;
+ memcpy(&rl, &corelimit, sizeof(struct rlimit));
+ rl.rlim_cur = 0;
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl);
-#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE */
+#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
+
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
/*
- * Close any open fd's other than stdin, stdout and stderr.
+ * Make set_perms point to the correct function.
+ * If we are using setresuid() or setreuid() we only need to set this
+ * once. If we are using POSIX saved uids we will switch to
+ * set_perms_nosuid after sudoers has been parsed if the "stay_suid"
+ * option is not set.
*/
-#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
- maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) - 1;
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+ set_perms = set_perms_suid;
#else
- maxfd = getdtablesize() - 1;
-#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */
-#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl) == 0) {
- if (rl.rlim_max != RLIM_INFINITY && rl.rlim_max <= maxfd)
- maxfd = rl.rlim_max - 1;
- }
-#endif /* RLIMIT_NOFILE */
-
- for (fd = maxfd; fd > STDERR_FILENO; fd--)
- (void) close(fd);
-
- /* Catch children as they die... */
- sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
- sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
- sa.sa_handler = reapchild;
- (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, NULL);
-
- /* Set set_perms pointer to the correct function */
-#if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
+# if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
if (sysconf(_SC_SAVED_IDS) == 1 && sysconf(_SC_VERSION) >= 199009)
set_perms = set_perms_posix;
else
-#endif
- set_perms = set_perms_fallback;
+# endif
+ set_perms = set_perms_nosuid;
+#endif /* HAVE_SETRESUID || HAVE_SETREUID */
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
- if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0) {
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "%s: only root can use -c %s\n",
- Argv[0], login_class);
- exit(1);
- }
+ if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0)
+ errx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class);
} else {
login_class = pw->pw_class;
if (!login_class || !*login_class)
}
}
+/*
+ * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as.
+ * By default, this is "root". Updates runas_pw as a side effect.
+ */
+int
+set_runaspw(user)
+ char *user;
+{
+ if (runas_pw != NULL) {
+ if (user_runas != &def_runas_default)
+ return(TRUE); /* don't override -u option */
+ free(runas_pw);
+ }
+ if (*user == '#') {
+ runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1));
+ if (runas_pw == NULL) {
+ runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd));
+ (void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd));
+ runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(user + 1);
+ }
+ } else {
+ runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user);
+ if (runas_pw == NULL)
+ log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", user);
+ }
+ return(TRUE);
+}
+
/*
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as.
- * By default, this is the user invoking sudo...
+ * By default, this is the user invoking sudo. In the most common
+ * case, this matches sudo_user.pw or runas_pw.
*/
static struct passwd *
get_authpw()
{
struct passwd *pw;
- if (def_ival(I_ROOTPW)) {
- if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
+ if (def_rootpw) {
+ if (runas_pw->pw_uid == 0)
+ pw = runas_pw;
+ else if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!");
- } else if (def_ival(I_RUNASPW)) {
- if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_str(I_RUNAS_DEFAULT))) == NULL)
+ } else if (def_runaspw) {
+ if (strcmp(def_runas_default, *user_runas) == 0)
+ pw = runas_pw;
+ else if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL)
log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
- def_str(I_RUNAS_DEFAULT));
- } else if (def_ival(I_TARGETPW)) {
- if (**user_runas == '#') {
- if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(*user_runas + 1))) == NULL)
- log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
- user_runas);
- } else {
- if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(*user_runas)) == NULL)
- log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
- user_runas);
- }
+ def_runas_default);
+ } else if (def_targetpw) {
+ if (runas_pw->pw_name == NULL)
+ log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %lu!",
+ runas_pw->pw_uid);
+ pw = runas_pw;
} else
pw = sudo_user.pw;
usage_excl(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
- (void) fprintf(stderr,
- "Only one of the -h, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used\n");
+ warnx("Only one of the -e, -h, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used");
usage(exit_val);
}
usage(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
-
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: sudo -V | -h | -L | -l | -v | -k | -K | %s",
- "[-H] [-P] [-S] [-b] [-p prompt]\n [-u username/#uid] ");
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "[-c class] ");
-#endif
+ char **p;
+ int linelen, linemax, ulen;
+ static char *uvec[] = {
+ " [-HPSb]",
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "[-a auth_type] ");
+ " [-a auth_type]",
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+ " [-c class|-]",
#endif
- (void) fprintf(stderr, "-s | <command>\n");
+ " [-p prompt]",
+ " [-u username|#uid]",
+ " { -e file [...] | -i | -s | <command> }",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * For sudoedit, replace the last entry in the usage vector.
+ * For sudo, print the secondary usage.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) {
+ /* Replace the last entry in the usage vector. */
+ for (p = uvec; p[1] != NULL; p++)
+ continue;
+ *p = " file [...]";
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -K | -L | -V | -h | -k | -l | -v\n",
+ getprogname());
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Print the main usage and wrap lines as needed.
+ * Assumes an 80-character wide terminal, which is kind of bogus...
+ */
+ ulen = (int)strlen(getprogname()) + 7;
+ linemax = 80;
+ linelen = linemax - ulen;
+ printf("usage: %s", getprogname());
+ for (p = uvec; *p != NULL; p++) {
+ if (linelen == linemax || (linelen -= strlen(*p)) >= 0) {
+ fputs(*p, stdout);
+ } else {
+ p--;
+ linelen = linemax;
+ printf("\n%*s", ulen, "");
+ }
+ }
+ putchar('\n');
exit(exit_val);
}
projects / debian / sudo / blobdiff