2 * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
4 * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
5 * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
6 * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
8 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
9 * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
10 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
11 * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
12 * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
13 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
14 * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
16 * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
17 * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
18 * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
20 * For a brief history of sudo, please see the HISTORY file included
21 * with this distribution.
32 #include <sys/types.h>
34 #include <sys/param.h>
35 #include <sys/socket.h>
37 # include <sys/time.h>
38 # include <sys/resource.h>
48 #endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
50 # if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_H) && !defined(STDC_HEADERS)
55 # ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
58 #endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
61 #endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
65 # include "emul/err.h"
66 #endif /* HAVE_ERR_H */
73 #include <netinet/in.h>
75 #if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
78 # include <hpsecurity.h>
80 # include <sys/security.h>
83 #endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
84 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
85 # include <login_cap.h>
86 # ifndef LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS
87 # define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon"
92 #include "interfaces.h"
96 static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.370 2004/08/24 18:01:13 millert Exp $";
102 static int init_vars __P((int));
103 static int parse_args __P((int, char **));
104 static void check_sudoers __P((void));
105 static void initial_setup __P((void));
106 static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *));
107 static void usage __P((int));
108 static void usage_excl __P((int));
109 static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void));
110 extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **));
111 extern void list_matches __P((void));
112 extern char **rebuild_env __P((char **, int, int));
113 extern char **zero_env __P((char **));
114 extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *));
115 extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t));
116 extern struct passwd *sudo_pwdup __P((const struct passwd *));
122 char **Argv, **NewArgv;
124 struct sudo_user sudo_user;
125 struct passwd *auth_pw;
127 struct interface *interfaces;
131 extern int errorlineno;
132 #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
133 static struct rlimit corelimit;
134 #endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
135 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
137 #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
138 #ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
140 #endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
141 sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp, saved_sa_chld;
142 void (*set_perms) __P((int));
146 main(argc, argv, envp)
158 extern int printmatches;
159 extern char **environ;
162 if ((Argc = argc) < 1)
165 /* Must be done as the first thing... */
166 #if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
167 (void) set_auth_parameters(Argc, Argv);
168 # ifdef HAVE_INITPRIVS
171 #endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
173 /* Zero out the environment. */
174 environ = zero_env(envp);
177 errx(1, "must be setuid root");
181 * Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt
182 * us at some point and avoid the logging.
183 * Install handler to wait for children when they exit.
185 sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
186 sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
187 sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
188 (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saved_sa_int);
189 (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &saved_sa_quit);
190 (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp);
191 sa.sa_handler = reapchild;
192 (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, &saved_sa_chld);
195 * Turn off core dumps, close open files and setup set_perms().
200 /* Parse our arguments. */
201 sudo_mode = parse_args(Argc, Argv);
203 /* Setup defaults data structures. */
206 /* Load the list of local ip addresses and netmasks. */
210 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL))
212 else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
213 user_cmnd = "sudoedit";
217 (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version);
230 user_cmnd = "validate";
234 case MODE_INVALIDATE:
249 /* Must have a command to run... */
250 if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0)
253 cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode);
256 validated = sudo_ldap_check(pwflag);
258 /* Skip reading /etc/sudoers if LDAP told us to */
259 if (def_ignore_local_sudoers); /* skips */
260 else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && !printmatches); /* skips */
261 else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && printmatches)
263 check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
265 /* User is found in LDAP and we want a list of all sudo commands the
266 * user can do, so consult sudoers but throw away result.
268 sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
273 check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
275 /* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */
276 validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
278 if (safe_cmnd == NULL)
279 safe_cmnd = user_cmnd;
282 * If we are using set_perms_posix() and the stay_setuid flag was not set,
283 * set the real, effective and saved uids to 0 and use set_perms_nosuid()
284 * instead of set_perms_posix().
286 #if !defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && !defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && \
287 !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
288 if (!def_stay_setuid && set_perms == set_perms_posix) {
293 set_perms = set_perms_nosuid;
298 * Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
300 if (def_timestampowner) {
303 if (*def_timestampowner == '#')
304 pw = getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
306 pw = getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
308 log_error(0, "timestamp owner (%s): No such user",
310 timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
313 /* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */
314 if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) {
315 remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL));
319 if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR))
320 log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
323 /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
324 if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
325 (void) fprintf(stderr,
326 "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n",
331 /* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */
332 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS))
333 def_preserve_groups = TRUE;
335 /* If no command line args and "set_home" is not set, error out. */
336 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs)
339 /* May need to set $HOME to target user if we are running a command. */
340 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && (def_always_set_home ||
341 (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL) && def_set_home)))
342 SET(sudo_mode, MODE_RESET_HOME);
344 /* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
345 if (def_requiretty) {
346 if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
347 log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo");
352 /* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */
353 auth_pw = get_authpw();
355 /* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
356 if (!ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOPASS))
357 check_user(ISSET(validated, FLAG_CHECK_USER));
359 /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
360 if (user_uid == 0 && prev_user != NULL && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
363 if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) {
369 /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits if we have a cmnd. */
370 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN))
371 new_environ = rebuild_env(envp, sudo_mode, ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOEXEC));
375 if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
376 /* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
377 if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
378 warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
380 } else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
381 warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
385 log_auth(validated, 1);
386 if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE)
388 else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) {
391 sudo_ldap_list_matches();
396 /* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */
397 if (def_umask != 0777)
398 (void) umask(def_umask);
400 /* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */
401 #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
402 (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
403 #endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
405 /* Become specified user or root if executing a command. */
406 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN))
407 set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS);
409 /* Close the password and group files */
413 /* Install the real environment. */
414 environ = new_environ;
416 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
419 /* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */
420 if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL)
425 /* Change to target user's homedir. */
426 if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1)
427 warn("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir);
430 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
431 exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv));
433 /* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */
434 (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL);
435 (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL);
436 (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL);
437 (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &saved_sa_chld, NULL);
440 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0)
443 EXECV(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */
446 #endif /* PROFILING */
448 * If we got here then the exec() failed...
450 warn("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd);
452 } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
453 log_auth(validated, 1);
455 } else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_NOT_OK)) {
458 * We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can
459 * *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd
460 * have to say "not allowed to run foo" even when the problem
461 * is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set
462 * their path to just contain a single dir.
465 !(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND));
466 if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
467 warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
468 else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
469 warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
471 /* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */
472 log_auth(validated, 1);
476 /* should never get here */
477 log_auth(validated, 1);
480 exit(0); /* not reached */
484 * Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and
485 * load the ``interfaces'' array.
491 char *p, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
492 int nohostname, rval;
494 /* Sanity check command from user. */
495 if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX)
496 errx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]);
499 (void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */
500 #endif /* HAVE_TZSET */
502 /* Default value for cmnd and cwd, overridden later. */
503 if (user_cmnd == NULL)
504 user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
505 (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
508 * We avoid gethostbyname() if possible since we don't want
509 * sudo to block if DNS or NIS is hosed.
510 * "host" is the (possibly fully-qualified) hostname and
511 * "shost" is the unqualified form of the hostname.
513 sudo_user.host_fqdn_queried = FALSE;
514 nohostname = gethostname(thost, sizeof(thost));
516 user_host = user_shost = "localhost";
518 user_host = estrdup(thost);
519 if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
521 user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
524 user_shost = user_host;
528 if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO))) {
529 if (strncmp(p, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
530 p += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
531 user_tty = estrdup(p);
533 user_tty = "unknown";
536 * Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password
537 * if necessary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we
538 * can read the shadow passwd file if necessary.
540 if ((sudo_user.pw = sudo_getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
541 /* Need to make a fake struct passwd for logging to work. */
543 char pw_name[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1];
545 pw.pw_uid = getuid();
546 (void) snprintf(pw_name, sizeof(pw_name), "%lu",
547 (unsigned long) pw.pw_uid);
548 pw.pw_name = pw_name;
552 * If we are in -k/-K mode, just spew to stderr. It is not unusual for
553 * users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout file which can cause sudo to
554 * be run during reboot after the YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died.
556 if (sudo_mode & (MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_KILL))
557 errx(1, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name);
558 log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name);
560 if (user_shell == NULL || *user_shell == '\0')
561 user_shell = sudo_user.pw->pw_shell;
563 /* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */
566 log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname");
568 /* We don't query FQDN yet, it might get disabled later. Querying is done
569 * when host matching is executed and def_fqdn still true */
571 set_runaspw(*user_runas); /* may call log_error() */
572 if (*user_runas[0] == '#' && runas_pw->pw_name && runas_pw->pw_name[0])
573 *user_runas = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_name);
576 * Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root.
578 set_perms(PERM_USER);
579 if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
580 set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
581 if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
582 warnx("cannot get working directory");
583 (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
586 set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
589 * If we were given the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options we need to redo
590 * NewArgv and NewArgc.
592 if ((sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) {
593 char **dst, **src = NewArgv;
595 NewArgv = (char **) emalloc2((++NewArgc + 1), sizeof(char *));
596 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
597 NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit";
598 else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))
599 NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell;
600 else if (user_shell && *user_shell)
601 NewArgv[0] = user_shell;
603 errx(1, "unable to determine shell");
605 /* copy the args from NewArgv */
606 for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst)
610 /* Set login class if applicable. */
611 set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw);
613 /* Resolve the path and return. */
615 user_stat = emalloc(sizeof(struct stat));
616 if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) {
617 if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) {
618 /* XXX - default_runas may be modified during parsing of sudoers */
619 set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
620 rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path);
621 set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
623 /* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */
624 set_perms(PERM_USER);
625 rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path);
626 set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
635 /* If we didn't realloc NewArgv it is contiguous so just count. */
636 if (!(sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) {
637 size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) +
638 strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1;
640 for (size = 0, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++)
641 size += strlen(*from) + 1;
644 /* Alloc and build up user_args. */
645 user_args = (char *) emalloc(size);
646 for (to = user_args, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) {
647 n = strlcpy(to, *from, size - (to - user_args));
648 if (n >= size - (to - user_args))
649 errx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow");
656 if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL)
659 user_base = user_cmnd;
665 * Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3).
668 parse_args(argc, argv)
672 int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is sudo to be run in? */
673 int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */
678 /* First, check to see if we were invoked as "sudoedit". */
679 if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) {
685 if (NewArgc == 0 && rval == MODE_RUN) { /* no options and no command */
686 SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
690 /* New default: reset the environment */
691 def_env_reset = TRUE;
692 while (NewArgc > 0 && NewArgv[0][0] == '-') {
693 if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0')
694 warnx("please use single character options");
696 switch (NewArgv[0][1]) {
698 /* Must have an associated prompt. */
699 if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
702 user_prompt = NewArgv[1];
708 /* Must have an associated runas user. */
709 if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
712 user_runas = &NewArgv[1];
717 #ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
719 /* Must have an associated authentication style. */
720 if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
723 login_style = NewArgv[1];
729 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
731 /* Must have an associated login class. */
732 if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
735 login_class = NewArgv[1];
736 def_use_loginclass = TRUE;
743 SET(rval, MODE_BACKGROUND);
747 if (excl && excl != 'e')
752 rval = MODE_VALIDATE;
753 if (excl && excl != 'v')
758 SET(rval, (MODE_LOGIN_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
759 def_env_reset = TRUE;
760 if (excl && excl != 'i')
765 rval = MODE_INVALIDATE;
766 if (excl && excl != 'k')
772 if (excl && excl != 'K')
777 rval = MODE_LISTDEFS;
778 if (excl && excl != 'L')
784 if (excl && excl != 'l')
790 if (excl && excl != 'V')
796 if (excl && excl != 'h')
801 SET(rval, MODE_SHELL);
802 if (excl && excl != 's')
807 SET(rval, MODE_RESET_HOME);
810 SET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS);
813 SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN);
818 if (rval == MODE_RUN)
819 SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
822 warnx("'-' requires an argument");
825 warnx("illegal option `%s'", NewArgv[0]);
832 if (user_runas != NULL && !ISSET(rval, (MODE_EDIT|MODE_RUN))) {
834 warnx("the `-u' and '-%c' options may not be used together", excl);
838 if ((NewArgc == 0 && (rval & MODE_EDIT)) ||
839 (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT))))
846 * Sanity check sudoers mode/owner/type.
847 * Leaves a file pointer to the sudoers file open in ``fp''.
857 * Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default.
858 * Only works if file system is readable/writable by root.
860 if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
861 SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 &&
862 (statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) {
864 if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
865 warnx("fixed mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
866 SET(statbuf.st_mode, SUDOERS_MODE);
867 if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) {
868 if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) {
869 warnx("set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
870 statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID;
872 warn("unable to set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
875 warn("unable to fix mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
879 * Sanity checks on sudoers file. Must be done as sudoers
880 * file owner. We already did a stat as root, so use that
881 * data if we can't stat as sudoers file owner.
883 set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS);
885 if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0)
886 log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
887 else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
888 log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS);
889 else if (statbuf.st_size == 0)
890 log_error(0, "%s is zero length", _PATH_SUDOERS);
891 else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE)
892 log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS,
893 (statbuf.st_mode & 07777), SUDOERS_MODE);
894 else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID)
895 log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS,
896 (unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_UID);
897 else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID)
898 log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS,
899 (unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_GID);
901 /* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */
902 for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) {
904 if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL ||
905 fread(&c, sizeof(c), 1, sudoers_fp) != 1) {
907 if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
913 if (sudoers_fp == NULL)
914 log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
917 set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* change back to root */
921 * Close all open files (except std*) and turn off core dumps.
922 * Also sets the set_perms() pointer to the correct function.
927 #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
931 * Turn off core dumps.
933 (void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
934 memcpy(&rl, &corelimit, sizeof(struct rlimit));
936 (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl);
937 #endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
939 closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
942 * Make set_perms point to the correct function.
943 * If we are using setresuid() or setreuid() we only need to set this
944 * once. If we are using POSIX saved uids we will switch to
945 * set_perms_nosuid after sudoers has been parsed if the "stay_suid"
948 #if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
949 set_perms = set_perms_suid;
951 # if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
952 if (sysconf(_SC_SAVED_IDS) == 1 && sysconf(_SC_VERSION) >= 199009)
953 set_perms = set_perms_posix;
956 set_perms = set_perms_nosuid;
957 #endif /* HAVE_SETRESUID || HAVE_SETREUID */
960 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
968 * Don't make it a fatal error if the user didn't specify the login
969 * class themselves. We do this because if login.conf gets
970 * corrupted we want the admin to be able to use sudo to fix it.
973 errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY;
975 errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
977 if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
978 if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0)
979 errx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class);
981 login_class = pw->pw_class;
982 if (!login_class || !*login_class)
984 (pw->pw_uid == 0) ? LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS : LOGIN_DEFCLASS;
987 lc = login_getclass(login_class);
988 if (!lc || !lc->lc_class || strcmp(lc->lc_class, login_class) != 0) {
989 log_error(errflags, "unknown login class: %s", login_class);
991 lc = login_getclass(NULL); /* needed for login_getstyle() later */
1000 #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
1003 * Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost.
1011 if (!def_fqdn || sudo_user.host_fqdn_queried) {
1012 /* Only querying just once is good enough */
1016 if (!(hp = gethostbyname(user_host))) {
1017 log_error(MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT,
1018 "unable to lookup %s via gethostbyname()", user_host);
1020 if (user_shost != user_host)
1023 user_host = estrdup(hp->h_name);
1025 if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
1027 user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
1030 user_shost = user_host;
1032 sudo_user.host_fqdn_queried = TRUE;
1036 * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as.
1037 * By default, this is "root". Updates runas_pw as a side effect.
1043 if (runas_pw != NULL) {
1044 if (user_runas != &def_runas_default)
1045 return(TRUE); /* don't override -u option */
1049 runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1));
1050 if (runas_pw == NULL) {
1051 runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd));
1052 (void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd));
1053 runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(user + 1);
1056 runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user);
1057 if (runas_pw == NULL)
1058 log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", user);
1064 * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as.
1065 * By default, this is the user invoking sudo. In the most common
1066 * case, this matches sudo_user.pw or runas_pw.
1068 static struct passwd *
1074 if (runas_pw->pw_uid == 0)
1076 else if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
1077 log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!");
1078 } else if (def_runaspw) {
1079 if (strcmp(def_runas_default, *user_runas) == 0)
1081 else if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL)
1082 log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
1084 } else if (def_targetpw) {
1085 if (runas_pw->pw_name == NULL)
1086 log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %lu!",
1087 (unsigned long) runas_pw->pw_uid);
1096 * Tell which options are mutually exclusive and exit.
1099 usage_excl(exit_val)
1102 warnx("Only one of the -e, -h, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used");
1107 * Give usage message and exit.
1114 int linelen, linemax, ulen;
1115 static char *uvec[] = {
1117 #ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
1120 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
1124 " [-u username|#uid]",
1125 " { -e file [...] | -i | -s | <command> }",
1130 * For sudoedit, replace the last entry in the usage vector.
1131 * For sudo, print the secondary usage.
1133 if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) {
1134 /* Replace the last entry in the usage vector. */
1135 for (p = uvec; p[1] != NULL; p++)
1139 fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -K | -L | -V | -h | -k | -l | -v\n",
1144 * Print the main usage and wrap lines as needed.
1145 * Assumes an 80-character wide terminal, which is kind of bogus...
1147 ulen = (int)strlen(getprogname()) + 7;
1149 linelen = linemax - ulen;
1150 printf("usage: %s", getprogname());
1151 for (p = uvec; *p != NULL; p++) {
1152 if (linelen == linemax || (linelen -= strlen(*p)) >= 0) {
1157 printf("\n%*s", ulen, "");